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Reeune of "Tho Piii;;iicica 011(j.arclij'" 
By Gonaalo Garcia 
Tho purpose of thio reaearcli io to cnalyse the oocial, 
economic and p o l i t i c a l organization of the " f i n a n c i a l olicarcliy" 
of Colombia. In the study tho author attenpta to detcriaine 
whether the f i n a n c i a l ollearcliy iu a clasa, a fraction of a 
clasQf an isolated s o c i a l croup, or an i n s t i t u t i o n , Furtherinore, 
he s t r i v e s to determine whether the f i n a n c i a l oliijc;rcliy io part 
of the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s a i t s e l f , ciid i f the f i n a n c i a l oli£iarcliy 
could be a ruling c l a s s or i f the c a i d t a l i c t claos as a whole 
could be considered as the r u l i n g c l a s s . 
In order to present a clearer vicv. of the p o l i t i c a l aiid 
economic role of the financia] tilij^arcliy ~'cho .'jivthor i^tiulins their 
main economic i r i s t i t u t i o n , "the f i n a n c i a l group" to deteri.iinc 
whether i t i s a prlvn,to enterprii^e, a f..niil;i' f i r u , a corporation, 
a monopoly of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s or a coleocence of bcjiking 
and i n d u s t r i a l raoiiopoly associations. Further, the author analyses 
the f i n a n c i a l arid c r e d i t system and tiie function of credit in the 
process of production, i n the reproduction of c a p i t a l and in 
the concentration and centralis;,.!;ion of c a p i t a l . 
I t i s also the attempt of t h i s rosearch to establish 
the location witliin the f i n a n c i a l groups of t-.ic vory top cen, 
and i f - the top finrinciers are a diatixjct breed of men, or i f 
thej' are merely a iniscellaneoua collection of Colombitms. Does 
the f i n a n c i a l olig;.ircby consist of a cross-section of Colombians 
who happen to be succe3;:full, or are tliey a quite uniform s o c i a l 
type which has had exceptional adv..ait..,::os of origin and training? 
How have they climbed to the top le v e l s of Colombian finance 
c a p i t a l ? How hare they maintained t h e i r poaltlona and how 
does Job recruitment take place? 
Studying the s o c i a l mobility of the Colombion f i n a n c i a l 
oligarchy the author derelops two different types of movements* 
The f i r s t * a v e r t i c a l movement, i s moving froia a lov/er occupational 
bacltground to a position i n the f i n a n c i a l oli^arcliy - movement 
out of the occupation of the father, through a succession of 
positions to a position i n the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy* The second, 
a horizontal movement, i s from a f i n a n c i a l background to a position 
i n the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy « movement through a s e r i e s of occupa-
tions withu the intention of establishing i n thei r omi persons 
the position t h e i r father occupied i n the f i n a n c i a l oligarcliy* 
These two movements give r i s e to two main groups t "The mobile 
bligarchy" and "the b i r t h oligarchy". At the saiao time, the 
"mobile f i n a n c i a l oligarchy" can be divided into two groups» "The 
well-bom mobile oligarchy" and "the social-climber mobile oligarchy" 
The "oocial-climber" moves from CUJ occupational baclcground out 
of the c&pitaliat claso or landovji.;jr clasci to a position in the 
f i n a n c i a l olignrcliy, MiH the "well-born" inove fron a ca p i t a l i o t 
( a c r i c u l t u x K l , commerciai and induotrial bourccoitiie) or landowner 
baclcground to a position i n the f i m m c l a l olii!;i:.rclTy, 
The finaJ.ioial c a p i t a l i s controlled b y f i n a n c i a l groups, 
v/hich are conipoued of a linkage of bcjiks, iiicuriiiico coiiipaiiieo, 
f i n a n c i a l corporations, saviiiG« f.uid loaii corporationB, v,-iv.\rchouG?n, 
inveotEiont trusto, doveloci-acnt f i J U K l a , the c.-.ntral bonk vim ^reat 
commercial ajid i n d u s t r i a l enterpriser, . This llulu:ice ±z affected 
i by a small number of I n d l r l d u a l s : top ahareholdera, ciiairmen of 
.; the boards» preaident8» vico-prosidents, ond others, w}io comprise 
•1 • • . 
[ top management. They may thus be said to preside over a combination 
' Of functions and thereby acquire a good measure of control over 
': a s l i o e of capitalism's sphere of operations. 
The.author demonstrates that the separation of ovmership . 
and control i n Colombian f i n a n c i a l oligarchy does not exists In " 
the f i r s t places the managers are verj' often cv.-nersj secondly, 
i even when mangagers are not important shareholders i n t h e i r own 
I groups, they are usually quite wealthy men; thirdlj', they. 
' are mutually interested i n high profits and profitable eoponsion;' 
'I and f ourtlily, the recruitment of managers and shareholders i s 
I predominantly from _the upper s t r a t a of society. 
In conOlusion, the advent of finance c a p i t a l has created 
an ollgarcliy within the c a p i t a l i s t clas.s i t s e l f . The top groupings 
of finance c a p i t a l have constituted c o l l e c t i v e l y the top stratum 
of the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s , and i n e f f e c t , decide policy, acting not j 
simply with_ajiriew of t h e i r own pa r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s but from : 
I t h e i r conception of the interests of their c l a s s as a whole. " 
I The p o l i t i c a l rule of the finance c a p i t a l i s not a matter of 
jabsolute power. I t i s a matter of pursuing class interests i n 
'. conditions of c l a s s struggle on a national and international 
i s c a l e . ' 
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IKTRODUCTION.. 
INTRODUCTION 6 . 
THE PROBLEM 
A socio.-economic study of Colombian 
society must take into account the basic power struc-
ture prevailing i n t h i s societyo Any s c i e n t i f i c i n -
vestigation, whether i t be indigenous, peasant or 
urban, i s part of a wider society, and therefore i s 
affected by powerful pressures, forces, which control 
the tangle of dependency relations of these groups. 
In Colombia t h i s power system i s enforced through a 
minority group, the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy, which cons-
t i t u t e s a very r e a l and effective pressure group. 
From t h i s group emanate the major decisions that per-
petuate the structure of power. 
A. very small c l a s s of people owns a very 
large sharej of the wealth i n Colombia and derives a 
great deal of privileges from that ownership. For 
example, i f we look at the monthly income of the urban 
and r u r a l population we find that while 0.77 per cent 
of the t o t a l population - r u r a l 0.08 per cent, urban 
1.20 per cent - gets more than 10,000.00 pesos per 
month, 71.97 per cent - r u r a l 89.5 per cent, urban 
60.6 per cent - gets l e s s than 1,000 pesos per month. (1) 
The majority of the Colombian population 
has extremely low incomes, especially among r u r a l 
dwellers, where 89.5 per cent get l e s s than 1,000»00 
pesos and only 0.08 per cent recive more than 
IjOOOoOO pesos. (2.) 
There i s also a. great concentration of 
f i n a n c i a l and i n d u s t r i a l resources that perpetuate a. 
small- but powerful s o c i a l class.. In 1970, the fi v e 
largest commercial banks i n the country allegedly 
accounted f o r more than 80 per cent of the c a p i t a l , 
reseznres and p r o f i t s of a l l Co3iombian banks» As of 
1965, nine per cent of the biggest industrial, firmsi 
control almost nine Jenthsi.of the t o t a l national 
i n d u s t r i a l investment, take part i n 75 per cent of 
the national manufacturing production, and paid 82 
per cent of a l l the national i n d u s t r i a l s a l a r i e s ^ (3) 
Ownership of land i n Colombia i s also 
highly concentrated.. Less than four per cent of 
farm properties contain about two thirds.of the readily 
available and cultivable land. (4.) 
Until-now, Colombian education has 
been largely education for the sons., of thi s minority 
c l a s s . Only f i v e per cent of those over, school age 
have completed secondary education and only one per 
cent higher education. (5.) A. study of owners, and man-
agers, of large business enterprises i n Bogota indicated 
that 52; per cent of those questioned had at le a s t 
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attended a university, and only 6 per cent had not 
completed t h e i r secondary education. (6) Approximately 
57 per cent of Colombians 15 years of age and older are 
i l l i t e r a t e . (7) More than half of Colombian primary 
sohools, including the overwhelming majority of the 
schools i n r u r a l areas, do not teach beyond the 
second grade* (8) Such denial of education res -
t r i c t s - access to prestige and s k i l l s for the majority 
of the Colombian population. The a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
education to t h i s minority group, on the other hand, 
provides i t with the i n t e l l e c t u a l tools.and c u l t u r a l 
attributes, necessary to complement i t s power. 
None of the groups within Colombia, 
indigenous, peasant or urban, are isolated from the 
r e s t of society. A l l are interrelated simultaneously, 
with one another and with the whole of society. Hugo 
Burgos writes:, the following: 
The Indians i n Riobamba. probably have 
never been isolated. They have always 
constituted a. part of the whole society. 
Therefore., any study of internal colonial-r 
ism must include something more, than a 
survey of the relations woven among mes-
tizos and Indians. I t must also deal with 
the relations between underdeveloped 
regions populated, by mestizos and Indians 
who are s t i l l l i v i n g under an incipient 
form of capitalism, and more developed 
regions that are. incorporated to a. 
dynamic c a p i t a l i s t process, regions often 
situated at the seashore, and called 
development poles.. The colonial s i t u a -
tion must be studied i n relation to the 
to the global, society, and even more, 
important, i t a dependency on that socl€t5.y 
must be referred, to,. (9j 
Indians, integrants; of a r e l a t i v e l y c l a s a -
l e s s society, are- suffering the d e t r i -
mental actions exerted by internal colon-
ialism, at a. national l e v e l , and by econom;-
i c a l colonialism (imperialism) at an 
international- l e v e l . The mechanisms, 
employed, to divert th e i r natural and 
human resources towards, developed, zones, 
and countriea, deepen ineq.uality and 
desintegration more and more., causing 
great concern to contemporary man* (10) 
Ho s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t can accurately 
analyse a. s o c i a l group and ignore, the. determinant 
factors, of sb.cigi changer-'Or ignore; i t s . dependency 
relations with other groups, with th i s minority class;, 
the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy, and with the general society. 
We know that presently a l l s o c i a l 
groups, i n Colombia are. undergoing rapid change, 
including a rapid process of urbanization. I intend 
to show that without adequate knowledge of the 
structure of the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy i t i s not pos-
s i b l e to understand f u l l y the causal factors, of 
change, within the larger society of Colombia, 
Our Indian groups have been affected 
i n serious ways by "pro-Indian"' or. ""indigenista" 
state, l e g i s l a t i o n and policies- which have rei n f orcedl 
i t s dependency r e l a t i o n s . One example w i l l , i l l u s t r a t e , 
the paternalist content of lawfs; affecting the Indian 
population: 
Indians, are submitted by the present 
law to the condition of minors. (11) 
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, I f we were to investigate peasant. 
grou'pa, we would encounter that the laws pertaining 
to agrarian reform, established i n 1941 (law 135. and 
the Chlicoral Agreement), have) played a major part in. 
dete'rmining the economic structure- of t h i s groupo 
The development of our peasanta i s . 
dependent upon their, access to land, on technical 
assistance and credit f a c i l i t i e s . Who. determines, 
these factora,; and who i s responsible., for managing 
then? What, modifications should be carried out to 
a l t e r them? No analysis of Colombian society would 
be complete i f we ignore these and other related 
aspects such as unemployment, i n f l a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l 
coricuption, economic and s o c i a l inequality and. under.-
development which are. a l l . problems, that affect 
Colombian s o c i a l structure. 
Eicom th i s perspective; i t becomes, 
c r u c i a l to analyse the. role of f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l 
and the s o c i a l group that controls; i t . 
F i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l concentrated i n the. 
hands, of a few, which exert a. v i r t u a l men— 
apo)3y, getsj enormous and ever-growing 
profits,.through the constitution of socie-
ties.; the emission of values;, bonds, state 
loans, etc., strengthen the oligarchy's, 
f i n a n c i a l domination and impo-sea tribute 
on the whole of society, for the benefit 
of the monopoliats. (12; 
A non-economic superstructure based on 
f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l , i t s p o l i t i c s , i t s 
ideology,, supports the tendency to colonial 
I L 
conquests. Financial, c a p i t a l i s not used, 
towards freedom, i t i s a. weapon f o r domina-
tion, as Hi'iferddng so aptly put i t . (13') 
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c feature, of imperialism 
i s precisely that i t tends to annexation, 
not only of agrarian regions, but annexa-
tion of highly industrialized, regions* (14) 
There, i s agreement among Marxists, as well, 
asi many reformists that the principal cause, of Latin 
American and Colombian underdevelopment: i s imperialism. 
But who i s the immediate; enemy, the f i r a t enemy to be 
fought in the revolutionary struggle)? I s the immediate 
enemy imperialism, or is. i t located within Colombian 
society? To. answer these questions, we have to study 
t h i s minority group and how i t interrelates, with imperial.-
ism and with the r e s t of Coilombian society* 
We already know that the upper c l a s a i s 
a minority group with enough power to determine the-
Colombian socio-economical structure* But who- com-
posesj th i s upper c l a s s ? Within th i s minority group, 
who controls more means of production, who has more, 
power., who could be considered the ruling group? 
In 1974, I submitted, to the Department 
of Anthropo'logy, at/.theoUnivefsity of •.•Los Andesf i a 
thesis, entitled. "The Ruling Class, in Colombia", where 
I attempted to show the following points: L) That 
the upper, c l a s s i s divided i n two main classes..;, the. 
high bourgeoisie and the big landlords:; 2) That with-
i n the upper class., there can be found a p l u r a l i t y of. 
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structures; economic, p o l i t i c a l , military and mass.' 
communication structures; 3.) That within the economic 
structure there can be found the following substznictures: 
the i n d u s t r i a l , commercial, fi n a n c i a l , and agrdicultural 
structures;, 4) I also attempted to es.tablish that the 
different structures and subs:tructures of the uppeir 
class, are v e r t i c a l l y s t r a t i f i e d into two superimposed 
sabstructures, the national and the intermediary. The 
national structure, i s to some extent a group interested 
i n the development of national resources whereas, an 
intermedian subatructure.. i s a. group that grows r i c h 
from l i n k s with foreign monopoly c a p i t a l . 
The most important conclusion of the. thesis 
was that the "ruling c l a s s " was. located in the economic 
structure and within t h i s i n the f i n a n c i a l intermediary 
substructure, and therefore, that the financial-oligarchy 
was the immediate intermediary of imperialism and the 
r e s t of the Colombian society.. The imperialist involve-
ment i n Colombia.is baaed pr i n c i p a l l y on a c l i e n t r e l a -
tionship maintained with the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy, while 
the l a t t e r maintains a. similar c l i e n t relationship with 
the landowning c l a s s and with the reat of the Colombian 
bourgeoisie. 
In the:, above thesis, I analysed the 
p o l i t i c a l and the economic power of inancial c a p i t a l , 
but I. did not study the. s o c i a l group that controls i t . 
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I treated i t as an economic force and not as. a social, 
group with i t s own structure.. Therefore the. object of 
the present research i s to analyse the s o c i a l , economic 
and p o l i t i c a l organization of thi s group, the f i n a n c i a l 
oligarchy. 
In order to study the financial, oligar-
chy, we have to determine i f i t i s a c l a s s , a. fraction 
of a. class., an isolated s o c i a l group or an i n s t i t u t i o n * 
We must dtermine, furthermore, whether the " f i n a n c i a l 
oligarchy" i s part of the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s ^ i t s e l f , and 
i f the " f i n a n c i a l oligarchy" could be. a. ruling c l a s a 
or i f only the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s as a whole could be. 
considered as the "ruling class".. 
TJO understand the i r economic and p o l i t i c a l 
role we have to study t h e i r main economic i n s t i t u t i o n , 
"the Financial-Group", V/e have to determine i f i t i a 
a. private enterprise, a. family firm, a. corporation, a 
monopoly of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s or a coalescence of 
banking and i n d u s t r i a l monO-poly associations. We have 
to analyse the f i n a n c i a l and credit system and the role 
of credit, i n the processes of production, reproduction 
of c a p i t a l and concentration of c a p i t a l . 
Another important question i s the locaf-
tion within the f i n a n c i a l groups of the very top. men, 
the leaders who. order and control its> vast operations. 
14, 
Are; a l l owners, and managera of the f i n a n c i a l groups-
part of. the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy, or i s there a f i n a n c i a l 
corporate, hierarchy? Do they represent a cross-section 
of Colombians who happen to be successful or are they 
a quite uniform s o c i a l type which has had exceptional, 
advantages, of origin and training? How have they r i s e n 
to the top l e v e l s of Colombian finance c a p i t a l ? How 
have they maintained t h e i r positions and how does, 
recruitment take place? 
She: Colombian upper class; arguea that 
f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l i s not controlled by a. handful of 
magnates.* I t i s argued that the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy 
i s divided into two irreconcilea^le: factions: the.' 
owner of c a p i t a l (the sharehaider:)) and the Cjontroller 
of the corporation (the manager)o. I t i s claimed that 
ccntrol. by a.small group of dominant shareholders i s 
not presently important^ and that control i s exercised 
by a. professional management cl a s s which i s not i t s e l f , 
i n control of ownership. Therefore, one main cbjective. 
of our present work i s to analyse the relationship 
between ownership and control i n the f i n a n c i a l groups: 
a) to determine i f ownership and control are in the 
hands of the same people and, 
b) to determine what are the interests, of manager and 
of owner and whe.ther these interests d i f f e r . 
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HESEABCH METHOD 
Eor the analysis; of peasant, or urban 
societtiea,; traditional, anthropological techniquea of. 
research are not adequate., and anthropologists w i l l 
have t'o borrow techniques, that, to date., have, belonged 
to other s o c i a l sclencea. Anthropologists, have to 
consider the p o s s i b i l i t y of using i n their invesAiga^-
tiona, s t a t i s t i c a l - analysis and ether sourcea of 
information such as:, newapapesa, magazines, radio, 
movies; and televisiono. If. i t i s necessary, they have; 
to apply other models., of analysis, even i f they were 
developed by economic and p o l i t i c a l sciences.. Anthrc-
pologista may find i t indispensable to employ computers., 
mathematical-models, or different systems, of. interviewingo 
Eor the: analysia of any of the aocial. 
groups we must understand the society'a framework and 
the inter-relationships of these s o c i a l groups,. We 
must know how to handle concepts, such as National. Develop.-
ment. I n f l a t i o n , Economic Growth, Unemployment, Devaluais 
tion. External. Dependency, Clasa Struggle, Balance of 
Payments, Gross National Product, etc a An anthropologist 
should havei s u f f i c i e n t knowledge, of these concepts i n 
order to develop models of analysia that w i l l e.valuatej 
the economic and p o l i t i c a l power of the "Financial 
Oligarchy" and therefore define how i t affec t a national 
society. 
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In order to analyse, the structure, of. 
the. Calombian "financial. Oligarchy" the present research 
proceeds, the following steps: 
a) l i b r a r y research; 
b.) Documental and atatis-tical informa;-
tion on the most important, f i n a n c i a l 
enterprisea; 
c ) Eesearch at govemmental and other 
centers., of s t a t i s t i c a l information; 
d.) Personal interviews with persons, whc 
excercisa control over f i n a n c i a l 
resources: or are closely acquainted 
with the f i n a n c i a l groups. 
a.) LIBRARY RESEARCH 
Research on general concepts, which are 
important to determine the methods, of research and. the 
theoretical background.. 
1. The different theories; i n the; i n t e r -
pretation of the concept of "ruling 
class?'. 
2v The function of credit i n the repro-
duction of capital.. 
3., The function of credit i n the procesa 
of concentration and centr^liaation 
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of capital,. 
4» Different typea of Financial 
Institutions,. 
5,. F i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l 
6. Monopolization 
7. The difference: be.tween ownership and 
control. 
8. Different systems of interview 
9. The concept of c l a s s 
10, Social mobility 
11, Structure, of. dependency 
12. Education i n CoOiombia 
13. Analysis, of foreign and national loans 
14, National distribution of income 
15. F i n a n c i a l groups 
16,. The State, and the "Ruling Class." 
17,= Social, s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
18 » Historical, materialism 
19. - Jlgrarian struc.tu£,e.i r?.:.i.'.. 1 ] . 
20, M l i t a r y structure 
b) EESEAECH OF DOCUMENTS AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION 
ON THE MOST IMPORTANT FINANCIAI INSTITUTIONS. 
The Colombian f i n a n c i a l atructure. covera 
a very complex: system of private.-, o f f i c i a l and semi;-
private.' organizations.: 
lo. Privately owned commercial, banks 
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2.. Eoreign commercial banka 
3.. Goveinment owned commercial banks; 
4. Insurance, companies; 
5» Warehouses 
6), Investment trust a 
7* Finance corporations. 
8» Savings, and loan corporations. 
9» Other credit, sources/ 
c.) GOVERMENTAL AED PRI7ATE CENTERS OP STATISTICAL 
IHPORMATIOIT 
1.. DAME National Department of 
S t a t i s t i c a l Analysis 
2.. The BANK DE LA REPUBLICA. 
3. The Chamber of Commerce 
4;.. The Ministry of Agriculture, 
' 5. The Ministry of Development 
6.. The Banking Association 
7.- The Department of National Planning 
Q, The National Coffee Federation 
d) PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONS WHO CONTROL 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
% field-work covered a i period of one. 
year and seven months and included 150 interviews, of 
peraons involved or c l a s e l y acquainted with f i n a n c i a l 
l a 
and imdixstrial- enterprises:: 1,. Members of boards of: 
directors; 2:, Presidents, and vice-presidents; 5» Share-
holders; and 4;,. Managera of departments* 
The research took place: i n Bogotil 
since the capitaX is . the focus of economic concentration, 
and where the management of the most important financial., 
i n d u s t r i a l and agricul.turai enterprises, are found.. In 
ether. Colombian c i t i e s , there, are only branches of the 
principal, enterprises» 
Ini order to carry out interviews 
among the "Financial Oligarchy", the researcher must 
off e r a very good reason, for example, propose an 
interchange: of business; or. publicity f o r the. i n t e r -
view,. If. the researcher, does, net have such a reason, 
he must create one; otherwise he w i l l not receive an 
appointment, a s "'time i s gold and the company will-
lose money i f i t s manager gets involved i n an unimportant 
matter".. In my case, I used, my .^ ob i n "Almacenar"' 
(a warehouse belonging to the Bank, of Commerce and. the 
Bank of Colombia) a s an excuse to interview most of. 
the men. To the people that I could not find any 
business, excuse to discuss with, I had t e s t a t e that. 
I was. writing a book about "the most, important- peoples 
i n Coilombia",. To.: prove t h i s I had to show. them, a 
l e t t e r from the "Latin American Publishing House", 
saying that they were going to publish the book,. In 
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any event, I had to cover up my r e a l purpose in order 
to obtain the interviewa.. 
Warehousea are part of the f i n a n c i a l 
atructure. Warehouses i n Colombia are simply branches 
of the commercial banks* In general, their functions 
are to receive goods in commission and to give back 
security bonds which are discounted by commercial banka 
and f i n a n c i a l corporations* A security bond i s a credit 
i n which the merchandise acts as a. guarantee* Working 
in "Almacenaru" gave me an excellent opportunity t a 
observe the. banking system^ i t s importance, in the 
economic structure, and the people who control i t . 
Another c r u c i a l aspect which helped 
my research i s that I worked, in "Almacenar" as a. manager 
of the Public Relations. Department, i n which my role 
was to:' increase, the deposits: of goods within the ware.-
house and the; purchase of security bonds;* Therefore I 
had to deal with c l i e n t a who were.* industrialists., a g r i -
culturalists;, etc., and with bankers... In other, v/ords, 
I offered, banking credit in order, to obtain merchandise 
in deposits for which the company charged a. monthly 
r e n t a l fee. 
When I started my field, work i thought 
I could do the interviews with a very concretely written 
•yes.^no' questionnaire. I made, f i v e different typea de.-
pending on t h e i r position i n the "Financial Oligarchy". 
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The questions, were, direct and short., so I could analyse 
them i n a con^uter. The questionnaires could be- answered 
i n 50 minutes. I t seemed., at the time, a. very e f f i c i e n t 
system, easy to administer and easy to analyses 
When. I tlxaX sought, appointments I 
used to state, my exact purpose for the interview,. I 
spent three months, and only obtained, seven interviews 
and completed five: queationnairea<. I t was a complete 
failure,. Nobody was interested in collaborating with 
the research.- I then decided, to devise a new s:trategy» 
I had to "se.H" them the idea* I t had to have some, 
value: or. i n t e r e s t for them,. That was the reason why. 
I had to use my job as an excuse., and I had to cover 
up the subject of the. research,. 
problems: 
In sum, I enccuntered. the following 
1,. I. did not interview gratia* I 
exchanged, i t f o r publicity, credit, etc; 
2., I disquiaed my status, as a student, 
as they are not interested, in a univer-
s i t y experiment. They belie.ve. "They 
was.te time with immature people whose; 
purpose i s to copy thieir knowledge of 
experience and not to offer them some.-
thing economically valuable"; (15) 
3. During the interviews I assumed the 
0 
role of an economist; and not an 'Anthro-
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pologist'. They relate. Anthropology 
and Sociology with revolution, p o l i t i -
c a l conflicts., violence, c l a s a s.truggle, 
etc.; 
4* I could use nc system of recording 
during the interviews, and therefore 
waa forced to memorize the data. They 
were afraid, of being quoted! and thua 
of beings p o l i t i c a l l y compromised. 
For them, direct questions, meant 
concrete answer a and therefore chasing 
between contradictory alternatives, 
s p e c i a l l y with questions, re l a t i n g toi 
politics.. They consider themselves to 
be non-politicians and attempt to avoid, 
compromising themselves with either the 
conservative, or the l i b e r a l parties. 
Their reaponsea are thus biased towarda 
the ideals of the pa r t i c u l a r party tliat 
happens, to be i n power? 
6* Their need, to be. treated, as though 
they are; "uniq.ue" negated the use. of 
standardised, procedures and a. formal 
interviewing technique, such aa ques-
tionnaires. 
7. In order to get. an intervie.w at a l l , 
I had to assume the appearance of a 
member from their own rank. This, i n -
volved, wearing special- clothes., pretending 
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to share, certain values, and opinions 
and to favour pa r t i c u l a r trends, especial-
l y of a p o l i t i c a l nature. In ether 
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CHAPTER I 
CLASS. RULING CLASS AND FINANCIAL OLIGAECHT 
27: 
Before gertting involved i n the s-tudy 
of Celombian f i n a n c i a l oligarchy we have, to de;termine; i f 
the: " f i n a n c i a l Oligarchy" i s a clasa,; a fraction, of a 
class,, an i s o l a t e d a o c i a l group, or an i n s t i t u t i o n . I s 
the ffin'ancial oligarchy"' p a r t of the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s , 
or. is., i t the. c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s i t s e l f ? I s the " f i n a n c i a l 
0-ligarchy"a. "ruling c l a s s " , or can only the c a p i t a l i s t 
c l a s s as. a. whole be considered, as the "ruling c l a s s " ? 
In order to c l a r i f y the meaning of. 
"f i n a n c i a l oligarchy", I outline two basic a l l y opposed 
points; of view: Marxism, and l i b e r a l democracy. The 
former accepts the existence of the "fin a n c i a l oligarchy" -
since i t i s a concept created, by Marxists. — and the l a t t e r 
denies i t s e3d.stence* I must necessarily simplify both 
approaches* I cannot deal with the many s l i g h t l y different 
interpretations i n each - Marxism and l i b e r a l democracy -
since my aim i s primarily to outline the basic stance of 
each. I t . i s important to nete that a l l finance men i n t e r -
viewed agreed with the " l i b e r a l democracy" approach. 
THE CONCEPT OF CLASS 
Each s o c i a l formation could best, be 
understood by studying t h e i r mode of production - the 
way i n which men get their l i v i n g , combining the "produc-
tive forces or technology and the relationships they enter 
into i n earning the i r l i v i n g , which Marx actually 
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cal l e d the "'production relations." or"economic struc-
ture." ( 1 ) * Upon this base i s bu i l t the superstructure 
of p o l i t i c a l and legal forma. Ideas, men'a consciousness 
of their^ lives., were to be understood not as, creating, 
but. as. emerging from these s.tructures - pas.t as. w e l l aa 
present and including those that formed nuclei for the 
future* 
The conce;pt of '*basis"^ and "super-
structure-" should not lead to the notion that society 
i s l i k e a building of which f i r s t the economic founda-
tions, must be l a i d , to be followed by the "superstruc-
ture", one flo o r succeeding the next a l l the way up to^ 
the roof. P o l i t i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l production does 
not follow material production in the l i n e a l way but, 
occurs simultaneously and in constant.interaction 
with i t * What, emerges aa the "superstructure" i s a 
t o t a l i t y of prescriptions and prohibitions., laws, 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , judgments, and prejudicies. which corres-
pond to the economic structure of society. 
Classes, are. distinguished by the 
different places, they occupy in the system of s o c i a l 
production, by thei r different relationships to the 
means, of production (2 ) , and by the different methods 
whereby they acquire a share of the. s o c i a l wealth* 
This i s how Marxists, have always, understood the d i s t i n c -
tion between classes.. 
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Marxists define capitalism as a 
system i n which the great majority of people own no 
means of production but work for wageSi and s a l a r i e s , 
and i n which the owners of the means of production 
- the c a p i t a l i s t class. - acquire wealth in the form of 
profits, made out of the labour of the majority. In 
t h i s system the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s i s the "ruling c l a s s " , 
because i t i s . able to control and direct the resources 
of s o c i a l production for i t s : own p r o f i t . 
Those who c o l l e c t i v e l y constitute 
the owners have a different c l a s s interest from those: 
who c o l l e c t i v e l y must s e l l t h e i r a b i l i t y for work to 
these owners. Divided c l a s a interests, do not a r i s e 
from one c a p i t a l i s t being benevolent and another 
intolerant; or one firm being run by managers preferring 
s o c i a l peace and another by an old fashioned boss 
wielding the big s t i c k . On the contrary, organizations 
such as the National I n d u s t r i a l Association "ANDI", 
National Agricultural Association and National Coffee 
Federation, have come into being precisely because, 
they represent a. common cla s s i n t e r e s t , whatever d i f -
ferences may a r i s e on how best to pursue that in t e r e s t . 
On the other hand, the trade union movement, with a l l 
i t s . divisions and contradictions, has come into being, 
aa an expression of the common cl a s s interest of a l l 
those who must s e l l t h e i r labour power. 
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The f a c t that the c a p i t a l i s t 
iJilass 1^ -cpmpAsejd ":.c[f ;grjOupings very often competing 
both on a national and international scale does. not. 
abolish t h e i r common cl a s s interest. They may d i f f e r 
on what mixture of concession or repression they are 
to pursue i n relat i o n to the working class movement; 
they may d i f f e r on the best means of containing 
Colombian socialism or the National Liberation Movements., 
but they experience, a common need to preserve their 
c l a s s positions. Moreover, the very points on which 
they d i f f e r express the i r common class nature. There 
i s no c a p i t a l i s t grouping i n the world which does not 
s t r i v e continuously to maximise, i t s p r o f i t s , to find 
spheres for investment at profitable rates., to exploit 
underdeveloped t e r r i t o r i e s and to li m i t the apheres 
of wording c l a s s organizations. The pursuit of such a 
aims may well bring about severe conflicts- between 
them, but i n c o n f l i c t they only express their common 
nature.. 
Identity of revenues, or of 
economic l i v i n g conditions i s . not s u f f i c i e n t to 
constitute a s o c i a l group as. a class in the f u l l , 
sense of the word. A passive identity such as t h i s , 
a community of intere s t dectated by destiny only, may 
be; defined as. a "class i n i t s e l f " (Hegelian terminology); 
i t becomes, a "class for i t s e l f " ' only through a. series, 
of further determining circumstances., among which 
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Marx counts the transcending of l o c a l limitations, 
such as the individual factory, the indvidual conir-
munity, the individual country - in other worda, 
associations and universality, the co-ordination and 
organization made possible thereby, the conscious 
opposition of the interests, of one's, own c l a s s to 
that of other classes, resistance, action, and the; 
c l a s s struggle. 
. CAPITALIST CLASS AND EULHTG CLASS 
When Marxists; say that "the capitalis-t 
class, i s the Ruling Class.", they are refering, i n a 
very general way, to the strongest s o c i a l forces that, 
produce, the greatest antagonism i n a c a p i t a l i s t mode 
of production. In th i s sense the c a p i t a l i s t as. a 
whole i s the "ruling class".. 
' Our e.pQch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, 
possesses,, however, this, distinctive, 
feature.: i t has simplified the c l a s s 
antagonisms.. Society as a. whole i s 
more and more s p l i t t i n g up into two 
great hostile camps, into two great 
classes d i r e c t l y facing each other: 
Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.. (3) 
But i f we. are carrying out a. conereta 
analysis, l i k e i n the case of Colombian c a p i t a l i s t c l a s a , 
t h i s statement i s an over-simplification of the c l a s a 
structure... We can not overlook the multitude of middle, 
and intermediate class.esi. We have to take account of 
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the d i v e r s i t y within society and to define more c l e a r l y 
the s p e c i a l characteristics; of the most important classes, 
Every antagonistic society consists, of principal and 
secondary classes.. The pri n c i p a l c l a s s e a are the claaaea 
whose inter - r e l a t i o n s de^termine the essence, of the made-
of production. The secondary claas.ea are those, which 
are related to economic sectors, that have survived from 
a. previous mode of production or emerged on to the 
existing system. There are also various; s o c i a l s t r a t a 
or s o c i a l groups, which hold some intermediate position, 
between the princi p a l and the secondary clas s e s . 
The p r i n c i p a l classes i n a. capitaliat. 
society are the bourgeoisie and the prolet a r i a t . Capitai-
l i s t society tends to s.tratify more and more intensively 
into the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.- This procesa 
began with the emergence of capitalism. But thi s 
procesa of polarisation does not lead to the extinction 
of the middle classes; or the complete homogenization of 
the p r i n c i p a l classes.. Indeed, Marxism says, that c a p i t a l -
ism tends, to ruin small and medium producers- But while, 
capitalism dooms the vast majority of them, i t promotea 
the emergence of new onea. This, process takes place 
as., a. r e s u l t of the operation of the internal law of 
capitalism; concentration and centralization of capital, 
i n the hands of a few, through competition (4)» 
No class., however, i s homogeneoua, 
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the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s no more than the working c l a s s * 
The bourgeoisie as., a class., aould be divided into, 
different factions or groupa, such aa: the agricultural, 
commercial, industrial.and financial, bourgeoisie, 
depending on t h e i r economic activity.. They may be 
small, medium, big or monopolist c a p i t a l i s t s , dapending 
on the rate of concentration and centralization of 
capitals They may be a "national" or "comprador" 
bourgeoisie: The former, i s , to some extent, intereste'd. 
i n . the development of the national economy, the l a t t e r 
grows r i c h from li n k s with foreign monopoly c a p i t a l . 
The c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s i t s e l f , , at a certain time, could 
be sharing power with the landownera^ 
I f we consider the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s a 
homogeneous, we would have to define i t aa an immutable 
aad monolithic s o c i a l formation. We would have to 
deny the process of concentration and centralization 
of capital.. And t h i s would be l i k e saying that a l l . 
the c a p i t a l i s t s share the same power, have the same 
control over the means of production and have the 
same economic and s o c i a l function. This would be 
rather absurd, at l e a s t in the case of Colombian 
society, as we. s h a l l see in the following chaptera* 
RULIKG CLASS AND FINAITCIAL OLIGARCHY 
Colombians have in r.ecent yeara. 
frequently used the word "oligarquia" (oligarchy) 
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to designate th e i r "Ruling Class", The term waa 
popularized by Jorge E l i e c e r Gaitan, a. lefteat. p o l i t i -
c a l leader, and has since: been employed as a term of 
opprobrium by the p o l i t i c a l l e f t and even, on occaaion, 
by conservatives, who have sometimes meant by i t the 
rule of l i b e r a l c a p i t a l i s t s , . In the Marxist scheme, 
the term "oligarchy" i s a. j u s t i f i a b l e one to the extent 
that the Colombian Ruling Class i s substantially a. 
self-perpetuating minority i n control of the key pcwer. 
resources of society-
In the Marxist scheme, the development-
of banking monopolies waa the re s u l t of high concentration 
and centralization of banking and cognate c a p i t a l which 
resulted from the concentration of production. I t caused 
more and more free money c a p i t a l to be deposited i n the 
banks, and the enlargement of production led to the 
growth of the proportion of borrowed funds i n the sum 
t o t a l of c a p i t a l functioning in industry. Big enter-
prises needed large c r e d i t s , which also promoted the 
enlargement of banks and f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The formation of i n d u s t r i a l and 
banking monopolies has changed the relationship be-tween 
banks and i n d u s t r i a l enterprises. Banking monopolies 
na longer confine themselves to providing credit, they 
penetrate into industry. The banks, buy shares i n 
i n d u s t r i a l companies, lend them money against securities^, 
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and participate in the organization of the new i n d u s t r i a l 
enterprises.. 
While banking monopolies, penetrate 
into industry i n d u s t r i a l nonopolies penetrate into 
banking. Thus, i n d u s t r i a l monopolies, buy up the shares 
i n big banks, and sometimes, even open their own banks. 
This nesults i n close ties> between 
i n d u s t r i a l and banking monopolies. Their intereats 
are closely interwoven. This i s . strengthened, by the 
personal l i n k s of monopolist bankers, and the monopolist: 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t : Bank directora hold key positions in^ 
i n d u s t r i a l enterprises, and company directors from industry 
i n banks... 
The interweaving and coalescence 
of bank and industry lead to the formation of finance, 
c a p i t a l . Lenin described finance, c a p i t a l aa follows: 
" . . . finance, c a p i t a l i s the bank ca p i t a l of a few. 
very big monopolist banks, merged, with the c a p i t a l of 
the monopolist associations, of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s .. . ."(5). 
The formation of finance capital, leads 
to the emergence, of a. new. type of monopoly, to the . 
emergence, of a. new type of c a p i t a l , which i s "particular-
l y mobile and f l e x i b l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y interknit at home 
and internationally, and p a r t i c u l a r l y impersonal and 
divorced from production proper; i t lends, i t s e l f to 
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concentration with par t i c u l a r ease, arid has been 
concentrated to an unusual degree already" (S.)* 
The "financial, dligarchy", a. s p e c i a l 
kind of monopoly association, refiLects; the coalescence 
of. bank.and i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l . I t . i s a. method by which 
a. handful of f i n a n c i a l magnates, can establish and extend 
t h e i r rule over a. vast number of i n d u s t r i a l , financial, 
and other enterprises, taking in a l l the aspects, of 
modem c a p i t a l i s t economy. This '.'financial oligarchy", 
though remarkably interlocked as we s h a l l see, and 
though keenly aware that they must preserve the appear-
ance of unity, nevertheless j o s t l e each other and even 
ress-form themselves, into new groups. 
THE REPUTATION OF THE CONCEPT OP RULING CLASS 
In opposition of the Marxist view, 
the theorists of " l i b e r a l democracy"' or democtatic 
pluralism" have denied that i t i s possible to speak 
in a r e a l l y meaningful way of a dominant class, or 
"Ruling Class-" at a l l , and that such economic power 
as could be located i n c a p i t a l i s t society was. diffuse, 
fragmented, competitive, and so much subject to a. 
multitude of countervailing checks as to render-
impossible i t s hegemonic assertion "vis-avia" the 
socie.ty.. They refe r to a. p l u r a l i t y of competing 
p o l i t i c a l and other e l i t e s , incapable by the very 
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f a c t of t h e i r competitive p l u r a l i t y , t h e i r lack of. 
cohesion and common purpose, of forming strong dominant 
c l a s s of any kind.- "Everybody, d i r e c t l y of through 
organized-groups, has some degree of power but. nobody 
has or can have too much of i t . . The f r i c t i o n s and 
balance between the different groups, that form Colombian 
society are the supreme safeguard of our''democracy'. 
No group can stand i n the center, for there i s no 
center" ( 7 ) . In the words; of a leading exponent of 
the "democratic pluralism" view., capitalism i s a. p o l i t i -
c a l system i n which " a l l the active and legitimate 
groups i n the population can make themselves heard at. 
some c r u c i a l stage i n the process of decision" ( 8 ) . 
I t : i s of course, true, that many 
of those who uphold the view of "democratic pluralism" 
agree, that there are e l i t e s i n different economic, 
s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , administrative, military, religious, 
professional and other pyramids of pcwer, but. then 
maintain that they lack the degree of cohesion required 
to turn them into a dominant or "ruling c l a s s " . In 
f a c t , "democratic pluralism", with the competition i t ; 
entails, between different groups, is. i t s e l f a. prime 
quarantee that power i n society w i l l be diffused and 
not concentrated. This view precludes a. c r i t i c a l 
attitude to t h i s or that aapect of the improvement 
and strengthening of a. system whose basi c a l l y "democratic" 
and desirable character i s held to be sol i d l y esta-
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blished, V/hile there may be a. good deal that i s 
wrong with them, there are already "democratic" 
societies., to which the notion of "ruling class'" i s 
absurdly i r r e l e v a n t . 
To conjure: up different domains,;; 
the economic, the p o l i t i c a l , the military, the adminis.trar-
tive., the professional, etc.., and to put them more or. 
l e s s on an equal footing, interacting according to the 
needs, of a. p a r t i c u l a r society, i a to build a atructure 
i n the a i r , not on the s o l i d ground of the nature of 
that society. Such theory s t a r t s with i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
not c l a s s e s . I t looks for "power groups", not for. the 
claas i n t e r e s t s that auch groups come into being to 
serve. 
In r e l a t i o n to monopoly doniination, 
some of these "democratic p l u r a l i s t s " maintain that 
monopoly mitigates and even ends the antagonism within 
socifety,io PJomnthesecpremisea, they draw the conclusion 
that "monopoly" should not be fought, but supported.* 
Some of the bourgeois theories counterpose monopoly 
ibo competition, and some of them take t h i s further 
and maintain that monopolies are ending competition, 
while others i n s i s t that competition remains, so i t 
would be wrong to speak of monopoly domination. They 
say that there are only two alternativea:. "pure 
monopoly" - the t o t a l monopolisation of a branch by 
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a. single firm, "or pure competition"* Since the. 
t o t a l monopolisation by a, single fia?m of a. whole branch 
i s extremely rare., they assert that there i s no.-
monojp.oly rule: and that modem capitalism continues 
to be, a. "free enterprise.. s.ystem"» 
7/ith regard to f i n a n c i a l capital., 
some of the bourgeois, ideologists give prominence: 
to the theory of the s e l f - l i q u i d a t i o n of financial, 
c a p i t a l by the severing of the lin k s between the banks, 
and the i n d u s t r i a l companies. Many modem ideologists! 
of monopoly maintain that the "financial oligarchy" 
has. disappeared.. I t i s alleged, to have, "'dissolved." 
under the influence: of the"democratisation of capital"" 
and the "managerial revolution". These pro^)onenta say 
that managers, are replacing and abolishing the f i n a n c i a l 
oligarchy and promoting the emergence of a new type of. 
capitalism, "people's capitalism, humanitarian capitalism", 
The concept of "neo-capitalism" or 
"peoplei'js. capitalism"' includes, a number of postulates 
- on the revolution i n ownership, production management, 
income and the role of the State - with the conclusion 
that modem capitalism differs, r a d i c a l l y from the 
capitalism of the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
The concept of "democratisation of 
c a p i t a l " i s one of the main p i l l a r s , of the theory of. 
"neo-capitalism". I t says., that the s.pread of j o i n t -
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atock companies^ and that the wide distribution of 
shares, among the papulation mean c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n of 
prcperty, that every shareholder, however small, 
becomea a. profit-making co-owner of c a p i t a l . I t 
interprets; ownership as., a formal right to income.. 
Therefore, they de.pict the distribution of shares, 
among the population aa "diffusion of ownership". 
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NOTES 
1,. The productive, forces; and the relat i o n of production 
form an indissoluble whole.,. This unity of the. produc-
ti v e forces, and the relations of production i a the. 
"Mode of Production", Toge.ther, the material and 
personal factors, of the production process form the 
"Productive. Poree. of Society",. The material, factors, 
are "the means of production" and the personal ones, 
are the working people v/ho operate the "means of 
production",. The productive forces, are only one aspect 
of the production process,- The "relations of produc-
tion" are. the other aspect. In the process of pro-
duction people act on nature, and at the same time 
enter into definite relations with one another. "They 
produce, only by co.-operating in a certain way and 
mutually exchanging t h e i r activities.", Marx, wrote.', 
"In order to produce, they enter into definite connec-
tions and relations with one another and only within 
these s o c i a l connections and relations does their 
actioni on nature, does, production, take place"* (K, Marx 
and P» Engels, Selected. Works, 1970,. Harcourt and Brace 
New York, Vol,. 1, pg, 159)• The s o c i a l connections, 
and relations which people establish i n the courae 
of production are, called, "the relations of production"* 
I* The things, which are subjected to man's labour are 
called, the "objecta of labor". They may be. found, i n 
nature,; l i k e , for instance, the ores extracted from 
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the bowels of the earth, or they m^ already have-
been worked upon, i n which case they are called, raw. 
materials* As. science and technology develap, the 
range of these cbjects: of labour, expands and new. uses 
f o r them are: discovered.. The means, of labour are. 
things, people use upon the objects- of labour, to change 
them to s a t i s f y t h e i r needS:,. They include the tools, 
land, roads.,, production buildings, a l l these things 
that are needed, for that labour process... Among a l l 
the means of. labour, the tools, or instruments, of 
labour, s p e c i a l l y the machine, eta., are. by f a r the 
most important.. Aa Marx said, they are the bone and 
muscle of production* The objects of labour and the. 
means of labour taken together constitute, the- "Means 
of• Production", the material factor of the production, 
process* 
%. MAlIffESTO OP THE C.OMMMIST PARTY, Progress Publishers, 
Moscow, 1952, pg, 40*. 
4. "Every individual capital, i s a. large- or smaller 
concentration of the means of production, giving 
command over a. large or smaller .army of workers* 
Every accumulation becomes the means of new accumulation* 
As. the mass, of wealth which functions as. capital, 
increases, there goes, on an increasing concentration 
of *hat wealth i n the hands, of individual c a p i t a l i s t s , 
•.•:• ... iwith a. resultant widening of the basis, of large-scale 
production and of the apecific methods of c a p i t a l i s t 
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production,. The growth of social- c a p i t a l i s . affe.cted. 
by the growth of many individual- c a p i t a l i s t s ,, . , 
two paints, characterise t h i a kind of c^G;oncentra.tioni 
which i s d i r e c t l y dependent upon accumulation, or., 
rather i d e n t i c a l , with i t . P i r s t of a l l , the increasing 
concentration of the s o c i a l means, of production into 
the handa of individual capitals., i a , other conditions, 
being equal, r e s t r i c t e d by the extent of s o c i a l wealth* 
In the second place:, the part of s o c i a l capital, domiciled 
i n each particular sphere of production i a divided 
among many c a p i t a l i s t s , who face, one another aa 
independent commodity producers competing one with 
another , , . This s p l i t t i n g up of social, capital, into 
a. number of individual c a p i t a l s , or the repulsion of 
i t s fragments, one by another, (Marx here has i n mind 
the d i v i s i o n of property), i s counteracted, by their, 
a t t r a c t i o n * The l a t t e r i s not simply a. concentration 
of the means of production and command over labor 
i d e n t i c a l with accumulation of already formed capitals, 
the destruction of t h e i r individual independence, the. 
expropriation of c a p i t a l i s t by c a p i t a l i s t , the trans.-
mation of many small c a p i t a l s into a. few large ones... 
This process i s distinguished from simple accumulation 
by t h i s , that i t involves, nothing more than a. change 
i n the distribution of capitals that already exist 
and already are at work . . . c a p i t a l aggregates., into 
great masses i n one hand because, else where, i t i a 
taken out of my handa.. Here, we have; genuine c e n t r a l i z a -
tion i n contradistinction to accumulation and concentra^ 
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tionl'* (Capital, Vol.. I . Pg.. 691). 
5* V. I . Lenin, COLLECTED WORKS, vol.. 22^ pg. 2.66. 
6* Ibid., pg. 105, 
7. Personal interview with Sr. Alfredo Holgin, v i c e -
president of Banco de: Colombia, Bogotd, December 1970, 
8* R. A. Dahl, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC. THEORY, Vintage 
Press, 1965;, pp* 137-8* 
CHAPTER I I 
THE CREDIT SYSTEM MB THE IIKMOIAL lUSTITUTIOITS 
THE CBEDIT SYSTEM 
The f i n a n c i a l and cr e d i t system of 
a. country reats. on the process of production and the. 
exchange that goea with i t , through which takes, place. 
the reproduction of c a p i t a l . In t h i s process, the f i n a n -
c i a l and c r e d i t system plays an active., and not a passive, 
role., I t i s not simply a piece, of machinery f o r ensuring 
ef f e c t i v e supply and c i r c u l a t i o n of money and c r e d i t , any 
more, than the system of production i s simply a mechanism 
f o r producing goods f o r the needs, of the people» Both 
are part of a. single system o f . c a p i t a l i s t production, 
d i s t r i b u t i o n and exchange.. 
Under capitalism, the. f i n a n c i a l and. 
cr e d i t system i s p r i v a t e l y owned.. And. because the 
entire system of pradudstipnomust.make use of i t , t h i a 
bestows, great power and influence, on the main f i n a n c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n a . I t i s their, integration with decisive 
branches, of industry and trade which constitutes finance 
capital.. 
In order to understand the role of 
the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , the.financial groups, and. 
the. finance; c a p i t a l i n the Colombian economic structure, 
we have, to analyze the function of cre d i t i n the process 
of production and i n the process of reproduction of cap i t a l , 
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lOM CAPITAL',' NATUEE., SOURCES- AND DTTEREST 
Loan c a p i t a l i s a separate, and 
: transmuted part and form of i n d u s t r i a l , c a p i t a l . I t i s 
money c a p i t a l loaned by i t s owner f o r a. f i x e d period 
of t i ^ e and i s paid f o r a d e f i n i t e consideration knovm. 
as i n t e r e s t * Loan c a p i t a l i s not money that i s lent 
to another person, but an economic r e l a t i o n between 
the creditor and the. debtor» 
The main sources, of loan c a p i t a l 
are: money c a p i t a l temporarily free, i n the various 
indus t r i e s (depreciation, temporarily free working 
capital-), part of the surplus value, of enterprises, 
i n cash;; the papulation's saving and incomes, concen-
trated i n banks; free funds i n the State budget, 
pension and insurance, funds, etCo. Functioning capitalists. 
(1) are the main consumer of. laan c a p i t a l . 
In the hands, of i t s . owner the money 
earmarSed. f o r lending becomes, a specific commodity (2) 
- c a p i t a l - which i s sold f o r a d e f i n i t e period to the 
functioning c a p i t a l i s t . This commodity i s useful to. 
the c a p i t a l i s t because of his. a b i l i t y to bring i n a. p r o f i t , 
i n excess of the payment he makes, f o r the use of that 
c a p i t a l . The payment f o r the use of that c a p i t a l is. 
called " i n t e r e s t " and i s part of the average.: p r o f i t 
derived, from the functioning c a p i t a l i s t on that c a p i t a l . 
The other part of the p r o f i t i s kept by the functioning 
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c a p i t a l i s t and i s called a " p r o f i t of enterprise". In 
the course of movement of loan c a p i t a l , the interest 
i s presented as. the r e s u l t of the self-expansion of money, 
.The p r o f i t of enterprise, i s then disguised as a "payment 
f o r supervision" and the bourgeois economists i d e n t i f y 
i t w i t h wage... But both the interest and the p r o f i t of 
enterprise are i n f a c t variants of surplus value. The. 
int e r e s t i s measured by the interest rate... This i s an 
expression aa a. percentage of the r e l a t i o n between the 
sum of the annual income obtained on loan c a p i t a l and 
the size of the c a p i t a l obtained, aa a loan. 
The i n t e r e s t rate fluctuates, within 
the l i m i t s of the average p r o f i t according to the supply 
and demand f o r laan capital.. I f the demand f o r loan 
c a p i t a l exceeds the supply, the int e r e s t - r a t e r i s e s . 
I f there i s a. l o t of l i q u i d money on the market and 
the demand i s small, the int e r e s t rate, drops. 
FORMS OP CAPITAIIST CREDIT 
The movement of loan c a p i t a l takes 
the form of c r e d i t . Credit leads to the separation 
and counterpositioning of "capti a l as. property", which 
haa no di r e c t r e l a t i o n to production, and c a p i t a l as> 
a. function, that i s , the c a p i t a l which d i r e c t l y exploits 
labour. 
In general, i n Colombia l i k e i n any 
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c a p i t a l i s t society there are the following basic 
forms of credit:, bank credit,, made available by the: 
• owners, of free money capital, and banks to functioning 
capitalista;, commercial c r e d i t , given by functioning 
c a p i t a l i s t s ; to on6 another to accelerate the sale of. 
commojdities.;; consumercc2:e:di4;-,v/ligranted. by merchants to 
the population to f a c i l i t a t e the sale of consumer goods; 
state c r e d i t , which i s . a system of cr e d i t relations, 
between the State; and the owners of money c a p i t a l , i n 
which the State.is the borrower; and international-
c r e d i t , which i s an extension of credit relations beyond 
the borders of individuals, countries,. 
Credit has a major influence on thei 
development of c a p i t a l i s t production: i t helps to 
le v e l the rates> of p r o f i t , reduces costa, considerably 
accelerates, the concentration and centralisation of 
c a p i t a l , temporarily expands the market, accelerates 
the growth i n the rate of. exploitation;; intensifies, 
the bondage- and exploitation of the less, developed 
countries., of the world, c a p i t a l i s t economy.. 
ROLE OP CREDIT IE THE FORMATION OP THE AVERAGE RATE 
OP PROFIT. 
The movement of loan c a p i t a l helps: to 
l e v e l the rates, of p r o f i t by accelerating and f a c i l i t a t i n g 
the transfer of c a p i t a l to the pr o f i t a b l e branches of the 
economy. However, while removing some disproportion, and 
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and l e v e l l i n g out the rate of profit., i t promotes the 
emergence, of new disproportions, intensifies, the chactic 
development of the various economic branches. 
This important role of loan c a p i t a l 
i s . f u l f i l l e d c h i e f l y by "banker's c r e d i t " , Bankeris 
c r e d i t can be given without intermediaries, ( for example, 
by the purchase of s e c u r i t i e s by the owners of laan 
c a p i t a l ) and d i r e c t from banks., savings banks and. 
insurance: companies. 
A bank i s a c a p i t a l i s t concern 
which makes, the normal rate of p r o f i t , by carrying out 
intermediary functions i n payment on credit operations, 
organises.- and promotes the movement of laan c a p i t a l . 
The bank transactions, aimed at a t t r a c t i n g the deposits 
of c a p i t a l i s t s , companies and the population int o i t s 
safes, are called "passive" transactions. The bank uses 
these deposits, to grant cr e d i t and to invest capital, 
(investment banks). These operations of the banks are 
called active transactions. The bank receives dividends 
or i n t e r e s t at a higher r a t e than the intere.s.t i t pays, 
to i t s de.|ios.itors. Thus, banks greatly accelerate the 
transformation of free money c a p i t a l which yields interest., 
and of loan c a p i t a l i n t o functioning c a p i t a l . 
The difference between the income from 
an active transaction and the payment of interest on 
passive transactions i s the banker's income... Bankers 
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speak of the "modest appetite".of banks, which earn 
very l i t t l e — only 2 to 2.O.50 per cent per peso on 
deposits. But since the advanced c a p i t a l of a bank i s 
generally only one-eighth to one-twelfth of i t de.posits, 
t h i s means that the p r o f i t s are nearer 24-30 per cent. 
Part of the bank income i s spent on running costs (wages, 
depreciation, advertising, e t c . ) . On the whole these; 
are the net d i s t r i b u t i o n costs. The remainder i s the 
banker's p r o f i t . As a re s u l t of competition the bank's; 
advanced c a p i t a l also brings, i n the average rate of p r o f i t . 
CREDIT AND SAVINGS OP DISTRIBUTION COSTS 
The other function of credit i s to 
manage d i s t r i b u t i o n costs.. . The savings of d i s t r i b u t i o n 
costs, i s achieved i n three ways: 1) through the mutual, 
clearing of debts and payment commitments; Z) through 
the replacement of metal money by credit money, and 
3) through the acceleration of the velocity of money 
c i r c u l a t i o n . 
The main role i n t h i s i s played by 
the second form of cre d i t - "commercial c r e d i t " -. 
When functioning c a p i t a l i s t s s e l l commodities to each 
other they do not pay i n cash, but issue promissory 
notes or b i l l s of exchange. Since many functioning 
c a p i t a l i s t s , issue b i l l s of exchange, the banks are 
able to make settlements, by cancelling them out against 
each other. This cashless.settlement of accounts is. 
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called c l e a r i n g . Usually big banks act as clearing" 
centers. I n Colombia the "Banco de l a Republica" 
functions as the sole bank of issue and clearing houses 
f o r a l l banks.. Every enterprise has., a current account 
i n the bank. On the w r i t t e n order of the enterprise 
(a. cheque) the bank pays the drawer of the cheque the 
specified amount from the enterprise's current account. 
In t h i s way the bank act^s as cashier f o r many enterprises, 
and companies. Often money i s transferred direct from 
one account to another. To s e t t l e accounts between enter-
prises which have accounts i n d i f f e r e n t banks and to 
organise the clearing of b i l l s of exchange the commercial 
banks buy up short-term b i l l s , of exchange issued by 
d i f f e r e n t companies at a. discount and clear them i n the. 
"Banco de. l a Republica." (Central Bank) without the use 
of ready cash. 
Commercial credit creates, a powerful 
sC^ :stem of f i n a n c i a l interdependence between different-
enterprises. The r u i n of one enterprise could affect: 
the f i n a n c i a l position of many others and may lead the 
others to collapse. As a r e s u l t the c i r c u l a t i o n of b i l l s 
of exchange i s interrupted and t h i s can, under certain 
conditions, spark o f f a chain reaction of bankrupticies, 
leading to the closure of many enterprises, and the 
i n f l i c t i o n of enormous losses, on society. 
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CREDIT AND THE CONCENTRATION AND CENTRALISATION OF 
CAPITAL 
The movement of loan capital, 
intensifies- the concentration and centralisation of 
c a p i t a l . Banks fuse small sums of money into big 
functioning c a p i t a l . The most important form of the 
ce n t r a l i s a t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s the joint-stock company. 
I t unites a multitude of free sums of ca p i t a l into big 
economic organisms.. This makes; i t possible to put up 
major projects and to use sophisticated and.expensive 
machinery* I n t h i s way the centralisation of c a p i t a l 
promojtes the enlargement and improvement of production, 
and accelerates the accumulation of c a p i t a l . 
Credit i s also a powerful weapon 
i n competition.. I t strengthens the positions of the. 
large enterprises., leading to the r u i n of small companies, 
peasants and artisans. In Colombia., 90^ of the Bank's 
c r e d i t i s given to 10^ of .-the. depositors (4)* Big 
c a p i t a l i s t s are able to obtain credits at 10-12. per 
cent a year, while small c a p i t a l i s t s oftenofiave. to 
pay up to 24-30 per cent, have to hand over p r a c t i c a l l y 
a l l t h e i r profits;.. Usurer's credit at interest rate 
of 30-40 per cent a year i s not uncommon i n Colombia, 
A specific role i s played by mortgage banks. 
They issue long-term, l&ans on the security of real. es.tate 
(land, buildings.,, houses). I f the interest or part of 
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the" debt i s not paid on time the security becomes; the 
property of the bank. 
ROIE OP CREDIT IH EXPANDIWG THE MARKET 
Consumer c r e d i t and State c r e d i t 
play a very important role i n the process of expanding 
the market. Consumer c r e d i t i s said to be granted when 
c a p i t a l i s t s s e l l Consumer goods on the instalment plan. 
This means that the buyers have to pay over the years 
not only, the price of the commodities, but also a high 
i n t e r e s t . Interest rates, can be as. high as. 16-36 per 
cent a year and t h i s means that i n most cases, consumer 
cr e d i t i s r e a l l y usurer's c r e d i t . Since commodities 
are sold on account of future incomes, t h i s creates a. 
mass demand and becomes, the basis f o r mass:. production, 
which cuts the prices, of consumer goods, and so lowers, 
the value of labour po.wer. As. a. r e s u l t the c a p i t a l i s t s 
are able to expand the market temporarily, but i n sub-
sequent years, when people have to repay the debts with 
interest,, the consumer demand drops, by the amount of the. 
repayments. This method of a r t i f i c i a l expansion of the 
market i s growing more and more important i n the developed, 
c a p i t a l i s t countries.. 
C a p i t a l i s t State credit i s the issue 
and sale by the state of bonds which increase the nation-
a l debt. Banks, f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n d i v i d u a l 
c a p i t a l i s t s and joint-stock companies i n general buy 
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state bonds and, as a r e s u l t , state purchases increase 
during the year in-cfuestipn. In l a t e r years a growing 
part, of the state revenue i s paid out as interest to 
banks. To cover the additional expenditure the state 
raises extra taxes. This means that the working 
people have less money to spend on purchases so that 
the domestic market contracts. Colombia owes, more 
to banks and f i n a n c i a l monopolies i n general than i t 
produces, i n a year.. 
Measures, to expand the market 
a r t i f i c i a l l y by f i s c a l means evolve i n f l a t i o n a r y 
tendencies. F i r s t , banks accept state bonds, and even 
part, of the a r t i c l e s bought onc©redit .;and: imor•tgage.a 
as. securities, f o r the issue of further credits., This 
creates an additional demand from the state and the 
population, and even from the creditors. Second, t h i s 
expansion of c r e d i t becomes self-sustaining, when one 
debt leads to another. 
When times are hard t h i s process i s 
reversed, the withdrav/al of one deposit leads to the 
reduction of a second, third., etc.. The rapid c u r t a i l -
ment of c r e d i t seriously affects the f i n a n c i a l position 




Cap i t a l i s t credit i s becoming one. 
of the p i l l a r s of the world c a p i t a l i s t economy, an 
important means used by the f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l i s t to. 
enslave and exploit peoples of other countries. Credit 
i s used as.; a. weapon i n the struggle f o r foreign markets, 
and raw material sources. 
There are two d i s t i n c t economic 
forms of c a p i t a l exports. When a. c a p i t a l exporter 
acquires, productive, commercial, i n d u s t r i a l , transport; 
or other enterprises i n another country and i s a 
functioning c a p i t a l i s t , c a p i t a l i s said to be exported 
as productive c a p i t a l . When he lends capital, to enter-
preneurs or governments of other countries without 
acquiring any property there and only reserves the 
r i g h t to r e c a l l the loan with i n t e r e s t , the c a p i t a l i s 
called loan c a p i t a l . The export of productive c a p i t a l 
brings i n a p r o f i t , and loan c a p i t a l i n t e r e s t . 
The type of loans that Colombia 
and Latin America obtain have never been an unconditional 
transfer of f i n a n c i a l resources. Usually the conditions 
attached to loans are c l e a r l y and d i r e c t l y intended to. 
serve the interests of the governments providing i t . 
Por example, President Kennedy revealed that over 80 per 
cent of the foreign loan program was spent on U. S, 
products ( 5 ) , In other words, loans represent a. subsidy 
f o r U. S, exporters. Poreign loans must generally be 
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used to buy goods and services from i t s provider,. 
Commodities. b.ought with United Statesi loans, must be 
carried, i n United States, ships. Loans from the United 
States are not, under the Hickenloo.per Amendment, 
available to countries which nationalize US-owned 
assetscand f a i l to "take appropriate steps."' to r e c t i f y 
the s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n s i x months. Loans from the World 
Bank are not, under an i n t e r n a l Policy Memorandum 
which has not been published, available to countries, 
which nationalize foreign-owned assets, without compensa-
t i o n , which f a i l to repay t h e i r debts or i n which there 
are claims on behalf of foreign investors, which the 
Bank considers should be se t t l e d . Foreign loans are, 
i n general, available to countries whose i n t e r n a l 
p o l i t i c a l arrangements, foreign policy alignments, 
treatment of foreign private investment, debt-servicing 
record, export policies., and so on, are considered 
desirable, p o t e n t i a l l y desirable, or at least acceptable, 
by the countries, or i n s t i t u t i o n s providing loans, and. 
which do not appear to threaten t h e i r i n t e r e s t s (6). 
A quotation from a New York Times, 
report of February 6., 1969, w i l l show what t h i s kind 
of loan implies: . .for the purposes of balance of 
payments, the United States, i s r e a l l y getting two 
dollars back f o r every one lent - one immediately with 
the purchase of American goods and another when the 
loan i s repaid". 
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Who, one must ask, i s "aiding" whom? 
"We should take pride," says former Under Secretary of 
State George W. B a l l , " i n the American businessmen who, 
with vigor and s p i r i t of adventure, are investing their, 
c a p i t a l i n foreign lands." (7) 
This — and Mr. B a l l must know i t -
i s sheer nonsense. "Adventure" implies r i s k , but 
thanks to foreign loans the r i s k that the U. S. business-
man i s taking i n investing abroad i s reduced to a 
minimum. In negotiating the. foreign loans program the 
United States, bears i n mind the necessity of opening 
up private investment p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and normally credit 
i s given only on condition that such private investment 
i s protected. Credit makes i t almost certain that U. S. 
businessmen "won't lose".. 
A l l . underdeveloped countries receiving 
c r e d i t from i m p e r i a l i s t countries are chronically i n 
debt because with loans received, t h e i r indebtedness 
continually increases:. I t i s a giant millstone around 
t h e i r necks preventing economic advance. "In 1956, 
the estimated medium - and long-term foreign public 
indebtedness of the underdeveloped countries was 
estimated to be $9..7 b i l l i o n . By 1967, i t was $41.5' 
b i l l i o n . " (a) 
This f o u r f o l d increase i n public 
indebtedness of the poorer countries also means, of 
5-9, 
course, an increase i n the interest payments and other 
charges; that are required to service the debt.- "In 
195-6, the cost to the poorer countries, of servicing t h i s 
indebtedness was $800 m i l l i o n ; by 196.7 t h i s had risen 
to ^3,9 b i l l i o n . . In 1966, 44 percent of a l l loans flowing 
from the advanced to the underdeveloped countries was 
u t i l i z e d merely tov finance past and present debts." (9) 
"During the years 1962 to 1966, the average annual service, 
payments on external public, debt of a l l Latin American 
countries was $1,596 m i l l i o n . During the same years, 
the average annual assistance from the United States 
i n the form of loans and grants amounted to $1,213 
m i l l i o n , " (10) Thus American "foreign c r e d i t " did not 
even cover the interest payments on past loans. 
Why are the underdeveloped countries 
unable to meet interest payments? Why are. they not 
able to gradually pay o f f t h e i r past indebtedness and 
free themselves from t h i s oppressive burden? The answer 
i s simple - because they cannot. 
Foreign loans must be paid o f f i n the 
currency of the country that has granted the "assistance". 
The only way of accumulating such currency i s to a t t a i n 
a surplus of exports over imports. Since World War I I 
the income received by the underdeveloped areas f o r t h e i r 
exports i s largely controlled by the very countries that 
have granted them the loans and which, of course, f i n d 
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i t i n t h e i r interests to keep these prices as low aa 
possible. 
This i s not the only reason why the 
underdeveloped countries can never shed t h e i r burden 
of debt. Aside from the enormous interest payments to 
the United States government: there are the s t i l l greater 
amounts payable abroad to U. S. corporations, to cover 
the huge p r o f i t s , that they have made on t h e i r investments. 
These p r o f i t s must also be paid i n the currency of the 
investing country, U. S, corporations do not want pesos 
or cruzeros, they want dol l a r s . 
So what do we find? The burden on 
the underdeveloped countries represented by the cost of 
"credit aids", plus the exports necessary to pay f o r 
the p r o f i t s of the foreign c a p i t a l i s t enterprises, 
represents an economic stranglehold which prevents the 
underdeveloped countries from advancing. Por example, 
f o r every d o l l a r of foreign exchange earned by Mexico 
by the sale of products abroad, six t y cents has to be 
earmarked f o r the servicing of her foreign debt and f o r 
interes.t payments and p r o f i t of foreign investors (mostly, 
of course, to the U. S.). This leaves Mexico with only 
f o r t y cents f o r her own essential imports. - a situation 
true, to a greater or lesser extent, i n a l l underdeveloped 
countries. Unable to accumulate s u f f i c i e n t c a p i t a l f o r 
t h e i r own i n d u s t r i a l and economic development, the 
underdeveloped countries, though providing enormous 
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wealth f o r the investing countries, are. kept i n a 
permanent 1 state of stagnation, mass poverty and subjection.. 
Withliinsufficient. foreign currency 
to pay the i n t e r e s t charges, they are.; compelled' by t h e i r 
Washington "benefactor" to continue borrowing, and gc 
s t i l l deeper into debt, (The only organizations that 
are prepared, to extend loans to underdeveloped countries, 
sucli as the World Bank, International Finance Corporation 
(IPC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), are controlled, 
by the U.S,>A.,). Increasing t h e i r t o t a l inde.btednes&. 
merely tightens the economic s.tranglehold by the richer 
country,. They prefer to keep their, victims^ permanently 
i n debt rather than have, the loan repaid, so the chronic 
inde.btejdness. of the underdeveloped countries, unquestion"!!?-
ably suits the i m p e r i a l i s t countries. Through debt, t h e i r 
c o n t r o l of the poorer coutries can be maintained* 
TYPES OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Financial i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Colombia 
include:- the "Banco; de l a Republica" (Central Bank), 
twenty-four commercial banks, seventeen Development 
Finance Corporations (Corporaciones Financieras), nine 
Investment Trusts (Pondos de Inversion), t h i r t y - f i v e 
Insurance;-Companies (Companies de Seguros), ten Ware-
houses. (Almacenes deDDeposito), several credit institur-
tions and various Fiduciary Funds operating i n associa-
t i o n with the Central Bank and other public e n t i t i e s . 
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Also several Savings and Loan Corporations are active, 
i n financing housing and construction. 
Banking operations, and monetary-
policy are regulated at the.government level, by tha 
" junta, monetaria." (Monetary Board.)» In 1963 the Monetary 
Board was. given authority to set reserve requirementa, 
discounts and interes.t ratesu, as well, as to regulate 
foreign exchange policy. The five-member Board of 
Directors: consists of government appointees. "Banco 
de l a Eepublica" acts, aa the executive arm of the 
Monetary Board.. I t functions as the sole bank of issue; 
clearing-house for a l l banks; and as. the government' •  
treasury. The private f i n a n c i a l and i n d u s t r i a l s.truc-
turea are. represented in the bank's ten-member Board 
of Directors... The Central Bank i s patterned after the. 
United States. Federal Reserve System. 
Enforcement of banking lav/a i s 
I I I I . entrusted to the Superintendencia. Bancaria (Banking 
Superintendent) which oversees, the nation's, banking 
operations and reports d i r e c t l y to the President of 
the Republic. 
COMMERCIAL BAITKS. 
E s s e n t i a l l y , the commercial banks-
borrow for short periods and lend for shorter periods. 
The difference between the rate they pay for borrowing. 
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and the rate they charge for lending constitutes, their 
p r o f i t . But t h i s i s not the whole story». The commercial 
banks do not simply lend out the amount they borrow. 
They "create" deposits, by making advances to business-
men and others, being guided by the established conv.en.-
tion that they can lend up to nine.times the cash they 
have available. 
What i s the nature of bank control? 
There i s f i r s t , the control a r i s i n g from handling the; 
f i n a n c i a l settlements, of a l l firms and many individuals.. 
The banks are i n a position to judge, the f i n a n c i a l posi-
tion of the different firms and to use that knowledge, 
i n advancing to t h e i r clients.. And in so f a r as they 
are d i r e c t l y linked with certain firms, knowledge.of 
the position of r i v a l s i s c l e a r l y of some importance. 
Secondly, there i s the control a r i s i n g 
from the i r power to grant or withhold credit. In spite.-
of self-financing, bank credit i s important especially 
f o r rapidly growing and expanding firms. Banks can 
thus influence.- policy. 
Thirdly, there i s the power to d i s c r i -
minate i n the rate of interest charged tolborrowers.* 
There i s considerable evidence that large c l i e n t s are 
able to borrow more cheaply than smaller ones. 
I t i s impossible to estimate the r e a l 
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t o t a l p r o f i t s made by the commercial banks,. They are 
allowed by the government to put a considerable amoun.t 
of t h e i r p r o f i t s into t h e i r reserves, which they are 
not required to disclose.. 
Current demand deposits, provide the 
bulk of operating resources for commercial banks, though 
recently term-deposits, c e r t i f i e d deposits and savings 
accounts, have become a. si g n i f i c a n t factor, due to higher 
i n t e r e s t rate l e v e l s . Seventy-five per cent of the. 
commercial bank's, portfolio corresponds, to short-term 
c r e d i t s , with the balance divided between medium and 
long-term loans. Theoretically commercial banks, are^ 
mainly suppliers of short-term cred i t , but i t i s 
increasingly recognised that continuous renewal of 
loans can e f f e c t i v e l y constitute a. long-term loan. 
Commercial banks also uadertake a. 
vari e t y of other a c t i v i t i e s , including: Investment i n 
government and private securities., required by law. 
Channeling of loans into p r i o r i t y economic sectors and 
assistance i n government financing. Maintenance of 
warehouse and storage f a c i l i t i e s for a g r i c u l t u r a l and 
i n d u s t r i a l products, to secure working c a p i t a l for 
producers,. And participation i n development credit 
by holding stock i n private development finance corporar-
tions and i n newly created saving and loan corporations,. 
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PRIVATELY - OWUED COMMERCIAL BAITKS 
Of the twenty-four commercial banks currently 
i n operation fourteen are privately owned, four are 
government a f i l i a t e d and the remaining s i x are foreign 
banks., C:b.lombian banks account for ninety per cent. of. 
the combined assets and equity of the nation's commercial 
banks.. (11) 
Assets- Per cent Equi-ty Capita. 
$US M l l i o n a $US Millions Reserves Per Cen.1. 
Private; Banks tl4., 
0 
O f f i c i a l Banks. (4;-, 
e b . 1, 919-0-9 o . • ....63'*T o v a . 
.... .814.. Oo • • ». 27.0. a a a . . »• o-'JQ'eT » 0 . .36.»8' 
Foreign Banks. (6) . 0 . . a 280. ..9.'. a e a . a9.»3.a a a » a . .•••1-7! »T . a .•.'.•e o ...8.3' 
TOTAL. ...»....< .. • 3,014^ .8... 100.0.... 100.0 
*Rate of Exchange: US $ = Col* $28.<.60 
Source^: Superintendencia Bancaria. (Banking Superintend;ency) 
Private, commercial banks operate, 
nationwide, with no r e s t r i c t i o n s on the number of. 
branches, established i n c i t i e s or municipalitiea* 
Ranking these banks by si z e of assejts;, the f i v e 
largest account for 8? per cent of t o t a l private 
commercial bank assets.. Their stock i s trade on the 
Bogota and Medellin Stock Marketa, with new. stock 
i s s u e s amounting to. ^ 11-2. million i n 1974.. 
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Colombia, has the following Private 
Commercial Banks: 
1» Banco de; America Latina. 
2.. Banco de Caldas 
3. Banco de Bogotd. 
4. -^anco de Construcci<5n y Desarrollo. 
5,. Banco de Colombia. 
S^o- Banco de l a Costa 
7«- Banco del Comercio 
8» Banco de- Occldente 
9.0 Banco., del Es.tado 
10„ Banca I n d u s t r i a l Colombiano. 
11, Banco Hacional 
12.. Banco Santander 
13 *• Banco Panamericano 
14, Banco Comercial Antioqueno 
The two largest commercial banks 
- Banco de. C.olmbia and Banco de Bogotd. - were founded 
i n 1874 and 1870 respectively. Headquarters, are located, 
i n the c a p i t a l , Bogotd. Banco de Colombia has 226 
branch o f f i c e s and employs. 4,300 persons; Banco de 
Bogo.td. has 217 off i c e s with a. s t a f f of 4,630 persons, 
and recently has established a branch in Hew. York,. 
Banco del Comercio (194.9), third largest i n Colombia, 
i s also located i n Bogotd. Banco Comercial Antioq^uefic 
(1912), andL.BancodliidiistriaiLjCoiombiano (1.94.4), fourth 
and f i f t h largest, have main o f f i c e s located i n Medellin, 
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FIVE LARGEST' PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BANKS - 1974 
(U.S. M i l l i o n s ) * 
Banco^ de Calombia. 
Banco de Bogotd. 
Banco dei Comercia. 
Banco Comercial.Antioquenc 








2 3 3 - 3 
2 2 8 o 6 . 
1 3 & . 5 
9 3 - v l 
5 4 . a - 3 
loans. Net. Equity 
income 
i 6 3 ; a . lo.a 3 4 o 2 . 
1 6 6 ; . 5 8 . » 5 3 7 a L 
1 1 2 ; a 2 4 . 6 2 0 . 6 
7 2 - 3 4 . 3 1 7 . 5 
3 8 . 7 2 . . 0 1 2 . 8 
*Ra.te of exchange:; Col• $28.60 = ^ Ub 
Source: Annual reports of Banks 
FOREIGN COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Foreign banks operate d i r e c t l y i n 
C'ojlombia. through branch offices and in d i r e c t l y through 
minority shareholding i n private l o c a l banks. Inter-
national banks currently active in Colombia are: F i r s t 
National City Bank of New York, Banque Nationale de. 
Paris , French-Italian Bank for. South America, Bank of 
London and South America, Royal Bank of Canada, and 
Bank of America. In addition, Chase Manhattan Bank owns 
equity i n "Banco del ComerciQa and F i r s t National City 
Bank of New York i s a stockholder i n the "Banco de Caldas". 
Between 1966 and 1974,; private foreign 
investment i n commercial banks and Finance Corporation 
increased by 93 per cent.. This was the highest percentage 
increase recorded i n any sector. 
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GOVEEMENT-OWED COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Over the past three decades four 
government-owned commercial banks have emerged as. a. 
major factor i n specialized lending a c t i v i t y . Today 
they account for 37 per cent of the credits granted 
by commercial banks, and 27 per cent of commercial 
bank assets. 
Banco Cafetero (Coffee Bank) ranks 
by assets, as the fourth largest commercial bank in 
Colombia, working mostly in the coffee growing and 
and exporting sector. Equity c a p i t a l of this i s 
held by the "Pondo Wacional del Caf.e" (National Coffee 
Fund), with resources derived from export taxes on 
coffee and administered by the "Pederacion Nacional 
de Cafeteros" (National Federation of Coffee Growers), 
The bank was founded in 1953 to 
a s s i s t coffee growers with their financing needs, but: 
has since greatly expanded i t s services to contribute 
to economic d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . I t now grants credit in 
coffee areas as well as manufacturing construction and 
various a g r i c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . Offices, are maintained, 
in major c i t i e s and r u r a l locations, particularly i n 
coffee growing regions. 
Another major government owned 
bank i s "Caja Agraria" (Agricultural Credit Bank), 
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channeling cred i t primarily into the agric u l t u r a l 
sector, which accounts for more than 25 per cent of 
Colombia's GNP (Gross National Product)a Lines of 
credi t have been received from the World Bank, Inter-
american Development Bank and other international 
agencies. 
Similarly active in livestock 
development i s the "Banco Ganadero" (Cattle Bank), 
operating since 1956.. I t i s backed 20 per cent by 
government funds and 80 per cent by private concerns-
engaged in the livestock industry. Cattle ranchers 
are required by law to buy stock in the bank. 
Ranking next to the Coffee Bank in 
terms of assets i s the "Banco Popular", founded in 
1959 to aid the expansion of small and medium size 
industrya I t i s a shareholder in several development 
corporations, i n a savings and loan corporation that 
offers financing for housing and construction, and in 
the international Trade F a i r of Bogota. 
Below, I include a few tables, which 
show the great increase and concentration of the banking 
system in Colombia. 
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SOm 'ASSETS AND LIABILITIES' ACCOUNTS OP THE COLOMBIAN BAUKS 
(EXCLUDING THE BAUCO DE LA REPUBLICA) 1925-1929 
































tot a l 
assets 
and 
l i a -
b i l i t i e s 
"92.7 
26 16.9 104...5 64.4 24.5 12..8 26.7 135.0 
n 21.4 154..1 77.1 50..3 17.2. 39.6 189.6 
18 21b3 202o9 112.3 65.3 11.3- 49.5 243^ .7 
19 20.6 207.8 9^.8 _ 77.7 18.0 5-1.1 25.0.2 
Source: Roberto T r i f f i n , "La Moneda y l a s instituciones 
Bancarias, en Colombia, Banco de l a Republica, 
1944., pg. 3. 
SOME 'ASSETS MI) LIABILITIES' ACCOUNTS OP THE COLOMBIAN BANKS 
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•' '8 .5' 
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t o t a l 
assets 
and 
l i a -
b i l i t i e s 
•i9a;.o"" 
55 24 .5 136 .1 81 .0 50.8 4.4 53.9 216 .1 
56 26.4 167.7 96 .0 50.3 8 .5 53.0 245.9 
57 . 26.7 182 .1 98.6 53.1 18..4 54.5 259.3 
58 26 .2 206 .0 107.1 61.5 18.6 5.6.9 27a. 2 
59 31.1 226,9 127,2 63 .2 22.6 60.0 301.5 
o^ 33.9 243 a 142.1 78.3 5.2 65.8 315.9 
77.9 16.0 70.4 350.2 . 
Source: Roberto T r i f f i n , "La Moneda y las Instituciones 
Bancarias en Colombia", Banco de. l a Republica, 
1944, pp. 41, 44, 45.. 
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BANK'S INFORMATION (EXCLUDING THE BANCO DE LA REPUBLICA) 
























77.2 16.7 1.0 . 451.7 41,4 36,8 47 »9 612.7 
80.6 19.4 1.0 520.3 48.7 44.7 63.. 6 m.3> 
78^8 18.6 1.0 577.5 47.7 73.5 78.7 875*8 
7^.5 _ 21.3 2.2 741.9 78.4 77.7 _ 102.. 1. 1101.1 
Source: Colombian monetary information, "Banco de l a 
Republica", June 1957, pp. 37-38. 
COLOMBIAN BANKS (EXCLUDING THE "BANCO DE LA REPUBLICA") 
(Million pesos.) 
ir Total reserves. Total credits. Deposits Total assesta and l i a b i l i t i e s 
.1 132. 878 
•2 ,185 1056 707 1593 
»3 197 1468 856.. 2346 
>4. 314 1854 1093. 3134 
»5 277 2285 1159 3726 
.6 
« 
327 2772: 1483. 4.663. 
7 291 2957 1578. 55.28; 
•8 459 3258 1958 6022 
i9 445 376.0 2230 6685; 
i.O 457 4444 2497 7718' 
i l 482 53.70 326.7 9556; 
)2 1061 6109 4054 12012 • 
4186 12132 
Source: Magazine of the "Banco de. l a Republica", 
February 1955, 1957, and 1964. 
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NUMBER OF BANKS AND THEIR BRANCHES 
(EXCLUDING THE "BANCO DE LA REPUBLICA") 
Year Banks Branches. 
1946 " 26 420 
1947 26 445 
1948 25 466 
1949 24 485 
1910 24 517 
Source.:. Superintendencia Bancaria. 
INSURANCE COr/EPANIES 
Standing next to the commercial 
banks are the insurance companies, whose investments 
i n industry, trafie and property are generally of a 
long-term charactera In t h i s sense the insurance 
companies play a very important role i n the sphere 
of shareholdingsa 
Their "general" business includes 
a variety of l i f e insurance business (technically 
referred to as "assurance") and general insurance, 
including f i r e , accident, and marine insurance. 
In so f a r as capitalism creates 
the need for insurance on a vast scale, both personal 
and i n s t i t u t i o n a l , the insurance companies are a 
powerful and pervading form of centralising money 
resources.. The companies receive premium payments. 
7 3 . 
largely as annual payments fixed for long periods of. 
years. They invest the sums received, and hold the 
resulting, assets against t h e i r l i a b i l i t i e s to pay under 
the terms of contracts called " p o l i c i e s " . Their control 
by a handful of concerns means that insurance companies 
help to determine national investment policy by the 
sheer proj)ortion for which they are responsible. The 
placing of new issues would be almost impossible with-
out the cooperation of the insurance companies;';, they can 
back take-over bids and property deals on a large scale. 
Their interest in control i s evidently 
determined by th e i r need for i t . Unless: they have a 
pa r t i c u l a r production or investment policy i n mind they 
w i l l be happy to see the firm conducted under i t s "normal 
management"a I f a c r i s i s or sharp differences i n policy 
should a r i s e , then naturally they w i l l intervene in 
the in t e r e s t s of their investment. But when one considers 
the boards of the insurance companies and their widespread 
f i n a n c i a l and i n d u s t r i a l connections, i t i s plain that 
they are interested i n the f i n a n c i a l and investment 
p o l i c i e s of the companies they invest in - even though 
th e i r s p e c i a l attention w i l l be on the largest and most 
powerful. 
The most important Colombian 
insurance companies are: 
1 . American International Underwriters de Colombia. Ltd. 
2 a Aseguradora del Valle 
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3. Aseguradora Grancolombiana 
4 . Assicurazioni Generali 
5 a Aura S. A a 
6. : Seguros Caribe S. A. 
7. CehtEalade'-Sgguros 
8 . Colseguros 
9. Colpa-tria. 
1 0 . . Compania. agricola de Seguros S. A. 
1 1 . . Seguros Atlas 
1 2 . Gompania de Seguros La Anoina 
13. Grupo Fenix 
14. Granadina. de Seguros 
1 5 . Seguros Colombia. 
1 6 . . La Continental 
1 7 . La Interamericana 
1 8 . . La. Libertad 
1 9 . La. Nacional de Seguros 
2 0 . . Seguros La Union 
2 1 a La. Previsora S. A. 
2 2 . Seguros Alfa 
2 3 a Seguros Colombia S. A. 
2 4 . Seguros del Estado 
2 5 a Seguros Universal 
2 6 . - Seguros Tequendama S. A. 
2 7 . Seguros La Equidad 
2 8 . Suramericana de Seguros 
2 9 . Compania de Seguros ia. Eacandia. 
75 
Below, I include two tables which 
show the great increase of the insurance business i n 
Colombia. 





























Source: Superintendencia Bancaria, 
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I t has been established that 20 
per cent of the c a p i t a l and reserves of insurance 
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companies are held by foreign investors. Participation 
i s d i r e c t , through branches of foreign companies, or 
through minority shareholding i n Colombian concerns a 
Among the foreign insurance companies-
represented in. Colombia are: Pan-American L i f e Insurance, 
The Home Insurance Co.., Sun Insurance Office Ltda,, The 
B r i t i s h American Assurance Co., America. International 
Underwriters,, La Baloise, Skandia, Assicurazioni Generali, 
Fireman Insurance Co., Royal Insurance Co..,Ltda., The 
Prudential Assurance Co. Ltda., Vigilant Insurance Co., 
Phoenix Insurance Co., and Albingia. 
COLOMBIAN INSURANCE COMPANIES 1926-1963 
Number of insurance Companies 
fear National Foreign Total 
1926 3 19 22 
1927 4 23' 27 
1928 6 23 29 
1930 5 21 26 
1940 4- 29 33. 
1950 9 22. 31 
1959 39 23 62 
1960 45 23 68 
1961 50 23 . 73. 
1963 49 23 72 
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria 
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WAREHOUSES 
Another important grouping of 
finance i n s t i t u t i o n s i s the "Almacenes Generales de 
Deposito" (Warehouses), who are r e a l l y branches of 
the commercial banks. Their main a c t i v i t i e s are: 
The maintainance of storage f a c i l i t i e s for ag r i c u l t u r a l 
and i n d u s t r i a l products. And in order to secure working 
c a p i t a l for producers they receive products on comis.-
sion for which they give "deposit c e r t i f i c a t e s " which 
are discounted by commercial banks and f i n a n c i a l 
corporations., 
The most important warehouses are: 
S7arehouses. Controller shareholders 
Almabanco . . . . . . . . . . Banco Ganadero 
Almacafe. . . . Banco Cafetero 
A.loccidente. . .. . .Banco de Occidente. 
Almavic . . . «. .. ...... .. Banco Indu s t r i a l Colombiano 
Banco del Comercio 
Almaviva . . . . . ....... . . .Banco de Bogota 
Inagrario. . . .. Caja Agraria. 
Alpopular . . . ... a a ... . Banco Popular 
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I i r V E S T M T TRUSTS 
Investment t r u s t s are companies whose main 
object i s to invest t h e i r c a p i t a l i n a wide range of 
other companies. An investment t r u s t issues share and 
uses i t s capital., to buy shares i n other companies. 
Unlike other f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , they are not 
prim a r i l y concerned with borrowing and lending.. They 
do, i t i s true, borrow some of t h e i r funds, by the 
issue of. deebentures. (order of-payment by the government), 
and they do lend i n so f a r as they hold government 
bonds and i n d u s t r i a l debentures.. But more character-
i s t i c a l l y they "own" and are "owned": that i s to say, 
they are e f f e c t i v e l y co-operative societies f o r the i n -
d i r e c t ownership of equity claims on the p r o f i t s of 
commercial and i n d u s t r i a l companies. Their advantage 
l i e s i n the risk-spreading that can be reconciled 
w i t h comparatively small holdings: $ 1000 pesos, 
invested i n an investment t r u s t may e f f e c t i v e l y 
represent investments of a few pesos i n each of a 
large number of companies. A l l of them are administered 
by insurance companies. 
The most important investment 
t r u s t s are: 
1. Pondo Grancolombiano 
2. Fondo Suramericano de Inversion S. A. 
3. Pondo Nacional de Inversiones Seguridad 
4. Pondo de Inversiones Colseguros 
5. Pondo de Inversiones Patria 
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So Pondo de Inversiones Tequendama 
7. Pondo Bolivariano 
8. Pondo de Crecimiento 
9. Pondo Colombia 
PIHMCE CORPOEATIOKS 
Development Pinance Corporations. 
(Corporaciones. Pinancieras) have become an important 
source of funds f o r private enterprise i n Colombiao. 
Through the exis t i n g seventeen corporations,, i n t e r n a l 
and external c a p i t a l i s channeled into medium and long-
term loans. Over 60 per cent of the loans received by 
the manufacturing sector i n 1974 were granted by these 
entities.. 
In addition to t h e i r own equity 
c a p i t a l , finance corporations allocate external f i n a n c i a l 
resources i n t o the promotion of new enterprises and the 
expansion of existing ones.. External resources include, 
the V/orld'' Bank and foreign commercial bank credits, and 
bond issue. 
Pinance. corporations are i n the position 
to o f f e r d i f f e r e n t types of f i n a n c i a l assistance, including 
c a p i t a l underwrittings, of new ventures, Req.uirementa 
f o r working c a p i t a l , purchase of local or imported equip-
ment, construction of plant f a c i l i t i e s , and funds f o r 
f e a s i b i l i t y studies and technical assistance are also 
made available,. 
80 
Emphasis i s put on loans to manufac-
t u r i n g enterprises, though a g r i c u l t u r a l , mining and 
f i s h i n g a c t i v i t i e s also receive backing, Pinance 
corporations have been established i n a. number of 
locations, due to the existence of numerous manufac-
t u r i n g centers i n Colombia, 
The most important finance corporations. 
are: 
1. Corporacion Pinanciera de; Pomento Agropecuario y 
de: Exportaciones (COPIAGRO) 
2. Corporacion Pinanciera Colombiana S. A. (COPINAIJCIERA) 
3. Corporacion Pinanciera de Caldas . 
4» Corporacion Pinanciera de Caribe S. A.. 
5. CorpoEacion Pinanciera. del ITorte 
6. Corporacion Pinanciera del Transporte 
7. Corporacion Pinanciera. del Valle 
8. Corporacion Pinanciera Estatal de.. Desarrollo I n d u s t r i a l 
9. Corporacion Pinanciera Grancolombiana S. A. 
10. Corporacion Pinanciera Agricola I n d u s t r i a l 
11. Corporacion Pinanciera Popular 
12. Corporacion Pinanciera. de Santander 
13. Corporacion Pinanciera del Tolima 
14« Corporacion Pinanciera Nacional 
15. I n s t i t u t e de Pomento I n d u s t r i a l (IPI) 
. Local and foreign commercial banks-
have been p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n development finance; corpoaia-
tions extensively. Banks are permitted to own up to 
25 per cent of the equity c a p i t a l of these f i n a n c i a l 
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i n s t i t u t i o n s . . Joint ventureyundertakingslihaye: bean 
encouraged, by t h i s type of p a r t i c i p a t i o n * 
Among the foreign banks and i n t e r -
national manufacturing groups with direct investment, 
i n f i n a n c i a l corporations are.;: 
PINAUCIAI. CORPORATIONS POREIGN PARTICIPAi 
AND TiON :;PERceEI3T: IN 
POREIGN GROUPS CAPITAI 
CORPORACION PINAJICIERA COIOMBIANA. . . . . . . . 40o6.-
Manufactures Hanover Trust Ca» 
Bank of London and South America. 
Pried Kcupp G»M*B.H.. of West Germany 
Bank of Tokyo 
I n d u s t r i a l Bank of Japan 
CORPORACION PINANCIERA DEL VALLE. ........ ia.0 
Continental- Bank of Chicago. 
In d u s t r i a l . Bank of Japan 
The Citizens; and Southern National Bank of Atlanta 
International Finance Corporation 
CORPORACION PINANCIERA NACIONAL .. . .17(^ 7 
Adela Investment Co;,-
Balfour Williamson COo. 
International Finance Corporation 
Bankers. International 
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CORPORACION FINANCIERA DEL NORTE ......... .39.2. 
Philadelphia International Investment 
Adela Investment Co* 
Esso Andina. Inc. 
International Finance Corporation 
Marine Midland Corporation 
CORPORACION FINANCIERA DE CALDAS 17.8. 
7/ella Fargo Bank 
International Finance Coitporation 
CORPORACION FINANCIERA DEL CARIBE . .64..0 
Algemene Bank Nederland N.. V. 
Hollandshe Bank Unie N;,. 
Interamerican Trade & Development Co.. 
Administratie Kantoor Princenhage N. Y. 
No Vo Trust-en Beleggings-maatschappij 
"T.ebema."' Amsterdam 
CORPORACION PINANCIERA DE OCCIDENTE 37.6 
F i r s t National City Bank of New York 
CORPORACION COLOMBIANA DE FINANCIAMIENTOS COLPIN 1.00.0-
F i r s t National City Bank of New York 
Source: "Colombia Financial System Supports Growth", 
Colombia.Today, Yol, 10, Noi 10, New York, 1975. 
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The government-owned " I n s t i t u t e do 
Pomento Induatrial." I P I ( I n s t i t u t e of I n d u s t r i a l Develop-
ment) i s responsible f o r over half of the credit, 
operations of development finance corporations* I t 
d i f f e r s from other finance., corporations, i n having 
access to public funds, and i t channels i t s funds into 
medium and large-size enterprises, with assets of over 
$16.0,000* 
I P I i s devoted to promote, manufacturing 
a c t i v i t i e s , and played an important role i n the formation 
of Colombia's ir o n and steel industries. I P I was 
founded i n 1940 and, i n 1963 became a finance corporation. 
SAVIUGS. MW UOM CORPORATIONS 
In May 1972., the Colombian authorities, 
established a number of Savings and Loan Corporations 
w i t h t h e i r deposits and loans subject to "monetary cor-
r e c t i o n " i n order to ensure the maintenance of t h e i r 
r e a l value. Prior to t h i s , mortage and construction 
c r e d i t had been financed by the Central Mortgage Bank 
(Banco Central Hipotecario) - a. p a r t l y publicly owned 
development bank - and, to a lesser extent, by the 
commercial banks. 
The Savings and Loan Corporations 
were created with the specific object of increasing 
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the flow of f i n a n c i a l resources toward the construction 
sector either d i r e c t l y through construction loans, or 
i n d i r e c t l y through mortgage, loans.. The former carry a 
basic in t e r e s t rate of 9 per cent - i n addition to. the 
monetary system described below — and are, subject to a. 
maturity term of six months over the length of the 
construction period, while the mortgage loans bear a. 
basic in t e r e s t rate of 8.5 per cent and have a. maximum, 
term of 15 years.. 
The basic new feature of the savings 
and loan system was the introduction of a Unit of' Constant 
Purchasing Power (UPAC), which was to r e f l e c t changes, 
i n the cost of l i v i n g index, and was to be applied as a 
facto r of adjustment to the deposits and loans of the. 
system so as to maintain t h e i r o r i g i n a l r e a l value. In. 
t h i s way, the basic rate of interest would remain the. 
same but the actual rate of interest paid on the o r i g i n a l 
deposits and loans would r i s e i n l i n e with the factor. 
of monetary correction. Only the cash sum re f l e c t i n g , 
the basic rate of interest i s subject to income tax on. 
the grounds that the monetary correction element is. 
simply maintaining the r e a l value of deposits.. The 
application of t h i s method of "monetary correction" to. 
deposits and loans was. designed to ensure that positive 
r e a l rates of interest prevailed within the system, 
thereby securing an increased flow of funds to the 
construction sector. The authorities, have placed most' 
emphasis on the UPAC system of monetary correction, and 
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the correspondingly high y i e l d on savings, and loan 
deposits, i n order to mobilize and increase volume of 
domestic, savings.. 
The following are the most important. 
Colombian Saving and Building Corporations: 
GRAFCOLOMBIANA. 
Shareholders.: 
Banco de Colombia 




Corporacion Pinanciera de. Santander 
Cpmpania. de Inversiones Bogotd S. A. 
La Nacional de: Seguros 
CENTRAL 
Shareholders:: 
Banco Central Hipotecario 




Pederacion Nacional de Cafeteros. 
Corporacion Pinanciera de Occidente 
Corporacion Pinanciera. del Tolima 
Corporacion Pinanciera de. Oriente 
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Compania Agricola de Seguros 
LAS VILLAS 
Shareholders;:. 
Banco de; Occidente. 




Banco Comercial Antioqueno 
Banco I n d u s t r i a l Colombiano 
Corporacion Pinanciera. Nacional 
Suramericana de Seguros 
Cia. de; Cementos Argos S. A.. 
DAVIVIENDA 
Shareholders.: 
Banco de Bogotd. 
Banco Pr.ances. e I t a l i a n o 
Seguros Bolivar 
Colseguros; 
Corporacion Pinanciera Colombiana. 
Seguros Tequendama 
C.uellar Serrano Gomez y Salazar Ltda.» 






I n s t i t u t e de. Credito T e r r i t o r i a l -
Fondo Nacional. del Ahorro 
Corporacion Pinanciera Pdpular 
DEL VALLE. 
Shareholders: 
Banco del Comercio 
Banco, dei Estado. 
Banco de Occidente 
Gorporaaion Pinanciera del. Valle 
CompaHia de Seguros del Pacifico 
Aseguradora. del Valle 
E t e m i t Pacifico 
Cementos del Valle 
Carton de) Colombia 
GOLPATRIA 
Shareholders: 
Banco de; la. Costa. 
Banco Nacional 
Banco de. America Latina 
Corporacion Financiera del Norte 
Seguros. Patria. 
V/ivienda Guadalupe S. A.. ' 
cblMENA. 
Gaja. de; Ahorros.. del-Circula de Obreros 
Gaja. Social del Ahorr.o 
Source:. "El Espectador"- (Newspaper.), July 14th 1974.-, pg. H-A. 
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Pinaneial.instrument 
In 1973, "UPAC." deposits yielded.. 18. 
percentage points, on a net tax basis, more than 
t r a d i t i o n a l savings deposits, and 12 percentage-' points 
more than investment bank bounds, which are the highest-
y i e l d i n g nondividend f i n a n c i a l investment available.,. 
TABLE; A . 
COLOMBIA : YIELD ON DTSTRUMENTS OP PINANCIAL SAVINGS, 1971-1973. 
, (Jja £er. cent J. 
197L 1972: "19;71 1972; L973i 
Savings deposits at 
commercial banks 1 
Mortgage bonds 1 
Development bonds, 1 
Investment bank bends 
JPAC savings; accounts. 

































1. Tax. free.. Source:. Banco de l a Republica 
TABLE: i ; 
COLOMBIA.: SUIMARY OPERATIONS OP THE SAVINGS. AND LOAN CORPORATIONS 
_ ( I n mi]J.ions__of Colombian 2esos]|, 




p r i v a t e sector^ 
Savings deposits-




I n d i v i d u a l mortgage; 
loans 









921- 2,088 3,516 
18L 717 1,652; 
740 ' 1,371 1,864; 
325 793^  1,884 
265. 612 1,376 
60 181 5.08. 















Sources: "^anco de Ta"ilepubTica;: and^Savings and Loan Boar^. 
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I t has. been primarily i n response to 
t h i s sizable i n t e r e s t rate d i f f e r e n t i a l that UPAC 
deposits, have displayed a tremendous rate of increase.. 
The over a l l deposits of the ten 
Savings and Loan Corporations currently i n cperation 
increased from Col. S184 m i l l i o n at the end of 1972 t c 
• Cpl. ilU,650 m i l l i o n by the end of 1973, and to Col. 
$8,313 m i l l i o n by June 1974 (see. Table B).. Thus, at 
the end of 1973, a f t e r barely 15 months of operation, 
UPAC deposits represented 36 per cent of t o t a l sa^inga 
deposits i n the banking. system and 22-. per cent of 
quasimoney holdings. I t i s interesting to note that, 
i n spite of the r e l a t i v e l y low minimum deposit require.-
ment of Colo $1,000, the average size of a UPAC c e r t i f i -
cate of deposit i n December 1973, was Col. $249,000 while 
that of a UPAC savings deposits was. Colo. $5.0,000, clearly 
i n d i c a t i n g that the bulk of UPAC deposits have been 
Tg.hld i n the p o r t f o l i o s of business enterpises or of 
individuals of high-income brackets. 
As regards the composition of the 
loan p o r t f o l i o s , of the Savings and Loan Corporations-, 
some two t h i r d s of the t o t a l i s i n the form of shorter-
term construction loans, ov/ing to the highly l i q u i d nature, 
of the UPAC deposits, while the regulation requiring 
that 50 per cent of the system's resources be allocated 
to low income and middle income housing has generally 
not been met. 
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OTHER CREDIT RESOURCES 
Additional sources, of financing 
are development funds, managed by the Banco de. La. 
Republica: 
FONDO DE PROMOCION DE EXPORTAClONES. "PROEXPO" (Colom.-
bian Trade Development Bureau). Financed by a 5 per. 
cent surcharge on imports, t h i s fund s p e c i f i c a l l y aids, 
export d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . Credit and teclinical assistance 
are available., 
PONDO DE INVERSIONES PRIVADAS "PIP" (Private Investment 
Fund). Financing both i n l o c a l and foreign currency 
exchange, F.IP has helped support new. undertakings and 
impro.ve the country's, balance of payments.. 
FONDO PINAITCIERO INDUSTRIAL "FPI"^ ( I n d u s t r i a l Finance 
Fund). Financing f o r small and medium-sized industry 
i s channeled through t h i s fund.. 
FONDO FINAJJCI'BRO AGRARIO "PPA" (AgricuLtural Finance. 
Fund). Credit i s offered, i n conjunction v/ith the 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Credit Bank and several commercial banks., 
to s.pur crop development. 
FONDO NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO "FONADE" (Fund f o r 
Financing F e a s i b i l i t y Studies). F e a s i b i l i t y studies, i n 
various, economic sectors, receive backing. 
We have nov/ b r i e f l y examined the. 
p r i n c i p a l types of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s - The Central 
Bank (Banco de l a Republica.),. the Commercial Banks, • 
Insurance Companies, Finance Corporations, Savings and. 
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Loan Corporations, Warehouses Investment Trusts, and 
the Development Punds. But i n classifying the types, 
of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r several and 
specific functions, we must beware of assuming that 
the economic system as. a. v/hole i s the mere sum of 
separate i n s t i t u t i o n s and separate functions. On 
the contrary - and t h i s point w i l l be developed i n 
the next chapter - the system i s dominated by power-
groupings, many of which are composed of a linkage of 
commercial banks, insurance companies, finance corpora-
t i o n s , savings and loan corporations, warehouses, 




1) V/e understand by functioning c a p i t a l i s t these who 
are; d i r e c t l y involved i n the process of production, 
2) "Commodity, something that i s bought and sold". 
The most important characteristic of commodity 
production i s that products are made f o r sale, 
that i s , f o r ex.change on the market, as d i s t i n c t 
from the natural economy u n i t . Lenin wrote: "By 
commodity production i s meant an organisation of 
social economy i n which goods, are produced by 
seperate, isolated producers, each specialsing i n 
the making of some one product, so that to s a t i s f y 
the needs of society i t i s necessary to buy and s e l l 
products (which, therefore, become commodities i n 
the market)."' See: V. I , Lenin, COLLECTED WORKS., 
Vol. 1, pg, 93.. 
3) "The working day i n c a p i t a l i s t establishments can 
be divided into two parts. In the f i r s t part of. 
the working day the worker creates a value equal 
to the value of his labour power. This i s called, 
the necessary laboiiir. During the rest of the working 
day, the worker creates value over and above the 
value of his labour povyer. This i s called the 
. surplus labour time and t h i s labour, the surplus 
labour that i s the unpaid labour of hired v/orkers, 
i s the source of surplus value",. See, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OP CAPITALISM, Progress Publishers, Moscow., 1974, p.g/55 
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4) Garcia Gonzalo, LA CLASE DIRIGENTE NACIONAL, Tiesis 
de Grade Universidad de Los. Andes,, facultad de 
Artes. y Ciencias., Dpto.. de. Antropologia, Bogo.td, 
Augus.t 1974, pg. 328. 
5..) John P.. Kennedy, A p r i l . 2., 196.3. In 1968. modifica;?-
tions were made i n loan contracts which made "aid" 
an even better deal f o r U.^  S. corporations. See, 
Felix Greene, THE ENEMY, WHAT. EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD 
KNOW ABOUT IMPERIALISM, Vintage Books. Edition, New 
York, Fe.bruary 1971, Pg. 123. 
6.) Tfiresa. Hayter, "AID"- AS' IJ^PERIALISM, Penguin Books,, 
1971, pg. 15. 
7) L i f e , A t l a n t i c Edition, 15 A p r i l 1968, pg. 4.6. 
8) Felix. Greene, THE ENEMY,WHAT EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD 
.KITOW ABOUT IMPERIALISM, Vintage Books Edition, New 
York, February 1971, pg. 143. 
9) Ibid... 
ID) I b i d . 
I L) COLOMBIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM SUPPORTS GROWTH, Colombian 
Today, Colombian Center, Vol. 10, No. 10, 1975. 
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THE PINMCIAL GROUPS 
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CHAPTEE I I I : THE PDrMCIAL GROUPS 
PIUMCE CAPITAL 
"Talk about centralisation.: The. 
cre d i t system which has. i t s focus; 
i n the so-called national banks, and 
the big money-lenders, and usurers 
surrounding them, constitutes, enor-
mous, cent r a l i s a t i o n , and gives to 
th i s class of parasites the fabulous-
power, not only to despoil per i o d i -
c a l l y i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t s , but-
also, to i n t e r f e r e i n actual production 
i n a most dangerous manner , . ."(L) 
In general terms, the fusion of banking and i n d u s t r i a l 
c a p i t a l means that the spheres of finance and credit 
have-become-increasingly integrated with the spheres of 
production and trade... The insurance companies, bank and 
nominees, f o r example, are nov/ the largest d i s t i n c t group 
of investors i n ordinary shares;.. The general integration 
proceeds, p a r t l y by way of fusion and coalitions of indus-
t r i a l and f i n a n c i a l organizations, and partly by way of 
f i n a n c i a l organizations entering industry and industrial, 
firms becoming financiers* Such integration i s an i n e v i t -
able consequence; of modem capitalism, of the scale of 
i t s operations and of the competitive struggle.. 
The joint-stock company i n Colombia, 
contributed to the separation of rentiers, from i n d u s t r i a l -
i s t s , and of f i n a n c i a l from i n d u s t r i a l organizations. 
I t . gave r i s e to a stratum of rentiers who had no intention 
of taking part d i r e c t l y i n the operations of the companies 
i n which they held shares. And preceding along side the 
9.6. 
j o i n t - s t o c k companies, grew the great financial- ins.titui-
tions who themselves, centralised money resources and 
len t them to joint-stock companies f o r conversion into; 
i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l . The development of the cr e d i t 
system demanded such a separation or specialization, 
of functions. 
Nevertheless, i t was. but temporary and 
relative., and gave way to a process of integration and 
fusion. Taking the whole period of growth af modem 
capitalism i n Colombia, we may distinguish a number of 
ways i n which the fusion of banking and cognate capi t a l 
w i th i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l has been brought about. 
Great firms and combines emerged whose 
accumulated surpluses financed not simply t h e i r own 
normal growth and reinvestment but policies of entry 
i n t o other spheres. Such firms use the banks f o r short-
term c a p i t a l only to release t h e i r own funds f o r long-
term plans. They become holding companies and f i n a n c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s themselves and i f they do not take over 
special f i n a n c i a l organizations, such as banks, insurance 
companies, etc., they l i n k up with them. This i s the 
case of "BAVARIA" f i n a n c i a l group who started as a beer 
industry and ended being one of the biggest f i n a n c i a l 
groups i n Colombia. "BAVARIA" i s an important share-
holder not only i n f i n a n c i a l corporations, banks, insur-
ance companies, savings and building corporations but: 
i n one hundred manufacturing enterprises (2). 
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There, i s secondly the more deliberate 
s t r i v i n g by f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s to invest d i r e c t l y 
i n industry and trade. 
The pressure f o r such investment.is 
strong from the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s themselves.. The 
most p r o f i t a b l e a c t i v i t y of the commercial banks is. i n 
advances, and the d i s t i n c t i o n between short and medium-
long advances becomes somewhat blurred, and probably 
unreal i n the case of the biggest customers with whom, 
they are often linked i n other ways. The most marked, 
pressure to invest comes from the insurance companies* 
The f i n a n c i a l safety of the insurance companies depends, 
on t h e i r a b i l i t y to f i n d p r o f i t a b l e investment f o r the-
funds they are c o l l e c t i n g on such a wide scale. Invest-
ment i s a neeessity, and i t has been estimated that 
insurance companies nov/ invest at the rate of one m i l l i o n 
pesos per day. 
Thirdly, i t happens that firms which 
need to begin a greatly increased scale of operations, 
that they cannot finance themselves, are obliged to j o i n 
up w ith some f i n a n c i a l group. This i s the case of 
"CRISTALERIA. PEIDAR" who had to j o i n "POSTOLUX" f i n a n c i a l 
group i n order to compete with the reat of the glass, 
industry. F i n a l l y , there are the results of State and 
semi-State intervention. The most notorious, example 
i s provided, by the a c t i v i t i e s of the "BANCO CAPETERO" 
who controls not only important f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
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but a l l the economic a c t i v i t y derived from the production 
and exportation of coffea. 
The growing concentration and c e n t r a l i -
sation i n industry and banking, the coalescence of 
banking and i n d u s t r i a l monopolies lead to the emergence, 
of a new type of monopoly association, 'The Finance. 
Capital G-roup'. 
The Colombian Pinaace Capital Group 
has a. nucleus of closely i n t e r - l i n k e d and powerful 
banking and c r e d i t and i n d u s t r i a l monopolies: a linkage, 
of commercial* banks, insurance companies, finance corpora-
ti o n s , saving and building corporations, warehouses, 
investment t r u s t and i n d u s t r i a l monopolies;. These 
parent companies pursue a common policy, and they control 
a large number and variety of companies i n a l l branches. 
Compared with other kinds of monopoly associations, the 
Financial Group i s a r e l a t i v e l y loose-knit organization. 
1 comparatively large number of companies are within 
the sphere of influence of various f i n a n c i a l groups.. 
SPECIFIC FEATURES OF FINANCIAL GROUPS 
In Colombia, l i k e i n most'developed 
c a p i t a l i s t countries the Financial Groups are i n the 
form of j o i n t - s t o c k companies or corporations. In 
general, a joint-stock company i s a form of group 
c a p i t a l i s t ownership i n which the associated c a p i t a l i s t 
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takes the place of a indivi d u a l c a p i t a l i s t . I t i s 
an enterprise whose c a p i t a l i s composed of the c o n t r i -
butions of i t s participants (shareholders), holding 
a. d e f i n i t e number of shares that i s proportional to 
the sum of money invested by them i n the company. A 
share i s a. security which e n t i t l e s the holders to a 
specified share i n the company's income and to p a r t i c i -
pation i n the business of the company. I t d i f f e r s from 
a b i l l of exchange i n that the money i s not repayable. 
The money raised by the sale of the shares i s the "dom;-
pany's share c a p i t a l " and i s the joint-stock company's 
property. Here loan c a p i t a l evolves as s e c u r i t i e s l i n 
the hands of the creditor (shareholder) and ca p i t a l i n 
the possession of the borrower (company). 
In addition to shares, the company also 
issues, bonds. Money obtained from the sale of bonds i s 
returnable a f t e r a stipulated period, and the company 
u n t i l then has to pay a guaranteed, fixed interest to 
the bondholder. This money i s the borrowed c a p i t a l of. 
the company. The joint-stock company f i r s t pays the 
bank interest and interest on the bonds. The part of. 
p r o f i t i s added to the c a p i t a l and used f o r expansion. 
The remainder i s divided between the shareholders i n 
proportion to the number of shares they hold. This 
income of the shareholder i s called the "dividend". 
The prices at which shares are bought and resold on 
the stock exchenge are known as "share quotations".. 
The shares are sold at the price which i f deposited in. 
LOG 
a. bank would bring i n approximately the same interest.* 
The quoitation of the share equals, bank, rate/dividend, x 
100. per cent:. Hence the price of the share i s the capi-
t a l i s e d dividend computed, i n accordance, with the current 
interest; rate-. 
The dividend, of every company changea 
according to the size of i t s . p r o f i t a . The bank rate. also, 
fluctuatea heavily. That i a why share, quotations, may 
fluctuate heavily over short periods... 
The board of the company i a elected 
at the, general shareholders'' meeting and every shares-
holder has- as., many votes, as. he possesses, shares.. The 
bigger shareholders, usually come to an agreement ao aa 
to f u l l y control, the shareholders' meeting.. Often a 
c a p i t a l i s t , a. group of capitalists.., a family or one or 
more corporations w i l l hold the contro l l i n g block of 
shares, that i s enough to ensure control over the company. 
Depending on the number of small shareholders: the con-
t r o l l i n g group may vary downward of 51%, 20% or even leaa 
of the t o t a l number of shares,. 
SYSTEM OP HOLDINGS 
A Pinancial- Group i n the form of a 
joint-stock company w i l l uae a. variety of methods, to 
establish domination, including p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the; 
c a p i t a l of the companies concerned, personal union, 
organizational and technical services., and the conclu-
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sion of special agreements* 
The system of holdings, a method by 
which one company owns p a r t of the c a p i t a l of another 
company, i s one form of the coalescence of banking and 
i n d u s t r i a l , monopolies, and the most effective means of 
making f i n a n c i a l groups more powerful. The system of 
holdings helps finance magnates, expand t h e i r sphere of. 
domination. Giant pjjjiramids of enterprises, which are; 
controlled through the system of holdings.,, form the 
basis-, of most f i n a n c i a l groups* The system of holdings, 
enable the finance magnates, to control, a. huge mass of. 
capital., exceeding that which they invest themselves 
many times over.. 
The German economist, Heymann, probably 
the f i r s . t , to c a l l attention to t h i s matter, describes 
the system of holdings i n t h i s way: 
The. head of the concern controls the 
p r i n c i p a l company ( l i t e r a l l y , the "mother 
company"); the l a t t e r reigns over the 
subsidiary companies, (daughter companies) 
which i n t h e i r tum control s t i l l other, 
subsidiaries, (grandchild companies), e.tc... 
In t h i s way i t i s possible with compara-
t i v e l y small c a p i t a l to dominate, immense 
spheres of production. Indeed, i f . hold-
ing 50% of. the c a p i t a l i s always, suf-
f i c i e n t to c o n t r o l a. company, the head 
of the concern needs only one m i l l i o n to. 
control eight millions i n the second sub-
s i d i a r i e s . And i f the "interlocking" i s 
extended, i t i s possible with one m i l l i o n 
to control 16 m i l l i o n s , 32 millions., etc.. 
(5) 
The spread of the.system of holdings 
i s promoted by the increase, i n the number of shareholders. 
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since i t i s much easier to gain control i f i t s c a p i t a l 
i s scattered among many people. Similar results are 
obtained by the ever more int r i c a t e , techniques used, to-
manage the f i c t i t i o u s c a p i t a l of companiea, f o r example, 
the issue of d i f f e r e n t kinds of shares. - a method 
that de.privea the small shareholders, of any say i n the 
business, of the company.. The f i n a n c i a l groups actually 
own no more than 10 per cent of the securities of the 
majority of the companies i n which they have an inter e s t . 
These 10 per cent, however, suffice to establish control, 
over many» 
The f i n a n c i a l group often uses the 
method of cross-holdings, of se.veral-of the group's, 
leading companies i n the c a p i t a l of a. given company -
to strengthen i t s control over companies i t considers:, 
important. To conceal t h e i r domination the financial, 
groups, often set up holding companies.-, figure-heads. 
The follcwing diagram shows, the monopoli-
sationne.twork of the f i n a n c i a l structure, the i n t e r -
r e lations among finance groups, between them and the. 
State and between them and the Foreign Pinancial 
Enterprises. . 
PINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
. - ' - « « 
1 
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Attached to the Diagram 
Among the most important Pinance Groups are: 
GRUPO COIOMBIA 
Investments..:. 
Seguros Colombia. S. A. 
Capitalizadora Colombia S.. A,. 
Adininistradora, de Inversiones Co.lombia S".. A.. 
Pondo Colombia 
Edificadora. Colombia S. A. 
Inversiones para Construccion. y Desarrollo S. A, 
Autofinaneiera Colombia S. A. 
Banco Nacional. 
(3(> GRUPO BAVARIA 
Investments::. 
Distribuidora Inversiones Bavaria. S.. A. 
Malterias de. Colombia 
Talleres de I/Iaquinas y Eepuestos S. A. 
Malteriaa de Techo S, A.. 
Empresa. Promotora de Inversiones S.. A.. 
Empresa de Refrescos S. A. 
Inversiones Penicia S. A, 
Cerveceria Germania S. A. 
Cia. Inversionista Nacional S, A. 
Tapas y Envases. S. A. 
Transportadora Modema 
Inmobiliaria. Colombiana S„ A. 
Agritecnica. S.. A.. 
B. H, C, I n d u s t r i a l S. A,. 
Pabrica de Moldes y Maquinas- S. A.. 
Inversiones del Sur S. A, 
Iiladeras de l a Sabana S, A.. 
Acerias Paz. del Rio S. A. 
Cajas Plasticas. S. A. 
Central de.: Abastecimientoa 
Banco de Colombia S. A., 
Ciudadela Ind u s t r i a l . T i b i t o S. A.. 
Deltec Panamericana. S. A.-
Pertilizantes. Colombianos. S. A.. 
Madereraa. del Norte S.. A. 
Petroquimica del Atlantico. S. A. 
Quimica Suramericana. S.. A.. 
The Pirsit Universal. Bank of Nassau. 
Palacio de las exposiciones 
Cia. de Desarrollo.'y Turismo, S. A. 
Industria Ganadera Colombiana S.. A. 
Corporacion Pinanciera de Norte 
(6.) GRUPO GRANCOLOMBIANO 
Investments:: . 
Aseguradora Grancolombiana S. A.. 
Aseguradora Grancolombiana. de Vida S.. A. 
Capitalizadora Grancolombiana. 
Sociedad Grancolombiana Administradora de Inversion 
Almacenar 
Grancolombiana. de Inversiones 
Pondo Grancolombiano.. 
Pondo Bolivsiriano. 
Mineros Colombianos S., A. 
Banco de Colombia. 
Avianca S,. A. 
Colombiana de Curtidos 
Coltejer S, A. 
Indus t r i a Harinera S.. A.. 





Ospina y Cia. 





Concasa Savings and Building Corporation. 
Corporacion Pinanciera de Occidente 
Corporation Pinanciera del Valle 
Corporacion Pinanciera del Norte 
Corporacion Pinanciera de. Caldas 
GRUPO PINANCIERO OCCIDENTE PACIPICO 
Investments: 
Seguros del Pacifico S. A. 
Capitalizadora del Pacifico S. A, 
Inversiones del Occidente S„ A. 
Sociedad Administradora de Inversiones de Occidente S. A. 
Pondo de: Occidente 
Banco de Occidente 
Corporacion Pinanciera del Valle 
Corporacion ideviAhorro y Vivienda. Las V i l l a a 
Corporacion de Ahorro y Vivienda del Valle 
GRUPO BOGOTA 
Investments.: 




Corporacion Pinantfiera Colombiana 
Corporacion Pinanciera de. Ahorro y Vdvienda. Davivienda. 
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GRUPO DEL BANCO DEL COMERCIO 
Investments.: 
Banco del Comercio 
Almacenar 
Corporacion Pinanciera Colombiana 
Corporacion Pinanciera de Caldaa 
Corporacion Pinanciera del Norte 
Corporacion de Ahorro y Vivienda Grancolombiana. 






Compania Espanola de Refrescos S.. A. (Madrid, Spain) 
Gaseosasf!!Colombiana S. A. 
Gaseosas Boyaca S. A. 
Gaseosas Mariquita S. A.> 
Gaseosas Chiquinquira S. A. 
Gaseosas del Geaar S,. A,. 
Gaseosas de l a Prontera S.. A. 
Gaseosas del Liana S.. A.. 
Gaseosas Tolima S. A. 
Gaseosas del Huila. S. A. 
Gaseosas del. Sur S. A, 
Gaseosas Narino S. A. 
Gaseosas.' Cordoba S* A. 
Tapas La Libertad S. A. 
Corchos y Plasticos S. A. 
Troqueles y Envasea S* A,. 
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C r i s t a l e r i a Peldar 
Azucar Manuelita 
Industriaa Metalicas de Palmira 
La Republic a. 
El Colombiano 







Sociedad Mercahtil (7) 
GRUPO CAICEDO GONZALEZ 
Investments;: 
Diarib Occidente 
Diario El Sigla 
Diario El Pais 
Tjodelar 
Ingenio Central C a s t i l l a Ltda. 
Ingenio Bengala 
Cia. Azucarera del Valle Ltda. 
Corporacion Pinanciera del Valle 
Corporacion de Ahorro y Vivienda. del Valle 
Ingenio Riopaila Ltda.. 
Ganaderia Riopaila 
Banco del Comercio 
Dulces Colombiana Ltda.. 
Distribuidara Colombiana Ltda. 
Pinaneo 
1D9> 
INTERLOCKING. OP. DIRECTORSHIPS 
The system of holdings i s supplemented 
by personal networks. (8) This enables the Pinancial 
Group to gain control, not only over the given company, 
but also i t s subsidiaries. I t i s not necessary f o r the 
majority on a board of directors of a company to be . 
based on the control of the bulk of that company's 
c a p i t a l or, i n f a c t , on a holding i n general.. 
Research done early i n 1972 among the 
companies who were members of the "BOLSA DE BOGOTA" 
(Bogotd Stock Exchange) showed the interlocking of 
directorships. Pacts that showed i n many ways the i n t e r -
locking directorates have no special significance. 
This would imply that the interlocking i s purely random.. 
As evidence, references are made to those directors 
who are t i t l e d or respectable gentlemen put up to make-
a company a t t r a c t i v e to investors. But the argument t 
that i n t e r l o c k i n g directorates represent primarily 
random connections would not be supported by those with 
experience of the world of big businesa and finance.. 
I f we. deal only with the giant corporations we can see 
that the appointment of directors has a d e f i n i t e basis: 
large or i n f l u e n t i a l shareholders, top executives, rep-
resentatives of powerful suppliers or c l i e n t e , individuals 
with special knowledge, of, or influence, with, government 
offices, and State departments. 
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DIRECTORS (name) 
Jorge Bo.ter.o Ospina 
Alvaro de Brigard 
Alvaro C a s t i l l o Sampej? 
Eduardo Cueliar 
Dario Arango Tamayo 
Eduardo Arias Bobledo 
Jaime Azcarate Rivera 
Jaime Botero S^enz 
Alberto Bernal Correa 
Duglas. Botero Boshell 
Federico Blanco de l a Rosa 
Guillermo Botero P a l l s 
Ivan Gorrea Arango 
Guillermo Cortes Castro 
Jorge Cubides Camacho 
BOARD OP DIRECTORS 
Panos. Vicuna Santa Pe: 
Confeccionea Pepalfa S, A» 
Vidriera de, Colombia 







Cia, Nacional de Chocolates 
Corporacion Pinanciera Nacional 
Panos. Vicuna Santa Ee 
Pabricato 
Banco Central Hipotecario 
Colmotorea 
Pondo Ganadero del Valle del 
Cauca 
Grasas S. A-
Corporacion Pinanciera de Caldaa 
Central Lechera de. Manizales 
Calema 
Eilanelita S.. A. 
la. Garantia. Dishington 
Banco de BogOJtd 
Avianca. 





Banco Indu s t r i a l Colombiano 






Cia. de. Inveraiones Bogotd 
Banco de Colombia 
I l l 
DIRECTORS (name) 
Jose Alejandro Cortes. 0., 
Hernando C a s t i l l o Samper 
Daniel Cortes Osorio 
Hernando Dumit K, 
Luis Carlos Estrada 
Luis Escobar Garcia 
Poicarpo Gutierrez E«. 
Carlos Gutierrez. B. 
Adolfo Arango Montoya 
Roberto Arango Mejia. 
Carlos Acevedo L, 
Carlos Angel V. 
Carlos Ardila Lule 
BOARDS OP DIRECTORS 
C r i s t a l e r i a Peidar 
Capitalizacion y Ahorros 
Bolivar 




Capitalizacion y Ahorros 
Bolivar 
Capitalizacion y Ahorros. 
Bolivar 
Indus.tria Harinera 
Manfacturas de. Cuero. La Corona. 
Empresa Colombiana de Curtidos 
Capitalizacion y Ahorros. Bolivar. 
Cia. Colombiana de. Gas 
Banco Santander 
Cia. Suramericana de Seggros. 
Banco Indu s t r i a l Colombiano 
Compania. Colombiana de Seguros 
Acerias Paz de Rio 
Manufacturas de Cuero La Corona 
Capitalizacion y Seguros Bolivar 
Cia, de Inversiones Bogotd 
Cemento.s Samper 
Cia. Colombiana de Seguros 
Cia. Suramericana de Seguros 
Cementos Argos 
Banco Indu s t r i a l Colombiano 
Cia. Colombiana de Tabaco. 
Corporacion Pinanciera Nacional 
Cementos Argos 
Corporacion Pinanciera Nacional 
Industrias Metalicas de Palmira 
Banco Comercial Antioqueno 
Cementos Argos 
Bavaria S. A. 
Industrias Me.talurgicas. Musa 




Banco Indu s t r i a l Colombiano 




Carlos Arango Restrapa 
Iganacio Be,tancur. Campuzano> 
Enrique; Barao. Guerrero 
BOARD OP DIRECTORS 
Banco. Grancolombiana 
C r i s t a l e r i a Peldar 
Cementos- Caldas. 
Corporacion Pinanciera de 
Caldas.: 
Ospina Y Cia 
Aeerias Paz, d e l Rio; 
Hilanderias. del. Ponae 
Banco. Santander 
The. role of. personal, uniona within the., 
fin a n c i a l , groups, has. grown i n recent decadea.. This i a 
promoted by the general, growth i n the concentration and 
cen t r a l i s a t i o n of. c a p i t a l , and by the. growing intricacy 
of the management of economieclif.e* That i s why, in 
addition to i n f i l t r a t i o n into the board offdirectors.-
ships,, the company'a engineering and technical services 
which pre.pare drafts, of the key decisions, for the boards, 
and over various rjesearch o f f i c e s , play an increasingly 
important part i n enterprise management* This shows that 
the importance i s growing of the third basic method of. 
monopalising control. — the rendering of various f i n a n c i a l , 
organisational and technical services., to enterprises by 
the financial, groups. 
PUTAHCIAL SERVICES AS A lETHOD OP MONOPOLY CONTROL 
A goad, way to e.s.tablish to which f i n a n c i a l 
group a company belongs i s to find out for whom i t 
provides the f i n a n c i a l services* The f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u -
tions that act as. organisational centers of groups, en-
deavour to monopolise the provision of financial, services 
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for 'itheir" companies and to extend them to the maximum* 
P-inancial- services are in t h i s case a means of r a i s i n g 
the p r o f i t s of a group (by holding on to a share; of the. 
value that would otherwise have to be paid to other 
banks rendering these services and charging exhorbitant 
fees for t h e i r services, to small companies., or to any 
independent companies i n d i f f i c u l t i e s ) * At the same time 
they are a. powerful means of extending the group's, sphere 
of control. 
The central, bank of the group generally 
handles, the current payments of "their" enterprises and 
negotiates, a l l important f i n a n c i a l transactions:, the 
increase i n the company's, c a p i t a l , the floating of bonds, 
the payment of dividends to sharehfitlders.v. the floating 
of new s e c u r i t i e s of the. company on the stock exchange 
and the representation of i t a intereB.ta there • 
At present f i n a n c i a l services are 
of tJen rendered to companies not by a single bank, but by 
several f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s which belong to different-
f i n a n c i a l groupa. Within these consortiums, there i s 
generally one bank that i s the main representative of 
the enterprise's, i n t e r e s t s and i s used by the monopoly 
elite , of the f i n a n c i a l group to control the enterprise. 
The participation of the same f i n a n c i a l groups i n a 
large, number of consortiums generally indicates that 
these groups are drawing close together, that a growing 
interpenetration i s leading to the gradual emergence of. 
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an even more pcwerful f i n a n c i a l and economic union, 
into whose sphere of influence several "old" f i n a n c i a l 
groups are drawn,. 
Fin a n c i a l services, are. very frequently 
combined with other kinds of se3rvices from the central, 
companies of the group, which are used by the f i n a n c i a l 
magnates to tighten control and to expand the group's, 
sphere of influence, Por example, since they have a 
large s t a f f of sp e c i a l l y trained people, banks and other-
cent r a l companies, for certain commodities, make recomenda.-
tions to enterprises, establish links with foreign 
customers for them, and help them on various technico-
economic, f i n a n c i a l and economic matters. 
PINfflNCIAL GROUPS AND THE FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY 
The s o c i a l group that controls the 
parent companies or the nucleus of the f i n a n c i a l groups 
i s the "Pinancial Oligarchy". I t i s a method, by which 
a. handful"of f i n a n c i a l magnates can establish and extend 
t h e i r rule over a vast number of i n d u s t r i a l , f i n a n c i a l 
and other enterprises. 
There i s , of course, no one type of 
f i n a n c i a l corporate, hierarchy, but one. general featuiEa 
of the corporate world does seem to prevail quite widely. 
I t involves a. number one stratum at the top - the con-
t r o l l i n g block of shareholders, the board of directors 
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and the president and vice-president - whose, members, 
advise and counsel, and receive reports from a number two 
stratum of operating managers. 
I t i s of the 'number one stratum' that 
the F i n a n c i a l Oligarchy i s a part. The 'number one strar-
tum' are the controlers, directors and co-ordinators. of 
the process of production and the f i n a n c i a l means.. And 
the 'number, two stratum' are the s c i e n t i s t s , technologists 
and the non-controlling block of shareholders, (small and 
medium shareholders). I t i s something l i k e the " l i n e " 
and the " s t a f f " division iiivented. by the army. The top 
i s s t a f f ; the number two i s l i n e , and thus operational. 
The. number two executives are individually 
responsible for given units, plants, departments, etc.. 
They stand between the active working hierarchies and 
the directing tcip to which they are responsible. And in 
t h e i r monthly and yearly reports to the top executives, 
one simple set of questions i s foremost: did we make 
money,, i f so, how much? I f not, why not? The 'number 
two' men, for example, may negotiate for months with the. 
salesmen over a. tubeless t i r e before the top executive 
descend to operation-level conferences... Theirs i s not 
the idea nor even the decision, but the judgement. On 
the top l e v e l s t h i s judgement usually has to do with 
the investment of money to make more money and the 
getting of others to do the work involved. "The running 
of a. large business c a n s i s t a e s s e n t i a l l y of getting. 
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somebody.to make something which somebody else w i l l , 
s e l l to somebody else for more than i t costs" (10). 
The 'number two stratum' .of managers 
are. mainly s p e c i a l i s t s . 
"We s i t at our desks a l l day, while around 
us gyrate a. vast number of s p e c i a l a c t i v i t i e s , 
some of which we. only dimly understand. And 
for each of these activities., t h e r e i i s a a 
s p e c i a l i s t ., .. ."' ". .: .All. of them, no., 
doubt, are good to have.. A l l seem to be. 
necessary. A l l are useful on frequent ocas.-
sions. But i t has; reached the point where. 
the greatest task of the president i s to 
understand enough of a l l . these s p e c i a l i t i e s 
so that when a problem comes up. he can assign 
the right team.of experts.to work on i t . " (11) 
On On the middle levels.,, specialization 
is. required. But generally the operating s p e c i a l i s t w i l l , 
not r i s e , only the "broadened." man w i l l r i s e . 7/hat does 
i t mean? I t means, for one thing, that the s p e c i a l i s t 
i s below the l e v e l on which men are wholly alerted, to 
p r o f i t , The "broadened" man i s the man who^ : no matter 
what he may be doing, i s able c l e a r l y to see the way to 
maximize the p r o f i t for the corporation as a. v/hole. 
The man who r i s e s to the top i s the broadened man whose, 
specialty coincides, with the aims of the corporation, 
which i ^ the maximizing of profit.. Pinancial expiedency 
i s the chief element of corporate decision, and generally, 
the higher the executive, the more he devotes his atten-
tion to the f i n a n c i a l aspect.. What, i s needed, as Gustavo 
Piquero remarked, " i s not s.pecialize.d knowledge, but. 
persuasive salesmanship, coupled with the a b i l i t y to 
command the millions and the investment-sales machinery 
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of a large, banking house, and to command also the 
servicea of astute^ corporation lawyers and s.tock market 
operators, (12) 
The closer to "the number one stratum"' 
the executive gets., the more important are the big-pro--
perjtied cliques, and p o l i t i c a l influence i n the making 
of h i s top executive career. "To be a. top manager i n 
a. ' f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l group' you have to be. an important 
stockholder or you have to represent one". (13) 
Seventy—tv/o per cent of the to.p execu-
t i v e s interviewed are. part, of the "controlling block of. 
shareholders" and the r e s t a:lways. represent a big share-
holder or an important group of them.. 
When one reads the speeches and reports 
of executives about the type of man that, i s required., one 
can not avoid t h i s simple conclusion: he must f i t i n 
with those already at the top» This means that he mus.t 
meet the expectations of hi s superiors;;, that i n personal, 
manners and p o l i t i c a l views, i n s o c i a l ways, and business 
s t y l e , he must be l i k e those who. are already i n the 
"number one stratum"-. 
The myth about "democratisation of 
c a p i t a l " , one of the main p i l l a r s of the theory of 
"neocapitalism", include a number of postulates - on 
the revolution i n ownership, production management. 
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income and the role of the State- - a l l of them based, 
on the differences and interelations between "the number 
one stratum" of managers; and shareholders.. This theory 
maintains that the spread of joint-stock companies and 
the wealth of property, that every shareholder, however 
small, becomes, a profit-making co-owner, of capital.. 
This theory i s confused i n two aspects: 
Pirs.t., i t confuses, two different processes.: concentration 
of c a p i t a l and s o c i a l i s a t i o n of production. Joint-
stock companies are not^i^re^oiatiLoBSlincQsmec'aMp'",' 
but only a. change, i n the form of private c a p i t a l i s t 
ownership.. Individual c a p i t a l i s t property merely becomes 
co l l e c t i v e c a p i t a l i s t property. But c a p i t a l i s t group 
property i s by no means s o c i a l property.. I t remains 
private property i n content, since the means of production 
remain i n monopoly possession, of the c a p i t a l i s t class; 
while the producers - the workers - are deprived, of. 
the means^ of production* And second., that c r u c i a l de.-
ci s i o n s on finanee5.1capital investment, e t c , are not 
taken by the "number two stratum" of managers and share-
holders, but i n every company by i t s "number one stratum", 
s p e c i a l l y by i t s board of directors* And the t y p i c a l 
board, of. directors i s not made up of departmental mana-
gers.-, s c i e n t i s t s or small shareholders.;, the c r u c i a l 
grouping i s the decisive shareholders. As I stated, 
e a r l i e r , "the board of the company i s elected at the 
general shareholders.' meeting and e.very shareholder has 
as many votes., as he possesses shares. The bigger share-
holders usually come to an agreement so as to f u l l y 
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control the shareholders' meeting* 
Sometimes a r i c h family w i l l hold the 
controlling block of share a, tithati?,£:enough-: too ensure, 
control over the company. Always in a joint-stock company 
i t i s the. board of directors who e l e c t s the "number one 
s.tratum" of managers - presidents and vice-presidents. 
V/e cannot interpret ownership as a 
formal right to income.. A share in the hands of a small, 
shareholder i s a symbol of ownership rather than r e a l 
possession of things concealed behind i t . The history 
of capitalism i s l i t t e r e d with " t i t l e s " , pieces of 
share paper, e t c I , which are worthless; that story i s . 
repeated,, s p e c i a l l y for small shareholders, every day. 
Marx., in the German Ideology wrote: " I f , for instance., 
the income from a piece of land i s lo s t owing to competi-
tion., then the proprietor certainly has his legal t i t l e 
to. i t .. . . but- he can do nothing with i t ... ." The 
important thing i s the relationship created by the fact 
that the means of production are privately owned., with 
a small group i n decisive ownership and control... The; 
small shareholder in the 'Financial Group' or in the 
c a p i t a l i s t society, as before, are deprived, of the means 
of production and are compelled to s.ell t h e i r labour 
power... For t h i s reason, we have to distinguish not only 
ownership of the means of production from ownership of. 
consumer goods, but also the decisive owners from those 
shareholdings which are nominal in relation to the way 
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they make-, th e i r l i v i n g * 
The diffusion of share among "the 
number one stratum" of shareholders, f a r from preventing, 
f i n a n c i a l magnates, from seizing joint-stock s o c i e t i e s , 
on the contrary, f a c i l i t a t e s t h i s task for them. SmalL 
shareholders need a smaller number of shares to win a 
majority of votes. In the f i n a n c i a l joint-stock societiea 
c a p i t a l i s i n possesion of several capit a l i s t s , rather 
then one, i , e . , of the board of directors.. But to make 
up for i t , the c a p i t a l at the dispoal of thses c a p i t a l i s t s 
i s many times larger then th e i r former individual pro-
perty* Through the system of shares a handful of finan-
c i a l magnates, has the entire c a p i t a l at their disposal. 
"To be able to handle the a f f a i r s of a 'Financial. Group', 
the c a p i t a l i s t only needs to have controlling interest, 
which i s approximately 25 per cent, and sometimes much 
l e s s , of the t o t a l values, of- shares.". (14.) 
The a b i l i t y of the joint-stock form to 
u t i l i s e small, packets, of money and the development, of the 
stock exchange as.- an instrument for buying and selling, 
of shares, have given r i s e to. a. wide, stratum of share-
holders, whose interesti.is. not the control of the company. 
They do not expect control but a. share in the profit 
made byv.the effective controllers.. Their concern has, 
in large part, been with the dividends and not with the 
t o t a l p r o f i t - a b i l i t y of the firm. 
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In t h i s way, instead of 'co l l e c t i v i s a e 
tion of c a p i t a l ' and 'expansion of the range of owners'' 
c a p i t a l i s in fact concentrated in- the hands of a hand-
f u l of c a p i t a l i s t s who reap, the f r u i t of production, 
which i s ' s o c i a l - i n character*-
THE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN STATE AND THE PINANCIAL OLIGARCHY 
Before, going on to an analysis of the 
in t e r - r e l a t i o n and coalescence among "the state" and the 
"f i n a n c i a l oligarchy" we have to clear up the concept of 
"state". There i s one problem about "the s.tate." whicli 
i s very seldom considered,, yet which requires:, .attention • 
i f t h i s discussion i s . to be properly focused.. This i s 
the f a c t that "the s.tate" i s . not a'thing, that i t does 
not, as such, e x i s t . What "the state"' stands for is . a 
number of particular i n s t i t u t i o n s which, together, consti-
tute; i t s : r e a l i t y , and which interact as part of what. 
may be cal l e d the state system. These are. the ins t i t u t i o n s : 
THE GdVERNT/ENT 
THE ADMINISTRATION - which now extends far. 
beyond, t r a d i t i o n a l bureaucracy of. the state, 
and which encompasses a large variety of bodies, 
often related to particular ministerial- de.part;-
ments, or enjoying a greater or l e s s e r degree 
• of autonomy - public corporations, "Banco de 
l a Republica", "Junta Monetaria", "Superinten-
dencia. Banc a r i a " , etc.. - and concerned with 
the management of the economic, s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l 
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and other a c t i v i t i e s i n which the st a t e i s 
now d i r e c t l y or in d i r e c t l y involved., 
THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE - and the para-
mil i t a r y and security forces of the s.tate, and. 
which together form that branch of i t mainly 
concerned with the "management of violence". 
THE. JUDICIAL BRANCH - Judges, "Corte Suprema 
de.. J u s t i c i a " , etc, 
PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES - "Senado", "Camara", 
"Asembleas. Departamentales", "Concejos Munici— 
pales.", etc.. 
I t i s thes.e institutions i n which "state 
power" l i e s , and i t i s through them that t h i s power is; 
wielded, in i t a different manifestations by the people 
who occupj^- the leading position in each of these i n s t i t u -
tions - presidents of Colombia, ministers, top military 
men, judges^ of the "Corte Suprema.de J u s t i c i a " , leading 
members, of parliamentary assemblies, etc.. 
I t i s not very surprising that govern-
ment and state, should often appear as synonymous.. For 
i t i s the government which speaks on the state.'s behalf.. 
I t was the state to which Weber was referring when he 
said, i n a. famous phrase, that,, in order to govern i t 
must "successfully claim the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical farce within a given t e r r i t o r y " (15) 
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But the "state" cannot , claim anything,: only, the govem.-
ment of the day, or i t s . duly empowered agents, can. Men., 
i t i s often said, give the i r allegiance not to the govern-
ment of the day but to the. state, yet from thi s point 
of view, the s.tate, i s a. nebulous entity; and while men 
may choose to give t h e i r allegiance to i t , i t i s to 
the government that they are required to give their 
obedience. A defiance of i t s orders i s a defiance of 
the state, whose name the government alone may speak, 
and for whose actions i t must assume ultimate responir-
s i b i l i t y . 
This, however, does, not mean that the 
government i s necessarily strong, either i n relat i o n to 
other elements of the state system or to forces outside; 
i t . On the contrary, i t may be very weak, and provide 
a mere facade, for one or other of these other elements 
and forces.. In other words, the fact that the government, 
does, speak i n the name of the state and i s formally 
invested with state power, does not mean that i t effec-
t i v e l y controls, that power. 
The coalescence, of the f i n a n c i a l 
groups and the state proceeds in two main directions.. 
On the one hand, there i s a growing monopolisation of 
the state, that i s , the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy increasingly 
takes over the state with a l l the resources, and powers.* 
On the other, the state i s taking over the c a p i t a l i s t 
economy in most diverse forms. The state becomes a big 
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i n d u s t r i a l i s t , merchant and banker - the Colombian 
state holds almost a third of the t o t a l assets of the 
Colombian, banking and credit system.. State regulation 
extends to a l l the most important aspects of c a p i t a l i s t 
reproduction, (16) 
In t h i s mechanism, subordinated to 
the interests of the f i n a n c i a l groups, the Colombian 
state commands a r e l a t i v e autonomy necessary to enable 
the bourgeois state to defend the common interests of. 
f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l . This autonomy i s due mainly to the. 
important role the state plays in the Colombian economy. 
The state must manoeuvre i n i t s policy, taking into 
account the competitive struggle between financial, 
groupings, and also the contradictions, between monopoly 
and non-monopoly c a p i t a l . The state acts not only in the. 
current, but also, sometimes mainly in the basic interests 
of f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l . In questions of economy, p o l i t i c s 
and c l a s s relations i t must adopt and implement long-
term decisions directed f i r s t and foremost at. reducing 
the threat at the very foundations of monopoly rule. I t 
often happens that the current needs of individual 
monopoly grouping clash with the basic interes.ts of 
f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l as a whole. In t h i s event the state, 
w i l l subordinate the f i r s t to the second, even at the 
r i s k of the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of some f i n a n c i a l groupings -
for example, President Lleras interferred with "Bavaria" 
f i n a n c i a l group to control their economic diversification.. 
A l l t h i s means that the monopolies themselves need the 
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state's autonomy to secure their v i t a l interes.ts. 
Even though the coalescence. of "s.tate-
financial-o.ligarchy"- occurs at., a l l l e v e l s and i n a l l . 
the state"s i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h i s coalescence can beat be 
seen by looking at the personal unions betwe.en the 
f i n a n c i a l groups and the government* These, personal 
l i n k s develcp along three, l i n e s : 
1) High government o f f i c i a l s hold key posts 
i n f i n a n c i a l groups. — 6 out of 5.. presidents, of. Colombia, 
during the "Prente Nacional", have had. key positions in. 
f i n a n c i a l groups. Six.ty per. cent of a l l the "Ministras 
dei Desarrollo" during the "Prente. Nacional" have very 
strong connections with the f i n a n c i a l groups* 
2;) F i n a n c i a l agents hold key positions in 
the government;; 30% of the members of the f i n a n c i a l 
oligarchy have had important, posts, i n the st a t e ' s 
f i n a n c i a l institutions, and public, corporations, 
3.) The f i n a n c i a l oligarchy takes the most r 
responsible posts in the government;. 10% of a l l the 
members of the "Banco de l a Republica", "Junta Monetaria", 
"Superintendencia Bancaria." and "Government Own Commercial 
Banks" boards of directors, belong to the f i n a n c i a l 
oligarchy. "Pinancial groups always have thei r own 
share i n the government; they have always, been very well 
represented i n the most important state i n s t i t u t i o n s . (17) 
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I t majr .be- granted that members, of 
the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy who enter the state system, 
i n whatever capacity, may not think of themselves as. 
representatives, of f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l i n general or 
even less of t h e i r own f i n a n c i a l group i n pa r t i c u l a r . 
But even though the w i l l to think i n "national" terms, 
may v/ell be strong, financiers involved i n government 
and administration are not very l i k e l y , a l l the same, 
to f i n d merit i n policies v/hich appear to run counter 
to what they conceive to be the interests of f i n a n c i a l 
c a p i t a l , much less to make themselves the advocates of 
such p o l i c i e s , since they are almost by d e f i n i t i o n most 
l i k e l y to believe such policies, to be inimical to the. 
"national interest"». 
Notwithstanding the substantial 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy i n the business; 
of the state, i t " i s however true that they have never-
constituted, and do not constitute now., more than a 
r e l a t i v e minority of the state e l i t e as a whole. I t i a 
i n t h i s sense that the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy of Colombia 
i s not, properly speaking, a. "'governing" class.. But, 
because they control more means of production and because 
they subordinated the state to the interests, of the 
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CHAPTER IV - FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
There i s a widespread impression among 
top financiers that the "Financial Oligarchy", as a l l the, 
corporate world, i s divided into two irreconciable factions: 
The owners, of the c a p i t a l , that i s the shareholders, and 
the controllers of the corporation, that i s the managers;,, 
that the control of the. "Financial Group" has. passed, 
in t o the hands of an increasingly professional group of 
manager.s:^;whQsecinterests are d i s t i n c t from those of the. 
shareholders and v/ho pursue t h e i r own policies.;, that the. 
control by a small group of dominant shareholders i s not. 
very important, and that the commonest type of control 
i s by a professional management which i s not i t s e l f a 
signifi c a n t , owner.. This leads to the view that t h i s 
professional management, unlike the shareholder, i s no.t 
pr i m a r i l y concerned with self-enrichment.. The managers 
are said to be more concerned with production rather than 
with p r o f i t , w i t h efficiency rather than exploitation, 
w i t h rank and s.tatus. rather than wealth. Not being 
shareholders, they prefer, to plough p r o f i t s back rather 
than to d i s t r i b u t e them i n dividends. 
From t h i s view of the managerial 
element as free from the direct pressure of the owners, 
of. the property which i t controls, i t i s but a short 
step to the claim that these managers constitute a 
d i s t i n c t economic and social grouping, with impulses, 
interests or motivations fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from 
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and even antagonistic to the interests, of mere share-
holders. They do als.o generally tend, i m p l i c i t l y or 
quite often e x p l i c i t l y , to claim that managerial motives 
and impulses are necessarily better, less s e l f i s h , more, 
so c i a l l y responsible, more closely concerned with the. 
public i n t e r e s t , than the shareholder... 
This view we have already encountered 
i n an elementary form i n the "nuetral technocracy" oL 
Berle and Means and the "Soulful Corporation"cdf. Car.L 
Kaysen: i t i s developed more elaborately i n such works 
as James Burham's "The Managerial Revolution" and Berle's 
"The 20th Century C a p i t a l i s t Revolution.". 
Carl Kaysen, i n a paper delivered at 
the 1956. annual meeting of the "American Economic. Associa-
t i o n " , speaks, of "the wide.-ranging scope of responsibility 
assumed by management"as one of the "characteristic -?a 
f.6atur.es. of behavior "of the modern corporation, and pro-
ceeds, as., f ollov7S;: 
No longer the agent of proprietorship 
aeeking to maximiz.a return on investment, 
management sees, i t s e l f as. responsible to 
stockholdera, employees., customers, the 
general public, and, perhaps, most impor-
tant, the f i r m i t s e l f as an i n s t i t u t i o n . 
. . From one point of view, t h i s behavior 
can be termed responsible: there is. no 
display of greed or graspingness.; there-
i s no attempt to push o f f onto workers; 
or the community at large part of tha 
social costs, of the enterprise. The 
modem corporation i s a s o u l f u l corpora-
t i o n . '(1.) 
Burham • s argument i s that the managers.. 
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are taking over the economic power which was formerly i n 
the hands of the c a p i t a l i s t owners of industry, and 
are thus acquiring the power to shape the whole social, 
system. He supports his thesis - which requires that the 
managers shall, have d i s t i n c t social group interests i n 
a struggle f o r power - by attempting to show that the. 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ideology of capitalism i s being replaced, 
by a managerialist ideology.. He argues that we are 
l i v i n g i n a period of t r a n s i t i o n from one type of society 
to another, from c a p i t a l i s t society to a. type of society 
which he proposes to c a l l the "managerial society". 
There i s a voluminous l i t e r a t u r e , 
dating back to the turn of the century and reaching i t s 
culmination i n the famous work of Berle and Means which 
argues, most emphatically that the modern corporation 
represents; a. q u a l i t a t i v e break with the older form of 
i n d i v i d u a l enterprise and that r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t types. 
of behavior are to be expected from i t . According to 
Berle and Means: 
I t i s conceivable - indeed i t seems, 
almost inevitable i f the corporate system 
i s to suvive - that the "control" of the. 
great corporations should develop into 
a. purely neutral technocracy, balancing 
a. variety of. claims by various groups i n 
the community and assigning to each a 
portion of the income streaia on the basis 
of public policy rather than private 
cupidity, (2.) 
A l l these views are linked with the theory 
about the spread of ^oint-stock companies - the diffusion 
of shares, among "the number two stratum" of shareholders.. 
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Many advocates of t h i s theory are ;;trying very hard. to. 
prove that under the present conditions the c a p i t a l i s t s 
have l o s t t h e i r r i g h t to the control, of. the economy. 
The American economist A. Berle writea: "The transforma-
t i o n of property from an active role to passive wealth 
has so operated that the wealthy stratum nc longer has 
power.. The function of control has., been taken over, by 
hired managers, depicted, as. "representative- of the people". (30 
According to these viewa, the. maximisa-
t i o n of p r o f i t s haa ceased to b.e the guiding pri n c i p l e 
of management. They, being self-appointed, and responsible-
to no outside group, are free to choose t h e i r aims and 
i n the t y p i c a l case are assumed to subordinate the old 
fashioned hunt f o r p r o f i t s . t o a variety of other, quant-
i t a t i v e l y lesa precise but q u a l i t a t i v e l y more worthy, 
objectives.. 
The implications of t h i s doctrine are; 
f a r reaching. The t r u t h i s that i f i t i s accepted, the 
whole corpus of t r a d i t i o n a l economic theory must be 
abandoned. This has been most e f f e c t i v e l y pointed out. 
by Mason: 
But i f p r o f i t maximization i s not tha 
dir e c t i n g agent, how are: resources a l -
located to t h e i r most productive uses., 
what r e l a t i o n have prices to relative, 
s c a r c i t i e s , and how do factors get 
remunierated i n accordance with t h e i r 
contribution to output? Assume ano 
economy composed of a few hundred large 
corporations, each enjoying substantial 
market power and a l l directed by manage-
ments with a "conscience". Each manage-
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ment v/ants to do the best i t can f o r 
society consistent, of course, with 
doing the best i t can f o r labor, cus,-
tomers, suppliers, and ov/ners.. How 
do prices get determined i n such an 
economy? How are factors remunerated, 
and what r e l a t i o n i s there between r e -
muneration and performance? What i s 
the mechanism, i f any, that assures 
effective resources use, and how can 
corporate, managements "do r i g h t by" 
labor, suppliers, customers, and owners, 
while simultaneously serving the public 
interest? (4) 
Along with the interviews, I made. a. 
search of management literature., both general and special-
ized, and I found that the most important aim of the 
Calombian Financial Oligarchy, whether as shareholders 
or managers,; i s the pursuj-t and achievement of the "high-
est possible practicable" p r o f i t f o r t h e i r own enterprise.-, 
A long-tea?m p r o f i t rather than a short-term p r o f i t maximi-
zation. They are very concerned about cost reduction, 
the expansion of revenue, and the increase of p r o f i t s . 
They give much importance to standards and to. the need, 
of remedying unsatisfactory situations. The drive i s 
always toward the better, and frequently the best, not 
j u s t the good. They have a. strong tendency to the grov/ing 
use of economists., and management consultants... The main 
function of most of these people i s to help top managers, 
•reduce costs, f i n d superior methods, choose the most 
p r o f i t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e , and uncover new p r o f i t oppbxtunities, 
As these people gain i n influence i n business councils, 
p r o f i t oriented r a t i o n a l i t y i s l i k e l y to be more and more, 
representative of top f i n a n c i a l managers. 
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I was: impressed by the rapid develop-
ment of a n a l y t i c a l and managerial ctechniq.aes;";thatVboth 
stimulate and assist the f i n a n c i a l corporation to f i n d 
the least costly ways of doing things and the most 
pr o f i t a b l e thing to doi There are also greatly improved 
forms of accounting and budgeting, improved methods of 
market analysis, and refinements i n business forecasting. 
The unifying character of these techniques, i s that they 
seek to apply the principles of r a t i o n a l problem-solving 
to business, planning and decision making. 
The theory of "highest possible prac-
t i c a b l e " p r o f i t s has been pointed out by James. Earley of 
the University of Wisconsin who had been engaged, for. 
a number of years on a study of management pol i c i e s ; 
The major goals of modern large-scale, 
business are high mangerial incomes, good 
p r o f i t s , a strong competitive position, 
and growth. Modern management does not 
view these goals as seriously inconsistent 
but rather, indeed, aa necessary, one 
to the other. Competitive strength 
and s u r v i v a l , management believes, require large innovative and substantial growth 
expenditures i n the rapidly changing 
technical and market conditions of the 
present day. Since growth by merger i s 
hazardous and frequently impossible, 
large and more or less continuous c a p i t a l 
expenditures are necessary. For w e l l -
recognized reasons, management wishes, 
to minimize outside financing, so the,' 
funds f o r most of these expenditures-
must be i n t e r n a l l y generated. This r e -
quires high and growing p r o f i t s above 
dividend levels. So, too, do high manager-
i a l rewards.. High and r i s i n g p r o f i t s 
are. hence an instrument as well as: a. 
di r e c t goal of great importance. 
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W'ith these goals and needs i n view, 
advanced management plans f o r p r o f i t , 
through time, using coordinated programs 
s.tretching as f a r ahead as'practicable. 
The p r o f i t targets, incorporated i n these 
programs are s u f f i c i e n t to finance not 
only good dividends but also desired 
innovative and growth expenditures. The 
programs are revised frequently, as. ex-
perience accrues and new opportunities, 
are discovered.. 
The tendency toward p r o f i t maximization 
appears i n t h i s system along several, 
dimensions. In the process ofrrevising 
and reformulating programs, more expen-
sive and less p r o f i t a b l e a c t i v i t i e s are 
pruned or dropped and cheaper or more: 
pr o f i t a b l e ones are added. Less costly 
processes and the more profitable, product 
and market sectors serve as. the standards 
toward which others are expected.to con-
verge or be replaced. By steadily select-
ing those methods and sectors that promise 
better returns, these standards are kept 
high and, i f possible, r i s i n g . F i n a l l y , 
the overall p r o f i t and grov/th targets of 
the enterprise as a whole are r^iised 
through time, unless adversity prevents. 
These goals and programs and standards, 
i t i s true, represent at any time "aspira-
tions levels" and the e f f o r t s to 'satisfy 
them receive prime attention. But the 
two major points about them are that: 1) 
they are to be hard to reach and 2) they 
w i l l o r d i n a r i l y recede, through time. 
Even i n good times the firm's aspiration 
levels, therefore ar.e f a i r l y taut, and 
they are. highly 'elas.tic upward. On the 
other hand, there is.a great resistance 
to adjusting p r o f i t and other standards 
downward, so that i n bad times the business, 
f i r m t r i e s even harder to make the highest 
practicable p r o f i t s . (.5) 
Earley i n t h i s statement introduces, a 
healthy corrective to the conventional notion of p r o f i t ; 
maKimization, This conventional notion has been t i e d to 
a. more or less e x p l i c i t l y stated assumption that the 
maximizing entrepreneur has complete knowledge of a l l . 
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alternatives, open to him and of the consequences, of choosing 
any combination of them. Given t h i s assumption, he can 
always select the combination of alternatives which y i e l d s 
an absolute, maximum. Further, i f i t is. assumed that his. 
knowledge remains equally complete i n the face of changing, 
conditions, i t follows l o g i c a l l y that he can always, make 
instantaneous and appropriate adjustments, to new circumstances,. 
What i s involved here i s an assumption of omniscience on 
the part of the entrepreneur which, f a r from being a useful 
abstraction, i s of course.an absurdity* 
The f i r m (whether individual, 
entrepreneur or f i n a n c i a l corporation makes, no difference) 
always finds i t s e l f i n a given h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , with 
l i m i t e d knowledge of changing conditions. I j i t h i s context 
i t can never, do. more than improve i t s p r o f i t position,. In 
practice, the search f o r "maximum" profits, can only ba 
the search f o r the greatest increase i n p r o f i t a which i s 
possible i n the given s i t u a t i o n , subject, of course to thc-
elementary proviso., that the exploitation of today's p r o f i t 
opportunities; must not r u i n tomorrow's.. 
Alternative goals such as:. 
growth, size, status, high managerial income, a. strong 
competitive position, etc., could be reducible to the. 
single common denominator of " p r o f i t a b i l i t y " . As Baran 
and Sweezy put i t , " p r o f i t s even though not the ultimata 
goal, are the necessary means to a l l ultimate goals.. As 
such, they become the immediate unique, unifying, quantita-
t i v e aim of corporate p o l i c i e s , the touchstone of corporate ' 
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r a t i o n a l i t y , the measure of corporate, success", (6.) 
Like big shareholders, top 
f i n a n c i a l managers are marked by the supreme,- contradiction 
of which Marx S-poke a. hundred years, ago, namely the contra-
d i c t i o n between i t s ever more social character and i t s en-
duringly private, purpose.. I t i s absurd to think that 
f i n a n c i a l managers, who are the main instruments of t h a t 
contradiction, should also be able to overcome i t by some 
"s o u l f u l " e f f o r t of w i l l . For them to do so must e n t a i l 
the denial of the very purpose of t h e i r a c t i v i t y , whicih 
i s the.achievement of private p r o f i t . 
Inside the Colombian f i n a n c i a l 
system the normal procedure: f o r an ambitious manager i s 
to work himself up to as near the top as possible of aa 
powerful and big a.financial corporation as possible. 
Once he enters a. given Financial Corporation, he devotes 
himself to two ends:, ascending the managerial ladder. 
and advancing the r e l a t i v e status, of his f i n a n c i a l 
group i n the corporative world. In practice these two 
ends are indistinguishable:, the manager's r i s e i n the 
f i n a n c i a l group depends on his contribution to improving 
the position of the group. This i s the crux of the 
matter, and t h i s i s why we can say that the f i n a n c i a l 
top manager i s dedicated to the advancement of his company 
precisely to the extent that he i s dedicated to advancing ' 
himself".- (7) 
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.Sometimes tension occurs 
between managers and shareholders, and occasionally 
erupts into c o n f l i c t . Shareholders, f o r instance, may 
f e e l that mangers are i n s u f f i c i e n t l y dividend-conscious, 
or too generous to themselves, by way of emulments, or 
too ready to spend, money f o r purposes, net immediately and 
obviously related to the making of p r o f i t ; and managers 
f o r t h e i r part may f e e l that shareholders, are more concerned 
w i t h short-term rather than long-term p r o f i t . But these 
are t a c t i c a l differences within a strategic consensus of. 
" p r o f i t maximization". The differences of purpose and 
motivation which may exist between them are overshadowed, 
by a basic community of interests,. 
I t i s of course true that i n 
the t y p i c a l Colombian f i n a n c i a l group the "number ona 
stratum" of management i s not subject to small stock-
holder c o n t r o l , and i n t h i s sense the separation of owner-
ship from control i s a f a c t . But there i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r concluding from t h i s that top management i s divorced 
from big ownership. Quite the contrary, managers are among 
the biggest shareholders: seventy-two per cent of the. 
top executives interviewed are part of the co n t r o l l i n g 
.block of shareholders of the f i n a n c i a l group i n which they 
are managera {A0% are representatives of t h e i r family 
t r u s t and 32% are. i n d i v i d u a l shareholders). And only 28% 
of them are medium or small shareholders, but a l l of them 
are elected by the shareholders' committee, a l l of them, 
are; agents, or representatives of big shareholders,, This 
139 
means that they can be removed from\ .their jcbs when ever 
the shareholders f e e l l i k e doing so. 
Even when managers, are not 
important shareholders i n t h e i r own companies, the.y ar.e3 
usually very wealthy men. Very high salaries, are the 
common characteristic of the top f i n a n c i a l managers. 
Salaries: over, a half m i l l i o n pesos annually are f a i r l y 
common, and higher ones are not exactly rare. Eighty-
nine percent of. the top executives interviev/ed were, 
found to have a. salary of more, than 600.000 pesos 
annually, excluding income derived from share ownership, 
pensions and retirement provisions, extra, bonus., expense 
accounts, etc.. 
Among the accoutrements, that. 
often go with the top executive salary but never reported, 
to tax collectors, are such benefits as these: free medical 
care, payments of club fees, company lawyer and accountants 
available f o r tax, f i n a n c i a l and legal advice, f a c i l i t i e s 
f o r entertaining customers, recreation, f a c i l i t i e s , expen-
sive holidays abroad, scholarship funds f o r children o£. 
executives, company automobiles, etc.- A company dedicated, 
to keeping i t s top managers, happy can with a l l propriety 
have., a company airplane f o r business t r i p s and a yacht 
i n Cartagena and a. hunting f i s h i n g lodge i n "Los Llanos 
Orientales," to entertain i t s biggest customers. I t can 
also arrange to hold i t s conventions i n San Andreas, Miami, 
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or Mexico. The e f f e c t , as f a r as company executives go., 
i s to provide t r a v e l and vacation f a c i l i t i e s without cost. 
The top. f i n a n c i a l managers, can have t h e i r holidays, any 
where;; take along enough work or enough customers to 
j u s t i f y the t r i p and proceed to have a. pleasant time. 
A l l these benefits are. free to the executive, and they 
are deductible as. an ordinary business expense by the 
corporation. These benefits can easily double or t r i p l e ; 
the manager's salary. That, salary, f o r the 85% of the. 
top managers, only represents. 15% to 20% of t h e i r t o t a l 
income. 
I t ; should be noted that the; 
social o r i g i n of the top f i n a n c i a l manager-.in?Cblombia. 
i s generally the same as that of other men of. high 
income and large property. These managers, come from 
high status f a m i l i e s . Their fathers are mainly owners of 
large business:: 56% are sons of important f i n a n c i a l 
shareholders; 18% of big commercial and i n d u s t r i a l entre-
preneurs; 12% of landowners; 11% of professional men. 
There are only 3.5% who are the sons of. "white, c o l l a r men". 
None of them are sons of artisans or manual workers. 
Among t h e i r r e l a t i v e s are to be found diplomats, big bus-
inessmen, large landowners;,, important army o f f i c e r s , influen-
t i a l p o l i t i c i a n s , etc. Even i f the socio-economic back-
ground of the top f i n a n c i a l managers i s traced back over 
two generations, they s t i l l appear to have experienced 
very l i t t l e s ocial m o b i l i t y . The occupations of t h e i r 
grandfather's s i g n i f y high social status. They were mostly 
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mostly landowners and big businessmen and they als.o 
included diplomats, p o l i t i c i a n s , doctors,-, c i v i l engineers, 
etc., 
Lfeny confuse the question of 
the class a f f i l i a t i o n of managers. Actually a special 
class of managers, i s non-existent. The lower echelons of 
the managerial apparatus, i,;e., those d i r e c t l y involved 
i n the process of material production, belong to the. 
" i n t e l l i g e n t s i a " and receive salaries. They are. not i n -
vested with the function of taking c r u c i a l decisions on 
the, a c t i v i t i e s of the enterprise, nor do they take part-
i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o f i t s . As f o r managers, i n the. 
"number one stratum"', they belong to the big monopoly 
bourgeoisie. Therefore, i t i s u t t e r l y wrong to depict 
them as representative of the people. Even they, however, 
control the a c t i v i t i e s , of corporations only when they have 
c o n t r o l l i n g interest i n the stock of shares, when thay are, 
i n e f f e c t , capitalists.. Thus the arguments, about the 
"managerial revolution" and"managerial society" axe. at 
variance with the realities... The basic aim of these, 
theories is. to camouflage the rule of the " f i n a n c i a l 
oligarchy" and the growth of i t s p r o f i t s . Tap managers 
receive huge income - hundreds of thousands of pesos a. 
year. This income i s one of the concrete forms, of appro-
p r i a t i o n of p r o f i t s , by the " f i n a n c i a l oligarchy". Bourgeois 
economists, t r y to conceal t h i s f a c t , depicting the "number 
one stratum" of managers as rank-and-file employees. 
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CHAPTER V: THE BIRTH AND THE MOBIIE FINANCIAI, OLIGARCHY 
The inteirview material- revealed the; 
career, patterns of the "financial-oligarchy"; how they 
reached and maintained t h e i r positions and the ways i n 
which job recruitment took place.. A l l t h i s was possible, 
by the manipulation of kinship or friendship ties, and 
by the possession of the r i g h t q ualifications and training, 
Because of the inter l a c i n g of kinship 
and friendship t i e s thraugh many "fin a n c i a l groups", one 
often hears the comment that i t i s not what you know but 
whom you know that counts i n getting, ahead. But perhaps, 
a l i t t l e more r e a l i s t i c i s the comment that i f a. f r i e n d 
can get you., i n the door - fromi then on you. are a l i t t l e , 
more on your own. Wo business can afford to hire and ad-
vance men who. can not compete, at a l l -
Looking more closely at the different, 
types, of pers-onal t i e a and the ways they operated, we f i n d 
that kinship was. functional f o r job recruitment and career 
advancement. There were two ways i n which kinship t i e s 
operated the .inheritance of a con t r o l l i n g shareholder 
position i n a " f i n a n c i a l group" and the manipulation of 
kin t i e s to secure a good job i n a "f i n a n c i a l group".. A l -
most f i f t y per cent of the sample had inherited t h e i r 
position i n a."financial group" from the previous genera-
t i o n of k i n , usually the father. Kin contacts were, also 
operative i n securing jobs i n "fin a n c i a l groups.." For 
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instance, many of the managers had f i r s t entered financial, 
groups through t h e i r father who had a fr i e n d who employed 
them. Both consanguineal and a f f i n a l ties, were used i n 
t h i s way. The s.paii of kinship t i e s used extended as f a r 
as:. second cousins. 
Friendship ties, operated i n a simila r 
way. Twenty per cent of the sample had gained, their, 
present positions through friendship t i e s . In most cases., 
there were, family friends., school friends and often, f r i e n d -
ships i n i t i a t e d at prestigious schools.. But i n general, 
a l l of them had manipulated personal t i e s to secure 
.positions during the course of t h e i r careers. 
Voluntary associations, i n general, 
helped the f i n a n c i a l men to make contacts useful f o r 
t h e i r careers... These clubs provided opportunities to 
make contacts.- which might, be useful both f o r job r e c r u i t -
ment and f o r doing business. One president of a bank 
t o l d me that he joined the "Bogotd Couatry Club" and 
took golf classes, there, simply because i t was a good way 
to make buainess; contacts.., especially with important 
American executives.. 
Some associations were, joined because 
membership was prestigious, though at the same time the. 
more prestigious the club the more i n f l u e n t i a l the contacts 
made there:. Members, of the Financial Oligarcliy tended 
to belong to the most prestigious clubs i n Bogotd -"Club , 
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Los Lagartoa", "Country:;;aiuby, '/Jockey:;Club.'/, '!Club..'de. 
Ejecutivos", etc... 
The importance of l o c a l connections; 
was; recognised', by several American Multinational corpora-
tions.,. In 1973, many of these corporations instead of. 
sending an American manager, to Colombia,, appointed a 
Colombian f o r the f i r s t time. This manager achieved 
the position through a b i l i t y and also because he was. 
considered to have useful connections.. 
In Colombia., as a r e s u l t of the great 
concentration and centralization of the f i n a n c i a l means, 
a. smalL"number of people have a great deal of influence 
over the f i n a n c i a l groups... Therefore, good connections 
are especially useful - a few goo.d connections can open 
up large areas of Colombian society.. Colombian financiers 
say that i n Colombia everyone knows, everyone else, meaning 
that everyone who i s anyone knows, everyone else. 
Another important means to mobility, is-
the possession of the r i g h t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and t r a i n i n g . 
Eighty-four per cent had some sort of further, education. 
Seventy per cent had attended university,; mo.st of them 
having graduated with a degree. Sixty-five per cent of. 
them had studied abroad* In these caaes., they had taken 
business or i n d u s t r i a l courses outside of Colombia, because 
they f e l t these were, of more value than those offered by 
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Colombian i n s t i t u t i o n s , . Many of them had taken courses, 
i n other parts of the world, especially i n the United 
States.. Here, there was. cl e a r l y a desire to gain a 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n better than that available i n Coloiibia. 
Qualification and t r a i n i n g are-.-very 
important i n Colombian f i n a n c i a l groups because they 
have to compete . with foreign corporations.,. I t means that, 
to be able to participate i n the i n d u s t r i a l and fi n a n c i a l , 
sectors, Colombian f i n a n c i a l groups must possess the 
same technological l e v e l and s k i l l e d personnel as the 
multinational corporations. This i n fac t tends to i n h i b i t 
the career of the aiitodidact. The nineteenth century 
European-style entrepreneur i s no longer possible. There-
f o r e , to be. successful, the twentieth century Colombian 
financier must acquire the r i g h t s k i l l s . 
V/hen studying the social mobility of. 
the Colombian f i n a n c i a l oligarchy we must keep i n mind 
two d i f f e r e n t types, of movements. The f i r s t , a v e r t i c a l , 
movement, i s from a lower occupational background to 
a. position i n the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy - movement out of 
the occupation of the father, through a succession of 
positions, to a position i n the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy. 
The second, a horizontal movement, i s from a-financial, 
background to a position i n the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy -
movement through a series of occupations with the intention 
of establishing i n t h e i r own persons the position their, 
father occupied i n the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy.- These two 
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movements, give r i s e to two main groups.:: "The mobile 
oligarchy" and "The b i r t h oligarc]:^". At the same time, 
the "mobile f i n a n c i a l oligarchy" can be divided into 
two groupar. "The well-bom mobile oligarchy" and "The. 
sociali-climber mobile oligarchy"* The "social-climber"' 
moves from an occupational background out of the c a p i t a l i s t 
class, or landowner class, to a position i n the financial, 
oligarchy* And the "well-bom" move from a c a p i t a l i s t , 
( a g r i c u l t u r a l , commercial and i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie.) 
or landowner background to a. position i n the financial, 
oligarchy,. 
THE "SOCIAL-CLIMBER" MOBILE FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY 
The "social-climber" mobile financial, 
oligarchy, 15% of the sample, i s represented by men whose 
fathers, were, members, of the "middle-classes";, small. 
' businessmen 3% and "white c o l l a r men 10^ ,. None of them 
were sons of artisans., peasants or manual workera* As. 
we can see,. 80% of the Colombian population i s deprived 
of. the p o s s i b i l i t y of moving up into the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy. 
These men have to traverse a large social 
distance to reach the top, and what i s more important, 
they have to go through the boundaries of the upper classes 
which implies the greatest social e f f o r t of moving up* 
These are men who come the long way from 
b i r t h i n t o a family of meager circumstances, with l i t t l e , 
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social prestige and less economic power. They are men 
who come from families with few or non.-useful. business 
and social connections. Generally, they have to make 
connections as they move up. 
These men did not have the advantage, 
of having k i n who were members, of prestigious clubs.,. 
Some of them had parents or kin members, of certain clubs, 
such as.:, l o c a l sports clubs, religious clubs, or working 
clubs, but none of them were, useful i n making t h e i r future 
f i n a n c i a l connections,. 
They ar.e men who did not i n h e r i t a. 
co n t r o l l i n g position i n a f i n a n c i a l group. They.usually 
do not have among t h e i r k i n diplomats, big shareholders., 
important p o l i t i c i a n s , large landowners, etc. In general, 
they started t h e i r careers without i n f l u e n t i a l friends, or 
ki n who could help them move up. 
They are men with less formal education 
and long hours of night school, those who worked t h e i r 
way through college. S i x t y - f i v e per cent of them have 
done some sort of professional t r a i n i n g which v/as. relevant 
to t h e i r work. Forty-five per cent of them have taken 
university courses,, most of them having graduated with 
a. degree. Only f i f t e e n per cent did hot f i n i s h high 
school. The majority of them who have university 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s have, attended state universities, or second 
class private universities, because they were., the only ones 
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they could a f f o r d * Only a few have studied abroad. 
Attendance at a university outside of Colombia requires 
a large f i n a n c i a l outlay. This kind of q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s 
cl e a r l y only available to the wealthy .unless they get an 
scholarship* And scholarships, specially to study 
abroad, are very d i f f i c u l t to obtain without good connections., 
I f we look at the way they financed 
t h e i r studies, we f i n d that half of them got t h e i r money 
exclusively from t h e i r family;, the existing scholarship 
system provided f o r the needa of 3 per cent of them;- 22% 
had to finance themselvea;,- another 25% had to v/ork to 
supplement themselvea. Thus 47% of them contributed to 
some extent by t h e i r own work to finance the ex.penses. 
involved i n t h e i r studies* 
There are at least two kinds, of "social-
climbers."* There are the powerful, resolute men with 
l i t t l e education who climb from job to job and, by 
enormous expenditure of energy, and always with the feeL-
ing of inadequate t r a i n i n g , reach the top; then there 
are the grov/ing number of college trained men who compete, 
with the f i r s t . ' ^ Fewer and fewer, of the "uneducated" . 
acheive. a. position i n the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy; .more often 
they remain as. "white c o l l a r men".. More often financial, 
groupa prefer to r i s k t h e i r money on college trained-men-...:~ 
.T£.e viiicr-teasihg^ pref erencei-.f oricolie^^ 
trained men f o r managerial advancement has put a c e i l i n g 
on the aspirations of men with no further education. The. 
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. need f o r college education can best be seen i n the. case; 
of. a. "sociaij-climber". 
Jaime Cendales, (the name i s f i c t i t i o u s ) 
was. bom i n Bogota, and came from a "middle class." family. 
His father, a bank cashier, died when Jaime was i n the 
l a s t year of high school. Therefore, he could not f i n i s h , 
high school Cbachillerato:). and he had to get a. f u l l - t i m e , 
joib to help the family''s finances.. A f t e r a few yeara he 
saved some money and took evening courses.- at a commercial, 
school. Starting as. an auditor, he gained valuable 
experience with several companies., jo i n i n g "Seguros. Bolivar" 
several years l a t e r and f i n a l l y becoming vice-president. 
Cendales. i s impressed by his own 
success, by the number of big names, he associates with 
i n business and i n the philanthropies, he actively supports. 
But, i n spite of t h i s pride, he thinks w i s t f u l l y about hia 
lack of formal education, " I f I had had college education. 
I would be. president of the company by now or at least, 
vice-president of the f i n a n c i a l group... I was crazy about; 
school, I was. simply heartbroken about not. going to college. 
I did not go because of finances. I have been associated, 
a l l my l i f e w i t h college men. I have always f e l t that i t 
has. been a. personal loss to me that I did not go to college. 
I t i s contradictory, but I only engage as. managers, college 
graduates. I often f e e l the lack of education, pa r t i c u -
l a r l y when I st:grted my career-. Even now I wonder i f I 
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am expressing myself properly; sometimes I can f o r g e t 
about i t , and t a l k a l o t ; other times I just s i t among, 
a l o t of degrees and l i s t e n * I s t i l l . g e t b u t t e r f l i e s i n 
my stomach when I am to make a speech, but i t seems I 
do better when I do not prepare them"* 
Cendales- revealed that he haa good 
relat i o n s with the people around him i n his organization, 
but he feels a lack of security with those, he considers 
his social and business; superiors.. He has channeled a l l 
of his t r a i n i n g and e f f o r t s into the f i n a n c i a l stream,, 
becoming expert i n t h i s one f i e l d of business, management 
and a valuable o f f i c e r and board member.of his company 
on matters of f i s c a l p c l i c y . But the in t e n s i t y with 
which he haa concentrated his e f f o r t s and the li m i t a t i o n s 
on his c u l t u r a l and social interesta have, to a certain: 
extent, cut him o f f from his new social group. He i s 
very much of the age of the " b r i e f i n g " , of the digest, of 
the two paragraph memos. The reading he has to do, he 
often delegated to others, who c l i p and summarize f o r 
him. He i s a talke r and a li s t e n e r rather than a reader 
or a w r i t e r . He picks up much of what he knows; at the.-
conference table and from friends i n other fields.. 
The story of*the. "social-climbers" i a 
the f u l f i l l m e n t o,f the c a p i t a l i s t dream. Shouldering 
out of t h e i r way the many competitors passed enroute, 
they are .the reaffirmation of our society's great myth: 
"we can a l l get to the top", i t said i f we have the gust. 
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the i n t e l l i g e n c e , the "whatever-it-is-that-it-takes". 
The idea i t s e l f became a powerful force i n reconciling 
large numbers of people to the existence of class society. 
And as the figures show, the places at the top are not. 
open to everyone, even to those with "what i t takes.". 
The "social-climber." mobile men have 
moved ever the longest social distance.. They are iden-
t i f i e d by the f a c t that t h e i r present position i n terms 
of prestige and income i s f a r removed from the occupation 
of t h e i r father - the occupation into v/hich they v/er.a 
.born. The position they now hold i s an example of the 
continual process of social movement that characterizes, 
every phase of t h e i r l i v e s . 
Before a l l , these'men are on the mcve. 
They l e f t t h e i r homes, and a l l that t h i s implies. They 
have l e f t behind a standard of l i v i n g , l e v e l of income, 
and s t y l e of l i f e to adopt a way of l i v i n g , i n most cases-, 
e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from that into which they were bom. 
The mobile man f i r s t of a l l leaves the physical, setting 
of his b i r t h . This includes the house he l i v e d i n , the. 
neighborhood he knew, and i n many cases, even the c i t y 
and region i n which he waa bom.-
This physical departure i s only a small 
part of the t o t a l process of leaving that t h i s mobile 
man undergoes. He must leave behind people as well aa 
places. The friends of e a r l i e r years must be l e f t , f o r 
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acquaintances of the loyver-status past are incompatible 
with the successful present. He must to some degree leave 
his b i r t h family along with friends, clubs and cliques 
of his family and of his youth, i f they in t e r f e r e with 
his m o b ility. For most of the "apcial-climbera" their. 
f amilies vvere, not. a consideration i n t h e i r moves* Fre-
quently they isolate them.:from: t h e i r known upper ciasa 
friends because they consider "they don't-have the proper 
class f o r the high social c i r c l e s " . 
I asked a "social-climber." i f any of 
the men he worked with were close friends and he said: 
"who has any good friends? Maybe one or two, but i f I 
l e f t the present company I'd f i n d new ones and the old 
ones would be forgotten. So would I * Oh, sure., I have 
plenty of frien d s . I could c a l l any bank president i n 
Bogotd and you'd have dinner with him because of my 
friendship with him. But i t doesn't mean anything* 
I learned a long time ago not to form close attachmenta. 
I t ' s easier to f i r e a guy when you are moved ahead of 
him. I think that's very important. Yet I'm f r i e n d l y . 
I make a point of never hurting anyone unnecessarily*."-
" When I asked, him about his. school 
friends., he said: " I don't have time to see my old 
friends, when 1. go to Manizalea* You know, when a. fellow 
succeeda, a l e t of people envy him"* 
In addition to these great departurea, 
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t h i s mo;bile man mus.t leava behind his way of behaving, 
h i a aeta of manners, and his attitudes toward other 
people, of his. early t r a i n i n g . He. must., i n many cas.e.a, 
leam, and employ,new .ways, mannera, and atti t u d e s 
apprcpriate. to his new position^ He leaves his e a r l i e r 
circumstances for. a d i f f e r e n t life., s.tyle, as he mcves 
from: position to. position.. Often each position change 
means leaving a se.t of frienda, mce.ting new persons., 
becoming involved v/ith them, and i n turn leaving that 
group f o r yet another with another positional, move;. 
Friends appropriate, to the; bank.'a cleaner have somehow 
less i n common with i t s auditor, and the auditor's 
f r i e n d a l i t t l e chance to get together with the president 
of. the bank. The auditor's friends, generally, l i v e i n 
a d i f f e r e n t neighborhood from that into which the president 
has..- moved... The cheap and small apartment i n the. "south" 
i s l e f t , behind f o r a bigger and more expensive one i n 
"El. Campin"", a f t e r which the children need to be taken 
to the "north" f o r the. sohools.. - because the place we 
have. I s too small, or because everyone we must know, l i v e s 
i n the. "Reservado de. los Lag.artos" or . i n "El Chico". 
Each of these changes, of houses, and neighborhoods, also^ 
brings: with i t many changes, from home furnishings, t o 
clubs, to vacation habits, to the children's schools. 
This mobile man i s that person who. is. 
able to i n i t i a t e and sustain t h i s complex, interwoven 
series., of changes.. He must learn, rapidly and thoroughly, 
the new behavior i n each new s i t u a t i o n . He must be able 
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to make use of, or create., the opportunities, to.move t a 
a new position. He must be able to leave his past behind 
as he moved in t o each new present* For that reaaon many 
people, of t h e i r e a r l i e r s o c i a l status refer, to them as> 
"oportunistaa", "loboa", "arribistas-" or simply "aocial-
c.limbers.". 
The social mobility of the. "s.ocial.-
climbers." i s not a constant, smooth and uniform process.* 
There: i s a time when he has to make the. "big leap"; 
when he has to croaa the boundaries of. the. upper, class 
or remain i n the middle levels.. In one way or- another 
he has to come into command of a strategic position 
.which allowa him to accumulate money, prestige and 
useful connectiona i n order to go into, the upper class.. 
Once he has', made t h i s "big jump", his p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
becoming a member of the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy w i l l increase, 
considerably. The more strategic his economic and social 
p o s i t i o n , the greater and surer are hia chahcea to reach 
the top. , I found that most of the "social-climbera" esta-
blished themselves-, i n a, "sponsor-prot^gd" relationship 
with highly placed men who provided a model f o r them and, 
more, important, who gave them the opportunity to reach, 
a strategic position so they could pre,par.e themselves 
f o r the "big jump". Many of them, even later, i n l i f e , 
are. able to continue r e l a t i n g themselves easily to figures 
of au t h o r i t y - never too close because disattachment may 
be. necessary, and never too., far. away when conti4uity and 
closeness are. necessary f o r advancement.. How. this, r.elar-.. 
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tionship functions i n the career of a. "social-climber" 
. i s i l l u s t r a t e d by one of them.: "Right a f t e r I arrived, 
on the. job I met the boss.. That maete a l l . the difference! 
From then on I waa on the way up. He took an in t e r e s t 
i n me. The boss and I admired each other; I admired 
h i a intelligence:, power and class and he admired my 
ambition and courage. I t was a case of mutual respect." 
" I moved up with the boss. He was 
vice-president of the bank when I became manager of one. 
of the branches. Then with a fev/'pesos I earned i n 
t h i s job - everybody does the same, managers alv/ays get 
commissions on loans - I decided to go on my own. I 
organized with four other fellows and"imports and exports" 
company. We almost went broke, but we worked l i k e h e l l 
and a f t e r a. while we caught on and i n time expanded and 
took on new a c t i v i t i e s , . We made money and began to 
develop a wonderful team of young men. Then my partners! 
r e t i r e d and I bought them out. A l l through the years I 
saw the boss. In f a c t , he gave us a l l the f i n a n c i a l 
support," 
" I promised the boss then that i f 
ever there was. a r i g h t time and a good opportunity I'd. 
s t i l l be interested i n the Bank. Well, my business went 
along and developed, but i t was never big enough to 
carry out the dream I had. F i n a l l y , he got to be presi-
dent and had complete charge of everything that went on 
at the Bank. He called me when he knew he was set for. 
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action. A l l he said was., "C.amilo., I think i t ' s time 
f o r you; and me to get togetherj I said okay.. I came. 
i n as a vice-president and special assistant to. the boss." 
"The board of directora accepted my 
appo^intment because I had shares, i n the. bank and bexiause; 
I was. supported, by my bosa's. financial-group*" 
, "We. s^tarted immediatly putting our 
ideas; into action, and I had. the opportunity to carry 
them out: because the bos.a tr.us,te.d me and had. to give his, 
attention to o.ther matters. When the boss, r e t i r e d , the 
board, made, me president. " 
Another, way of. preparing themaelVea 
for. the "big jump" was. by marrying up. I t replaced, in. 
some cases the lacking of i n f l u e n t i a l family contacts. 
and, i n many ways., put them i n the position of equal, 
opportunities, with the. "well-bom" f i n a n c i a l oligarchy. 
Only f i f t e e n per cent: of. the ""socialr-c limber a" married up 
and a l l , of them were, ciillege. graduates... Therefore, educa-
t i o n seems to hav.e big effect: on marriage, betv/een "social-
climbers" and the upper clasa. 
For the majority of the. "socialf-climbera" 
the ambition of getting a. better social statua haa been 
a. great atimulus i n the process of mo.ving up» They always 
wanted to escape from t h e i r previous social atatus,. 
They always wanted to catch up with . . . or to be better 
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than «. . .; to have a better atatus than his cousins, to-
prove to his neighbors he edn be "una persona descents;"-
or "to catch up with his school friends", etc.. How this., 
social ambition functions i n the career of a. "social-
climber"' is. i l l u s t r a t e d by one of them: 
Asked f o r childhood memoriea, he said: 
" I t was. j u s t hard work, period.. I t was: hard., work on 
my wife's side too,. That's, why we appreciate, money today." 
"A kid I knew had the. most of any of 
the fellows I played with. His father, had. a good position.. 
He got a. new. au i t a l l the time.. That's, what I used to. 
admire, him for.." 
" I f i t hadn't been for. my mother I couldn't 
have gone to college. She helped, encouraged me to get 
an education, I worked three years a f t e r graduating from, 
high school and made enough money to pay the f i r s t year, of. 
college. I was the only one of the four children to go 
to college. My mother's s i s t e r c r i t i c i z e d her f o r allowing 
me to go to college at a l l . You know, a l l the time I 
worked those threes years. I did not apend any money at a l l , 
none at a l l ; I gave i t a l l to my mother.." 
" I don't, know, though. I associated, i n 
high school, with a.group of f o l k who had more money than 
I , V/hen we got out of high school. I waa the only one who. 
did not go on to college, but I waa determined to go, I 
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waa determined to catch up with them. So. I set about 
working that out v/ith my mother's help and encouragement.. 
She did not l e t me lose sight of that. I worked three 
years, a f t e r high school, and I worked a l l . the tima I 
went to college." 
"Another reason I wanted to go to 
college.was. that I waa determined to prove to my mother's 
family that. I could be. "somebody".. He indicated, at several 
points, i n the interviev/. that his parents' relations with 
t h e i r families was a strained one. "There were, alwaya 
clashes, between my father.'s side of the family and my 
mother's, side because her peo-ple were.. c.onsidere.d "de 
mejor. f a m i l i a " , and we were, never, considered part of the. 
family because we didn't have "the class;"• 
Another, important characteristic of. 
m.o^ t of the/"social-climbers." was. t h e i r enormous concentra-
t i o n on t h e i r business, careera. They showed up i n the 
interviews to be devoting almost a l l of t h e i r energies to 
the forwarding of t h e i r business careers., the company they 
were with, and t h e i r position i n the company. V/hen these, 
men described t h e i r community a c t i v i t i e s , i t waa i n terma 
of the "Camara de Comercio"^ (Chamber of Commerce.), aaaocia-
tions. of manufacturers, bankers, or r e t a i l e r a , i n general, 
groups and organizations that are an immediate extension 
of the business a c t i v i t i e s engaged i n . As one said, 
"Sobbies;? I guesa my business; i s my hobby." Even i n 
the choice of vacations business concerns predominate.^ 
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An expression of t h i s came i n the remark of one of them. 
"Anywhere. I go Itm pretty close to my business. There's 
always a tendency to connect the l o c a l i t y with your busi-
nesa. You can't drive through Cali without thinking t h i a 
or that town would be good f o r a branch." 
This d r i v i n g concentration on the 
business career i s i n a way necessary to mobility. The. 
task of moving through the busihaesa hierarchy i s a de-
manding one and requires intensive focusing of interes.ta, 
energies and s k i l l s . But a contradiction appears, f o r 
t h i s necessary concentration on business makes i t d i f f i c u l t 
f o r some of them to develop the broader interests, and 
a c t i v i t i e s necessary to participate with the kind of 
people they encounter as they move up i n the business 
and social hierarchy. No doubt, the many accusations of 
provincialism and boorishness directed toward the. "social-
climber" are to some extent a result of t h i s problem. To 
be a- "social-climber", i n the derogatory aense i n which 
i t i s used, means i n part that energy and attention have; 
not been given to becoming the more sophisticated and 
l i t e r a t e person his c r i t i c s would have him be... 
The "social-climber" confronts i n the^ 
course of his career a dual task. He must achieve and 
maintain his o.ccupational position i n the business ' 
hierarchy, and he must establish himself and his family 
as accepted members of the status., of "rulers" of the 
c a p i t a l i s t class. These tv/o tasks, are interdependent 
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and occur as., interwoven and interacting themes, i n the 
l i f e of the business man.. His occupationsl mobility 
provides him the income and some of the prestige on 
which his status depends, and also his status position 
can advance or impede his progress i n the business, hierarchy, 
THE "WELL-BOEN" MOBIIE PINANCIAL OLIGAECHY 
The "well-bom" mobile financial, 
oligarchy, 39 per cent of the sample, i s represented 
by men whose fathers were members of the "upper clasa"; 
big commercial and i n d u s t r i a l enterpreneura (25^^) and. 
big landowners (14^). Although t h e i r familiea do not 
come from the " b i r t h oligarchy", they have the great 
advantage of being bom i n the "upper class"» The 
occupational and family background of these mobile men 
are very important i n shaping t h e i r careers. The kind 
of education they receive, the kind of kinship and 
friendship connections they have, the kind of women they 
married, the kind of jobs they take, etc., a l l are affected 
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y by the kind of family they come from. 
The degree to which a.family affects 
the career varies with the family's social position. 
Many of the. "social-climbera" have rejected t h e i r families 
of b i r t h and climbed up away from them. They have rejected, 
that way of l i f e which, f a r from helping them, would 
impede t h e i r progress or make i t impossible. Men born to 
the "well-born" mobile oligarchy, on the other hand, 
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have families who, f o r the most part, expect them to stay 
i n high positions and reinforce t h e i r careera with social 
and economic powers. 
Thes.e. mobile men s t a r t t h e i r careera 
with the advantage of having a very "y/ell connected" family. 
On average, each of t h e i r families had close friendship 
t i e s with four members of the congress., two ministers, 
ten big business men and four important executives of. 
foreign enterprises. Among t h e i r kin were to be found 
diplomats, big businessmen, large landowners., important 
p o l i t i c i a n s , army o f f i c e r s and members of the f i n a n c i a l , 
oligarchy. 
A l l the advantages, of being bom i n 
the upper class and the ambition of becoming the "rulera 
of society" make the "v/ell-born" mobile oligarchy the 
group v/ith more formal education. Eighty-five per cent 
of them had some sort of further education. Seventy-nine, 
per. cent had attended university. And sixty-eight per-
cent had studied abroad.-
Though the majority of them had some 
sort of university q u a l i f i c a t i o n , theyi.imahipulated..kinship 
and friendship t i e s to secure positions during the 
course of t h e i r careers. This can best be seen by looking 
at the career of a t y p i c a l successful "well-born" mobile, 
mani 
Ignacio Copete (the name i s f i c t i t i o u a ) 
164, 
was president of a very important commercial bank i n 
Colombia "Banco de Bogotd".. . Copete was. bom i n Manizalea 
and came from a high status family. His grandfather was 
a. large landowner and his father an engineer and a p o l i -
t i c i a n v/ho worked f o r the gbvemment. Copete went to a 
prestigious school i n Bogotd "El Gimnacio Modemo.", and 
then to C a l i f o r n i a University i n the United States., where 
he studied o i l engineering,. As well as t h i s he had taken, 
numerous courses i n accounting, sales and buainess adminis-
t r a t i o n i n d i f f e r e n t Colombian and foreign u n i v e r s i t i e a , 
Copete had the following joba: 
1934-1945 • O i l engineering of "Mobil O i l de 
Colombia".. He got t h i s job through a 
recommendation from California University. 
1945-1951 Assistant General Manager of "Mobil O i l 
de Colombia".. An old f r i e n d of his waa 
running an American organization at the 
time and so he got the job through him. 
1951-1957 General Llanager of "Raymon Concrete", 
He got t h i s job through a recommendation 
from one of the members of "Mobil O i l 
de Colombia" board of directors.. 
1957-1958 Minister of Agriculture. He got t h i s 
job through his good p o l i t i c a l connections 
his father was one of the president's 
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beat f r i e n d s - and through his great, 
knowledge and experience i n Colombian 
a g r i c u l t u r e * 
1958-1962 Vice-president of " l a t i n American Mo.bil 
O i l " i n New York. 
1962. . . . President of "Banco de Bogota." and 
"Grupo. Bogotd". 
Copete belonged to three of the most 
prestigious clubs i n Colombia:: "The Country Club", "The 
Jokey Club" and "Club de Ejecutivos" to. which most businesa-
men belonged.. 
I n f l u e n t i a l connections and educational, 
requirements such as: degrees from colfflmbian u n i v e r s i t i e s , 
and professional courses of further education, are monopolized, 
by high status, groups.* Clearly high s.tatus makes, i t easier 
to make good connections through exclusive schooling, 
membership to prestigious clubs, kin ties;, etc. But the; 
importance attached to t r a i n i n g and q u a l i f i c a t i o n also 
gives an advantage to the potential mobile men from high 
status backgrounds.. Attendance at a university outside of 
Colombia requires a large f i n a n c i a l outlay. This kind of 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s clearly only a v a i l a b l e to the wealthy.. 
Iit.is.::.very;,pf!eS;tigious, however, and similar Colombian courses-
were considered by many poor i n comparison to the- North 
American degree f o r instance. The most'valued form of. 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n i n the i n d u s t r i a l and f i n a n c i a l sectors, then 
166 
waa only available to high status groups... 
Colombian educational opportunity i s 
affected by social s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . Approximately 37 per 
cent of Colombians 15 years of age and older are i l l i t e r a t e (L), 
Five per cent of those over school, age have completed secon-
dary and less than one per cent higher education (2). I n 
1962, with a population of 15.000..000 people, Colombia, 
had the following student population: 
1»791.813. students iix primary school 
160.880 " " secondary school. 
30,416 " " university 
2.495 " graduating from university (3-) 
And i t has been estimated that only 14 
per cent of the high school student and 7 per cent of the 
university si;udents i n Colombia are of working class, 
orig i n s ( 4 ) , When one considers that workers, peasants, 
and low-level service workers make up about 80 per cent. 
of the Colombian population, the proportion that b e n e f i t s 
from higher education seems extremely small. 
In Colombia success at school i s s t i l l 
very closely related to the social and economic statua 
of the parents. In Bogotd i i i ' 1962, out of every one 
hundred children entering school from the "upper clasa"', 
seventy-two passed i n secondary school. Out of every one 
hundred from the "middle class", the number entering 
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secondary school was thir t y - t w o and from the lower clasa, 
fourteen (5.)» 
I t i s true that primary education i s 
free and that t u i t i o n fees, at Colombian State Universities, 
are small. But many families simply can not afford the 
cost of foregoing income from the student i n addition to 
the expenditure of school and university supplies which 
becomes, too big a burden over the years.. Moreover, univer-
s i t y courses are lengthy which means that a student 
embarking on one haa to f i n d the resources to support 
himself f o r three to six years.. Engineering courses., f o r 
example, are mostly six years., though to qu a l i f y as. a 
technician i s only three... Qualification i n accounting 
and commercial expertise require f i v e years. Por a degree 
i n Economics and Finance, four years i s the minimum period 
of study. 
Thus, l i k e the degree from a foreign 
u n i v e r s i t y , Colombian fu r t h e r education courses which 
v/ere highly valued i n a mobile man's career v/ere i n 
general the prerogative of high status groupa. 
THE "BIRTH" PINAJMCIAL OLIGARCHY 
The " b i r t h " f i n a n c i a l oligarchy, 46 per 
cent of the sample, are at the other extreme, f o r they are 
the i n h e r i t o r s who r e t a i n the position t h e i r father holds, 
before them. Their careers do not f i t the ever-fascinating. 
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drama of hard-won success Colombians, stage f o r themselves.. 
Indeed t h e i r l i v e a , by v i r t u e of the seeming ease of suc-
cession to high position, are i n every sense a denial of. 
the " c a p i t a l i s t dream" and the ref u t a t i o n of i t s principles 
of equal opportunity. The background of these men make 
t h e i r careers, less t r y i n g , less d i f f i c u l t , than the career 
task of the "social-climber" and "well-bom" mobile men. 
The " b i r t h " oligarchy tended to s t a r t 
t h e i r careers with f ^ i l i e s better connected than the rest 
of the group. On average, each of t h e i r families had 
close friendship t i e s with 6 members of the congress, 
three ministers, ten big businessmen, six executives of. 
foreign enterprises and one ex-president's family. 
In addition to a l l the advantages, they 
have f o r having an upper class background - wealthy 
f a m i l i e s , good connections, great educational opportunities, 
etc,,- they also have the enormous advantage of having 
families who are big shareholders, i n f i n a n c i a l groups. 
Therefore the majority of them s t a r t t h e i r careers, knowing 
what t h e i r business positions w i l l be;,. 
The " b i r t h " , oligarchy has. more formal 
education than the "social-climbera" but less than the 
"well-bom" mobile men. Eighty per cent of them had some 
sort of f u r t h e r education. Sixty-nine per cent had attended 
u n i v e r s i t y . And sixty-three per cent had studied abroad. 
Although they are confronted with the task of occupational 
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mobility - they must compete successfully with the rest 
of the group and must move from one position to another 
before succeding to t h e i r father's, position - to be 
successful, these men need less formal education than the 
rest of the group because they can replace educational 
requirements more easily f o r shares and connections,.. 
Their class, privileges, can be seen i n 
the case of one of them: 
Ricardo Pombo (the name is. f i c t i t i o u s . ) 
was president of "El Grupo Grancolombiano" a. very important 
f i n a n c i a l group,;and General Manager of "Banco de Colombia", 
one of the biggest banks i n Colombia.. 
Pombo. was. bom i n Bogotd. (Colombia) and 
came from a high status family. His family have been one 
of the biggest shareholders of the "Banco de Colombia."' 
and "Bavaria", Among his kin were to be found, diplomata, 
big businessmen, landowners and two ex.-presidents of 
Colombia, Pombo went to a prestigious school i n Bogotd., 
"Colegio de los Hermanos Slaristas" and then to the Univer-
s i t y "El Rosario" v/here he studied law and economica, 
Pombo had the following joba: 
1948-1953 Accountant of "Pavimentadora El. Recuerdo" 
General Secretary of "J. L. Bonnet y Cia S. A. 
Assistant Manager of "Urbanizadora El. Ejido" 
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1953-1959. General Secretary of " l a Nacional de.:Seguroa" 
1959-1969 President of a l l the companies members of. 
the "Grupo Andino" 
1969 . . . President of "El Grupo Grancolombianc" and 
"Banco de. Colombia" 
Professor of Colombian Economics, at "La 
Javeriana. and "El Rosario." universitiea. 
Pombo waa member of the following boards 
of directora: "Funicular a Monserrate S. A."j 
"Inversiones Bogotd."', "La. Javeriana Univer-
sity"- and "Los. Andes. University".. 
Pombo belonged to three prestigious clubs, 
i n Bogotd: "Jockey Club" , "Gun ClubJ"- and 
"Club E l Rincon/'v 
When I . asked about his family support, 
he re p l i e d : "The family nanie did't hurt. In f a c t i t 
helped a l o t i n my career. After a l l , my family i s a. 
strong shareholder i n t h i s group.. But I know i f I had 
not possessed a b i l i t y I vfould never have been allowed to 
reach any position of importance i n t h i s bank. You know! 
my family i s not the only big shareholder i n t h i s "Financial 
Group", Besides the bank can't afford to be run by some.-
one who i s not competant. Perhaps I shouldn't say this., 
I know i t ' s immodest, but to make my point — one of my 
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cousins t r i e d to do much what I've done. He.just didn't 
have i t . Maybe because he didn't have the r i g h t q u a l i f i - ' 
cations or simply because he didn't have the a b i l i t y to 
get my. position." 
The " b i r t h " oligarchy and the. "v/ell-bom"' 
mobile oligarchy eyes the "social-climbers." and thinks of 
them as too-conscious, as. having made money and as grab-
bing f o r more, but as. not having acquired the social back-
ground or the s.tyle of cultured l i f e b e f i t t i n g t h e i r f i nan-
c i a l rank, 
V/hen the "social-climber" come up against 
the prestige of the " b i r t h " oligarchy and the "v/ell-bom" 
mobile oligarchy on business and p o l i t i c a l issues, they 
often translate that prestige into "old age", which is. 
associated i n t h e i r minds with the quiet, "old-fashioned" 
manner, and the dragging p o l i t i c a l views of the old upper, 
class. They f e e l that the old upper class people do not 
use t h e i r prestige to make money i n t h e i r manner. They 
see old aocial prestige mainly i n i t s p o l i t i c a l and economic, 
relevance: when they do not have i t , i t i s aome.thing 
standing i n t h e i r v/ay. 
These differences need not be pushed 
too f a r . Successful "§ocial-climber.a" are eaaily assimilated, 
i n t o the old upper class, both i n t h e i r style of l i f e and 
i n t h e i r outlook. Some may r e t a i n a. lingering sense of 
t h e i r antecedents, but t h i s i s unlikely to be of great. 
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consequence, so c i a l l y or ideologically. Wealth, i n t h i s 
r e s t r i c t e d sense at least, i s the great l e v e l l e r , "Social-
climbers" i n Colombia have been able to supplement capital-
is.t cash with upper-cachet. But wealth i s also a great, 
l e v e l l e r i n ideological and p o l i t i c a l terms. 
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^ CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIOIIS-
I f the power to decide national issues 
were- shared, i n an absolutely equal way, there would be 
no powerful f i n a n c i a l oligarchy; i n f a c t , there would 
be no gradation of power, but only a ra d i c a l homogeneity* 
At the opposite extreme, i f the power to decide issues, 
were absolutely monopolized by one small group, there-
would be no. gradation of power; there would simply be 
t h i s small group i n command, and below i t the undif-
ferentiated., dominated massea, Colombian society today 
represents; neither the one noi? the other of these ex-
tremes... Although the upper classes, i n Colombia control, 
the majority of the means of production and p o l i t i c a l , 
power, the c a p i t a l i s t class as a whole (and within i t 
the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy) has more control. Therefore 
there i s a gradation of power. The advent of finance 
c a p i t a l has created an oligarchy within the c a p i t a l i s t , 
class i t s e l f . The top groupings, of finance c a p i t a l have 
constituted c o l l e c t i v e l y the top stratum of the c a p i t a l i s t 
class, and i n e f f e c t , decide policy, acting not simply 
with a view of t h e i r own particular interests, but from 
t h e i r conception of the interests of t h e i r class as a 
whole. The p o l i t i c a l rule of the finaace c a p i t a l i s not 
a matter of absolute power. I t i s a matter of pursuing 
class interests, i n conditions of class struggle on a 
national and i n t e r n a t i o n a l scale.. 
Financial c a p i t a l i s controlled by 
f i n a n c i a l groups, which are composed of a linkage of 
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banks, insurance companies, f i n a n c i a l corporations, 
savings and loan corporations, warehouses, investment 
t r u s t s , development funds, the central bank and great 
commercial and i n d u s t r i a l enterprises. This linkage 
i s affected by a small number of individuals: top 
shareholders, chairmen of the boards, presidents, vice 
presidents, and others, who comprise top management* 
They may thus be said to preside over a combination of 
functions and thereby acquire a good measure of control 
over a s l i c e of capitalism's sphere of operations.. 
I t i s clear that the fundamental notion 
of the separation of ownership and control i n Colombian 
f i n a n c i a l oligarchy i s not true.- There i s a close con-
nection between the owners and the managers of the finan-
c i a l c a p i t a l . In several respects., i n the f i r s t place,, 
the managers.are very often owners, i n the sense that 
they have substantial shareholding i n t h e i r companies; 
and although shareholdings may be quite widely dispersed 
t h i s only makes i t easier f o r a small number, of large 
shareholders to control the policies of the financial, 
group. Secondly, even when managers are not important 
shareholders i n t h e i r own groups, they are usually quite 
wealthy men; as C, Wright M i l l s points, out i n "The Pov/er 
E l i t e " (p. 119), "The chief executive and the very r i c h 
are not two d i s t i n c t , and c l e a r l y segregated, groupa* 
They are both very much mixed up i n the corporate- world, 
of property and privilege . . ."• Thirdly, they are mutual-
l y interested i n high p r o f i t s and prof i t a b l e expansion. 
They a l l f i n d an objective standard i n pr o f i t s , and t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n to the c a p i t a l employed. Success i n making 
p r o f i t and, on the basis of t h i s p r o f i t , maintaining and 
expanding one's share of the market i n order to increase 
p r o f i t - t h i s i s the d r i v i n g force of the f i n a n c i a l group, 
i t s owners and contro l l e r s . Failure i s measured by 
being swallowed up or going bankrupt. Fourthly, as we 
have seen, the recruitment of managers and shareholders, 
i s predominantly from the upper strata of society,. I t 
i s evident, then, that these factors destroy the notion 
of the top managers, having become i n any rea l sense isolated 
from the top shareholder, or of t h e i r being motivated 
p r i n c i p a l l y by prestige, power or any of the other catch-
words, and so becoming somehow a r b i t r a r y i n t h e i r judge.-
ments. 
By studying the backgrounds and careers, 
of the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy, i t was possible to see the 
social movement and l i f e chances i n t h i s important area, 
of our society.. To the extent that the majority of 
the men who dir e c t Colombian f i n a n c i a l groups are the 
sons of the upper class, our social system may be said 
to be closed, f o r that extent the higher positions i n 
our f i n a n c i a l system are available almost exclusively 
to those whose families have power and prestige. I t 
i s easy to see that even the upward mobile man of today, • 
bom i n a low position, who possesses the necessary pluck, 
" w i l l - t o - d o " , and a b i l i t y to accumulate, can not, i n 
most cases, work his way into, a top position of financial. , 
c a p i t a l , -
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The infusion of new blood into the 
f i n a n c i a l oligarchy may present a competitive threat to 
individuals who are already there, but t h i ^ i s no threat 
to the system i t s e l f . Even a f a r more "meritocratic" 
way to the top, grafted to the existing, economic system, 
would only ensure that a large number of people of not 
upper-class o r i g i n would occup^rythe; to.p rungs of the 
"'existing system". This may be desirable, but i t would. 
not cause i t s transformation into a "d i f f e r e n t system.". 
The a b i l i t y of the existing top f i n a n c i a l groups i n 
Colombia to absorb (and so to contain) "new men at the 
top" i s a s t r i k i n g sign of the f l e x i b i l i t y of finance 
capital.: Again the common class interest asserts i t s e l f . 
Marx himself pointed out that. 
The more a r u l i n g class i s able to 
assimilate the foremost minds of a 
ruled class, the more stable and dangerous, 
becomes i t s r u l e . (Capital. Yol. 3, Ch.36 
pg. 4:7.) 
Although, as we saw, members of the 
f i n a n c i a l oligarchy are often divided over a multitude 
of specific policies and issues, i n general, they are: 
s o c i a l l y cohesive. For what divisions there may have.-
existed among them about private property, practicable 
p r o f i t , economic development, foreign investment, trade 
unions, e t c , occurred inside a f i e l d of conservative 
options, and severely excluded any other... There may 
have been some differences among the members of the 
f i n a n c i a l oligarchy who wished f o r rapid democratization, 
but h i s t o r y does not record a massive degree of pressure 
on the part of any segment of the Colombian financial-
oligarchy on behalf of the nationalization of wealth, f o r 
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a r a d i c a l extension of social benefits, or f o r an exten-
sion of trade union rights.. 
Specific differences among the f i n a n c i a l 
oligarchy, however genuine they may be i n a variety of. 
ways, are safely contained within a p a r t i c u l a r ideological 
spectrum, and do not preclude a basic p o l i t i c a l consensus 
i n regard to the c r u c i a l issues of economic and p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e . One obvious manifestation of t h i s f a c t i s the 
support which the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy accord to the "Frente 
Nacional" - l i b e r a l and conservative party alliance. 
D i f f e r e n t segments of the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy may support 
eit h e r the l i b e r a l or the conservative party;, but they 
do not tend to support anti-Frente nacional ones.. 
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